Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Pick Manufacturing Co. v. General Motors Corp.

Pick Mfg. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 299 U.S. 3 (1936)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1936-10-26
Topic
general

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Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Pick Manufacturing Co. v. General Motors Corp.. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
51 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Antitrust & Competition Law — Tying A contractual provision by which a motor vehicle manufacturer requires its dealers not to sell, offer for sale, or use in repairs second-hand or used parts or any parts not manufactured or authorized by the manufacturer is subject to challenge under § 3 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits conditioning the lease, sale, or contract for sale of goods on the purchaser's agreement not to use or deal in the goods of a competitor, where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
  2. Antitrust & Competition Law — Substantial Lessening of Competition To establish a violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act based on a restrictive provision in a dealer contract, the evidence must show that the effect of the provision is substantially to lessen competition or to create a monopoly in a line of commerce; a finding that the clause had not in any way substantially lessened competition or created a monopoly in any line of commerce precludes relief.
  3. Civil Procedure — Standard of Review An appellate court accepts findings of fact in which two lower courts concur unless clear error is shown.
Per Curiam.

By this suit petitioner challenged the validity under § 3 of the Clayton Act (38 Stat. 730, 731, 15 U. S. C. 14) of a provision of the contracts made with dealers by selling organizations of the General Motors Corporation. The provision in the contract between the Chevrolet Motor Company and dealers is as follows:

“Dealer agrees that he will not sell, offer for sale, or use in the repair of Chevrolet motor vehicles and chassis second-hand or used parts or any part or parts not manufactured by or authorized by the Chevrolet Motor Company. It - is agreed that Dealer is not granted any *4 exclusive selling rights in genuine new Chevrolet parts or accessories.”

There is a similar provision in contracts made by the Buick company.

The District Court dismissed the bill of complaint for want of equity and its decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 80 F. (2d) 641. Upon the evidence adduced at the trial the District Court found that the effect of the clause had not been in any way substantially to lessen competition or to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. This finding was sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Id., p. 644.

Under the established rule, this Court accepts the findings in which two courts concur unless clear error is shown. Stuart v. Hayden, 169 U. S. 1, 14; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 232 U. S. 338; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 558; United States v. Commercial Credit Co., 286 U. S. 63, 67; Continental Bank v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 294 U. S. 648, 678. Applying this rule, the decree is

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Van Devanter, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Roberts took no part in the consideration and decision of this cause.