Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Gypsy Oil Co. v. Escoe
275 U.S. 498
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1927-11-21
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- after the special master refused to disgorge excessive pay, requiring the special master to show cause why he should not be disbarred and punished for contempt
- “If ... a timely motion for leave to file [a] second petition [for rehearing] is granted, and the petition is actually entertained by the Court, then the time within which application may be made ... for certiorari begins to run from the day when the Court denies such second petition.”
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Gypsy Oil Co. v. Escoe. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 13 opinions
This petition.for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma is denied.
The application was. not made in accordance with § 8 .(a), act óf February 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 940, which provides:
“ No writ of error, appeal, or. writ of certiorari shall be allowed, or entertained unless application therefor be duly made within three' months after the entry of such judgment or decree * *
The judgment of the Supreme Court was entered March 22, 1927. A timely petition for rehearing was . denied June 14, 1927.' On June 18, 1927, an application for leave to file a second petition for rehearing was endorsed:
“ Leave granted to file — Fred C. Branson, Chief Justice.”
“ On August 2, 1927, as appears from the minutes, the following proceedings were taken by the court:
' “ Gypsy Oil Company v. Escoe, et aL Application for leave to file a second petition for rehearing denied; application for. oral argument dénied. Fred C. Branson, Chief Justice.”
. On September 30,' 1927, more than three months after denial'of the petition for rehearing (June 14), the present petition for certiorari was filed. -
The running of the-time within which’proceedings.may be initiated here to bring up 'judgment or decree for review is suspended by the seasonable filing of a petition for *499 rehearing. But it begins to run from the date of denial of such petition and further suspension can not be obtained by the mere presentation of a motion for leave to file a second request for rehearing. Morse v. United States, 270 U. S. 151, 153, 154.
Messrs. Chester I. Long, George E. Chamberlain, Peter Q. Nyce and James B. Diggs for petitioner. Mr. Creekmore Wallace for respondent.If, however, a timely motion for leave to file the second petition is granted, and the petition is actually entertained by the Court, then the time within which application may be made here for certiorari begins to run from the day when the Court denies such second petition.