Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Merritt v. United States

267 U.S. 338

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1925-03-02
Topic
bankruptcy

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that a claim on an implied-in-law contract does not fall within Tucker Act jurisdiction
  • holding that a plaintiff cannot bring suit under the Tucker Act where “[t]he petition does not allege any contract, express or implied in fact, by the government with the plaintiff to pay the latter ... on any basis.”
  • noting that Court of Federal Claims generally lacks the power to grant remedies based in equity
  • stating that implied-in-law contracts are not within the United States Claims Court’s jurisdiction
  • stating “[t]he Tucker Act does not give a right of action against the United States in those cases where, if the transaction were between private parties, recovery could be had upon a contract implied in law”
  • no Tucker Act jurisdiction where petitioner "does not allege any contract, express or implied in fact"
  • “The petition may not be so general as to leave the defendant in doubt as to what must be met.”
  • where petition did not allege any express or implied-in-fact contract between itself and the United States, recovery was denied

Citator

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Cited by
252 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Federal Government Contracts — Claims Relief under the Dent Act requires that the claimant establish each of the statutory conditions, including that prior to November 12, 1918, an agreement, express or implied, was entered into with the Secretary of War or an officer or agent acting under his authority, direction, or instruction, or that of the President; that such agreement was performed, or expenditures made or obligations incurred upon the faith of it, before November 12, 1918; and that the claim was presented before June 30, 1919. Failure to establish any one of these conditions bars recovery.
  2. Federal Government Contracts — Claims A subcontractor may not recover under § 4 of the Dent Act absent a showing that, before payment by the Government to the prime contractor, the subcontractor had made expenditures, incurred obligations, rendered service, or furnished material, equipment, or supplies to the prime contractor with the knowledge and approval of a duly authorized agent of the Secretary of War.
  3. Federal Government Contracts — Tucker Act Recovery against the United States under the Tucker Act requires the allegation of a contract, express or implied in fact, with the Government, or facts from which such a contract may be implied; a petition failing to allege either does not state a cause of action. Judicial Code § 145, 24 Stat. 505
  4. Federal Government Contracts — Tucker Act The Tucker Act does not confer a right of action against the United States in cases where, if the transaction were between private parties, recovery could be had only upon a contract implied in law, such as money had and received. Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121; Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575, 581
  5. General — Court of Claims — Pleading Requirements The practice of the Court of Claims, while liberal, does not permit a general statement of claim in analogy to the common counts; it requires a plain, concise statement of the facts relied upon, and the petition may not be so general as to leave the defendant in doubt as to what must be met. Rule 15, Court of Claims; Schierling v. United States, 23 Ct. Clms. 361
Me.- Justice Brandéis-

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In July, 1918, or earlier, the United States contracted with the Panama Knitting Mills for a quantity of khaki at $3.20 a yard. In June, 1919, this contract was can-celled by a' new agreement between the Government and the Mills, made pursuant to the Dent Act, MarchJ2,1919, c. 94, 40 Stat. 1272. Under the cancellation agreement the Government adjusted its liability by accepting delivery of half of the khaki originally: contracted for, paying the .contract rate together with the carrying charges. The Mills had a sub-contract with the plaintiff for the supply of the khaki. By falsely representing that the Government compelled settlement on the basis of $2.50 a yard- plus the carrying' charges, the Mills induced the plaintiff to release it, on that basis, from the sub-contract.- When the Government learned of the fraud thus perpetrated, it exacted from the Mills a repayment of $5,210.02 — the difference between the amount actually paid by the Government and what would have been paid if settlement had been made on the basis of $2.50 a yard. *340 This suit was brought in March, 1923, to recover from the United States the sum so repaid. The Court of Claims dismissed the petition on demurrer for failure to state a cause of action. The case is here on appeal under § 242 of the Judicial Code.

Plaintiff cannot recover under the Dent Act. There are three obstacles. It does not appear, as required by § 1, that, prior to November 12, 1918, an agreement with the plaintiff, express or implied, was entered into by the Secretary of War, or “ by any officer or agent acting under his authority, direction, or instruction, or that of the President.” Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 385; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 592. It does not appear; as required by § 1, that any such agreement had been “performed . . , or expenditures ■. . made or obligations incurred upon the faith, of the same . . prior to ” November 12, 1918. Price Fire & Water Proofing Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 179, 183. It does not appear, as required by- § 1, that the claim sued on was presented before June 30, 1919. The Dent Act affords. relief although there is no agreement “ executed in the manner prescribed by law,” but only under the conditions stated. The plaintiff is not helped by § 4 which deals with sub-contracts; among other reasons, because it does not appear, as therein prescribed, that, before the payment made by the Government to the prime contractor, the plaintiff had “made expenditures, incurred obligations, rendered service, or furnished material, equipment, or supplies to such prime contractor, with the knowledge and approval of any agent of the Secretary of.War duly authorized thereunto.”

Plaintiff cannot recover under the Tucker Act, Judicial Code,'§ 145, 24 Stat. 505. The petition does not allege any contract, express or implied in fact, by the Government with the plaintiff to pay the latter for the khaki on *341 any basis. Nor does it set forth facts from which such a contract will be implied. The pleader may have intended to sue for money had and received. But no facts are alleged which afford any basis for a claim that the repayment made by the Mills was exacted by the Government for the benefit of the plaintiff. The Tucker Act does not give a right of action against the United States in those cases where, if the transaction were between private parties, recovery could be had upon a contract implied in law. Tempel v. United States, 248 U. S. 121; Sutton v. United States, 256 U. S. 575, 581. For aught that • appears repayment was compelled solely for the benefit of the Government, under the proviso in § 1 of the Dent Act, which authorizes recovery of money paid under a settlement, if it has been defrauded.-

The practice of the Court of Claims, while liberal, does not allow a general statement .of claim in analogy to the common counts. It requires a plain, concise statement of the¡ facts relied upon. See'Rule 15, Court of Claims. The petition may not be so general as to leave the defendant in- doubt as to what must be met. Schierling v. United States, 23 Ct. Clms. 361; The Atlantic Works v. United States, 46 Ct. Clms. 57, 61; New Jersey Foundry & Machine Co. v. United States, 49 Ct. Clms. 235; United States v. Stratton, 88 Fed. 54, 59.

Affirmed.