Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad v. Industrial Commission
Chi. & E. Ill. R.R. v. Indus. Comm’n, 284 U.S. 296 (1932)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1932-01-04
- Topic
- general
Mr. Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of the Court. Thomas, an employee of the railroad company, in attempting to oil an electric motor while it was running, was injured by having his hand caught in the gears. The railroad was engaged, in both intrastate and interstate commerce. The motor furnished power for hoisting coal into a chute, to be taken therefrom by, and for the use of, locomotive engines principally employed in . the movement of interstate freight.
Citator
Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad v. Industrial Commission has been questioned or limited by later authorities: relies on overruled authority: 40 S. Ct. 454 (overruled by Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad v. Industrial Commission, 284 U.S. 296 (1932)). Read them before relying on it. 102 later decisions cite it.
- Authority status
- caution
- Cited by
- 102 opinions
Headnotes
- Labor & Employment Law — Federal Employers' Liability Act — Scope of Interstate Employment A railway employee whose work consists of oiling an electric motor used to hoist coal into a chute, from which the coal is taken for use by locomotives principally employed in moving interstate freight, is not engaged in interstate transportation, or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it, and an injury sustained while so occupied is therefore not within the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 284 U.S. 296, 297
- Labor & Employment Law — Federal Employers' Liability Act — Test for Interstate Employment The test for determining whether an employee is engaged in interstate commerce at the time of injury is whether the employee was then engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it; putting a supply of coal in a convenient place from which it could be taken as required for use bears no such close or direct relation to interstate transportation. 284 U.S. 296, 299–300 (quoting Shanks v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 239 U.S. 556, 558, and Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U.S. 177, 180)
- Labor & Employment Law — Federal Employers' Liability Act — Prior Decisions Overruled Prior decisions treating employees who supplied water or dried sand for locomotives as engaged in interstate commerce substituted the phrase "interstate commerce" for "interstate transportation" and thus failed to follow the governing test; those decisions are out of harmony with the general current of authority and are overruled, and the rule that work bearing no close or direct relation to interstate transportation is not within the Act is authoritative. 284 U.S. 296, 300–302 (overruling Erie R. Co. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77, and Erie R. Co. v. Szary, 253 U.S. 86)
CHICAGO E.I.R. CO.v. COMMISSION,284 U.S. 296(1932)
52 S.Ct. 151
CHICAGO EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD CO.v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
ILLINOIS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS.
No. 79.
Argued December 1, 1931.
Decided January 4, 1932.
CERTIORARI,post, p. 599, to review a judgment affirming an
award of compensation for personal injuries under a state
workmen's compensation act. The Supreme Court of Illinois
declined to review.
The railroad company contended, and an arbitrator, appointed by the commission, found, that the work in which Thomas was engaged was in interstate commerce, that the case, therefore, was not within the state act and the commission was without jurisdiction. The commission, on review, held otherwise and awarded compensation aggregating $2,184.64. The court below affirmed the award upon a writ of certiorari authorized by state statute. The state supreme court, in the exercise of its discretion, declined to review the judgment; and the case isPage 298properly here on certiorari to the state circuit court.AmericanRy. Express Co. v.Levee,263 U.S. 19,20;Western Union Tel.Co. v.Crovo,220 U.S. 364,366.
The contention that Thomas was employed in interstate commerce at the time of the injury, rests upon the decisions of this court inErie R. Co. v.Collins,253 U.S. 77, andErie R. Co. v.Szary,253 U.S. 86. In theCollinscase the employee, at the time of his injury, was operating a gasoline engine to pump water into a tank for the use of locomotives engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce. In theSzarycase the duty of the employee was to dry sand by the application of heat for the use of locomotives operating in both kinds of commerce; and he was so employed when injured. In each case this court held that the employee was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the injury, within the terms of the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
The only difference between those cases and this one is that here the work of the employee related to coal, while in theCollinscase it related to water, and in theSzarycase, to sand. Obviously, the difference is not one of substance and if theCollinsandSzarycases are followed a reversal of the judgment below would result.
But inChicago, B. Q.R. Co. v.Harrington,241 U.S. 177, the injured employee was engaged in taking coal from storage tracks to bins or chutes for the use of locomotives used in the movement of both interstate and intrastate traffic; and this court held that the service was not in interstate commerce. After quoting the test for determining whether an employee is engaged in interstate commerce, laid down inShanksv.Delaware, L.W.R. Co.,239 U.S. 556,558, namely, "was the employe at the time of the injury engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it," this court said (p. 180), "Manifestly, therePage 299was no such close or direct relation to interstate transportation in the taking of the coal to the coal chutes. This was nothing more than the putting of the coal supply in a convenient place from which it could be taken as required for use."
We are unable to reconcile this decision with the rule deducible from theCollinsandSzarycases, and it becomes our duty to determine which is authoritative. From a reading of the opinion in theCollinscase, it is apparent that the test of theShankscase was not followed (see p. 85), the words "interstate commerce" being inadvertently substituted for the words "interstate transportation" TheSzarycase is subject to the same criticism, since it simply followed theCollinscase. Both cases are out of harmony with the general current of the decisions of this court since theShankscaseChicago NorthWestern Ry. Co. v.Bolle, ante, p. 74, and they are now definitely overruled. TheHarringtoncase furnishes the correct rule, and, applying it, the judgment below must beAffirmed.