Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co.
Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541 (1927)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1927-03-21
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- noting that a trademark secured in one country “depend[s] for its protection” there and “confer[s] no rights” elsewhere
- enforcing Hong Kong judgment in trademark suit despite holding in Philippine lower court that Hong Kong judgment evidenced “clear mistake of law or fact”
- "A trademark started elsewhere would depend for its protection in Honkong upon the law prevailing in Honkong and would confer no rights except by the consent of that law."
- "A trademark started elsewhere would depend for its protection in Hongkong upon the law prevailing in Hongkong and would confer no rights except by the consent of that law."
- “Evidence of registration in other countries is not legally or factually relevant to potential customer perception of Bayer’s analgesic goods in the United States.”
- “A trade-mark started elsewhere would depend for its protection in Hongkong upon the law prevailing in Hongkong and would confer no rights except by the consent of that law”
- where the “final exponent of th[e] law[] authoritatively declares” its 51 Appellate Case: 21-1196 Document: 010110795395 Date Filed: 01/10/2023 Page: 139 meaning, “we do not see how it is possible for a foreign Court to pronounce [that] decision wrong”
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co.. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 39 opinions
INGENOHLv. OLSEN CO.,273 U.S. 541(1927)
47 S.Ct. 451
INGENOHLv. OLSEN COMPANY, INC.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
No. 174.
Argued March 1, 1927.
Decided March 14, 1927.
CERTIORARI (269 U.S. 542) to a judgment of the Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands which reversed a judgment recovered by
the plaintiff, Ingenohl, in the Court of First Instance. The
action was based on a judgment for costs, awarded to the
plaintiff by the Supreme Court of Hongkong, in a suit to restrain
the defendant, Walter E. Olsen Company Inc., from infringing
the plaintiff's trade-mark.
The supposed mistake consisted in denying effect in Hongkong to a sale of business and trade-marks by the Alien Property Custodian to the defendant, the circumstances and nature of which may be stated in few words so far as they concern the present case. The plaintiff Ingenohl had built up a great business as a cigar manufacturer and exporter having his factory at Manila. In 1908 he established a factory at Hongkong and thereafter goods from both factories were sold under the same trade-marks, the outside box or package of the Hongkong goods having a label indicating that they came from there. The trade-marks were registered in Hongkong and the cigars covered by them had acquired a reputation. In 1918 the Alien Property Custodian seized and sold all the property "wheresoever situate in the Philippine Islands . . . including the business as going concern, and the good will, trade names and trade-marks thereof, of Syndicat Oriente," being the above mentioned business of the plaintiff in the Philippines. The Supreme Court of the Philippines held that it was plain error in the Supreme Court of the British Colony to hold that this sale did notPage 544carry the exclusive right to use the trade-marks in the latter place.
A trade-mark started elsewhere would depend for its protection in Hongkong upon the law prevailing in Hongkong and would confer no rights except by the consent of that law.Hanover StarMilling Co. v.Metcalf,240 U.S. 403.United Drug Co. v.Theodore Rectanus Co.,248 U.S. 90. When, then, the judge who, in the absence of an appeal to the Privy Council, is the final exponent of that law, authoritatively declares that the assignment by the Custodian of the assets of the Manila firm cannot and will not be allowed to affect the rights of the party concerned in Hongkong, we do not see how it is possible for a foreign Court to pronounce his decision wrong. It will be acted on and settles the rights of the parties in Hongkong; and in view of that fact it seems somewhat paradoxical to say that it is not the law. If the Alien Property Custodian purported to convey rights in English territory valid as against those whom the English law protects he exceeded the powers that were or could be given to him by the United States.
It is not necessary to consider whether the section of the Code of Civil Procedure relied upon was within the power of the Philippine Commission to pass. In any event as interpreted it involved delicate considerations of international relations and therefore we should not hold ourselves bound to that deference that we show to the judgment of the local Court upon matters of only local concern. We are of opinion that whatever scope may be given to the section it is far from warranting the refusal to enforce this English judgment for costs, obtained after a fair trial before a court having jurisdiction of the parties, when the judgment is unquestionably valid and in other respects will be enforced. Of course a foreign state might accept the Custodian's transfer as good within its jurisdiction, if there were no opposing local interest or right,Page 545and that may be the fact for China outside of Hongkong as seems to have been held in another case not yet finally disposed of, but no principle requires the transfer to be given effect outside of the United States and when as here it has been decided to have been ineffectual it is unnecessary to inquire whether in the other event the Alien Property Custodian was authorized by the statute to use or did use in fact words purporting to have that effect, or what the effect, if any, would be.
Some question was made of the jurisdiction of this Court. The jurisdiction was asserted, at least provisionally, when the writ of certiorari was granted. There are few cases in which it is more important to maintain it, and we confirm it now. The validity of the section of the Code of Civil Procedure is drawn in question, and also the construction of the Trading with the Enemy Act which is treated as purporting to authorize what in our opinion it could not authorize if it tried.Judgment reversed.