Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Commonwealth & Dominion Line, Ltd.

278 U.S. 427

Type: Opinion
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: Federal
Date: 1929-01-21
Topic: general

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered'the opinion of the Court. This is a libel in admiralty against the United States as owner of the steam collier Proteus to recover damages caused by á collision .with the libellant’s vessel Port Phillip. The District Court and the Circuit' Court of *428 Appeals agreed in finding that the Proteus alone was in' fault, but the Circuit Court of Appeals modified the decree against the United States by allowing interest on the damages found. 20 F. (2d) 729.

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed United States v. Commonwealth & Dominion Line, Ltd.. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by: 13 opinions

UNITED STATESv. COMMONWEALTH LINE,278 U.S. 427(1929)

49 S.Ct. 183

UNITED STATESv. COMMONWEALTH AND DOMINION LINE, LTD.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 21.

Argued January 7, 1929.

Decided January 21, 1929.

In a proceeding in admiralty against the United States for collision losses, a special act granting jurisdiction to enter a decree in favor of either party for the amount of damages and costs "upon the same principles and measures of liability as in like cases in admiralty between private parties and with the same rights of appeal" is to be construed strictly, and no interest could be allowed against the United States, though it filed a cross libel.TheThekla,266 U.S. 328, distinguished. P. 427.20 F.2d 729, reversed.

CERTIORARI,275 U.S. 521, to a judgment of the Circuit Court

of Appeals affirming an award of damages against the United

States in a collision case and adding interest. The suit was

brought by the present respondent under a special Act of

Congress. The United States prosecuted a cross libel.

Assistant Attorney General Farnum, with whomSolicitorGeneral Mitchell, andMessrs. J. Frank StaleyandJohn T.Fowler, Jr., were on the brief, for the United States.Mr. Allan B.A. Bradley, with whomMr. George deF. Lordwas on the brief, for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a libel in admiralty against the United States as owner of the steam collier Proteus to recover damages caused by a collision with the libellant's vessel Port Phillip. The District Court and the Circuit Court ofPage 428Appeals agreed in finding that the Proteus alone was in fault, but the Circuit Court of Appeals modified the decree against the United States by allowing interest on the damages found.20 F.2d 729. A writ of certiorari was granted by this Court to review the decision as to interest, consideration of the question to await the decision of this Court in the case ofBoston Sandand Gravel Co. v.United States, which now has been decided,ante, p. 41, and in which interest was denied.

Jurisdiction inBoston Sand and Gravel Co. v.UnitedStateswas granted by a special act authorizing judgment "for the amount of the legal damages sustained by reason of said collision, . . . upon the same principle and measure of liability with costs as in like cases in admiralty between private parties, with the same rights of appeal." It was held in view of the history of legislation that the words were to be taken strictly and that no interest could be allowed against the United States. The present suit is based upon the special Act of March 4, 1923, c. 321;42 Stat. 1796, where the language is substantially the same, except that it is further qualified; jurisdiction of the suit is granted "to the extent only of such damages suffered other than claims for the demurrage to [the Port Phillip] and to enter a judgment or decree for the amount of such damages and costs, if any, as shall be found to be due against the United States in favor of the owner of the British steamer Port Phillip or against such owner in favor of the United States, upon the same principles and measures of liability as in like cases in admiralty between private parties and with the same rights of appeal." The only ground of distinction favorable to the Port Phillip is that in this case the United States filed a cross libel. It is urged that in view of that fact the principle ofUnited Statesv.The Thekla,266 U.S. 328, applies.

But the difference between the two cases is plain. InTheTheklathe United States came into Court of its ownPage 429motion as a libellant, and it was held that when the sovereign thus voluntarily brought itself within the jurisdiction in a collision case it should be assumed to agree that justice should be done with regard to the subject matter, and therefore that it might be held liable in damages if its vessel was in fault. The main question in the case was whether the United States could be held at all. When that point was decided interest was allowed as generally it would be allowed against a private party, there being nothing to qualify the submission found to be implied. But in the present case the United States is brought into Court to defend its property under a statute that marks the limits of the liability assumed. The cross libel is really an incident of the suit, contemplated by the very words of the special act which provide for a decree in favor of either party, and it would be absurd to say that if the United States resorted to the usual instruments of defence the statute authorized what otherwise it did not allow.Decree reversed.