Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Dickson v. Luck Land Co.
Dickson v. Luck Land Co., 242 U.S. 371 (1917)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1917-01-08
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- “With those restrictions [of Congress] entirely removed and the fee simple issued it would seem that the situation was one in which all questions pertaining to the disposal of the lands naturally would fall within the scope and operation of the laws of the State”
- “With those restrictions entirely removed and the fee-simple patent issued, it would seem that the situation was one in which all questions pertaining to the disposal of the lands naturally would fall within the scope and operation of the laws of the state.”
Citator
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- Cited by
- 36 opinions
Headnotes
- Native American Law — Patents and Implied Findings Every patent for public or Indian lands carries with it an implied affirmation or finding of every fact made a prerequisite to its issue; where the statute under which a fee simple patent issued made the allottee's majority a prerequisite, the patent implies an administrative finding that the allottee was then an adult. 242 U.S. 371 (opinion of Van Devanter, J.)
- Native American Law — Effect of Implied Findings in Patents The implied findings imported by a land patent are indulged in support of titles held under the Government's patents but are not regarded as otherwise having any conclusive or controlling force; they are not judgments within the rules respecting estoppel by judgment, and are to be given no greater force or influence than prior decisions have sanctioned. 242 U.S. 371 (citing Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U.S. 447, 450)
- Native American Law — Restricted Allotments — Removal of Restrictions A provision authorizing the immediate issue of fee simple patents to a particular class of allottees and withdrawing their allotments from congressionally imposed restrictions does no more than that, and implies only that the administrative officers were satisfied, before issuing the patent, that the allotment belonged to that class; the finding so implied has no greater effect or wider application than the finding implied from the issue of other patents. 242 U.S. 371
- Native American Law — Conclusiveness of Patent as to Allottee's Age An administrative finding implied from the issuance of a fee simple patent that the allottee was an adult is not decisive of the allottee's age for any purpose other than that of fixing his right to receive the full title freed from the restrictions upon its disposal which Congress had imposed; it does not conclusively establish his majority for the purpose of determining whether a deed made after patent was subject, under state law, to disaffirmance as a deed made in infancy. 242 U.S. 371
- Native American Law — Allottees Under Fee Simple Patent — Applicable State Law Where the restrictions on an Indian allotment are entirely removed and a fee simple patent is issued, questions pertaining to the disposal of the land fall within the scope and operation of state law; under the Act of May 8, 1906, the allottee has the benefit of and is subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State, including those governing the transfer of real property, fixing the age of majority, and declaring the disability of minors. 242 U.S. 371 (citing 34 Stat. 182, c. 2348)
DICKSONv. LUCK LAND COMPANY,242 U.S. 371(1917)
37 S.Ct. 167
DICKSONv. LUCK LAND COMPANY.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.
No. 600.
Submitted December 6, 1916.
Decided January 8, 1917.
THE case is stated in the opinion.
In both courts the decision was put upon the ground that the first deed was made while the allottee was a minor and the second after he became an adult and that under the law of the State the deed given during his minority was disaffirmed and avoided by the one given after he became an adult. The only federal question presented or considered was whether the patent was conclusive of his having attained his majority at that time. The defendant contended that it was, but the ruling was the other way and the plaintiff was permitted to show the allottee's age by other evidence. The defendant concedes that, if the patent was not conclusive upon that point, the judgment must stand.
The validity of the patent is not assailed. On the contrary, both parties claim under it, one as much as the other. Nor is it questioned that the allottee received the full title freed from all the restrictions upon its disposalPage 374which Congress had imposed. Thus the question for decision is whether the patent was to be taken as determining the allottee's age for any purpose other than that of fixing his right to receive the full title freed from all the restrictions imposed by Congress.
There is no mention of his age in the patent, and yet it must be taken as impliedly containing a finding that he was then an adult. This is so, because every patent for public or Indian lands carries with it an implied affirmation or finding of every fact made a prerequisite to its issue, and because the provision in the Act of 1907 made the majority of the allottee a prerequisite to the issue of this patent. But such implications, although appropriately and generally indulged in support of titles held under the Government's patents (Steelv.SmeltingCompany,106 U.S. 447450et seq.), are not regarded as otherwise having any conclusive or controlling force. They are not judgments in the sense of the rules respecting estoppel by judgment, and we perceive no reason for giving them any greater force or influence than has been sanctioned by prior decisions.
The provision in the Act of 1907, under which this patent was issued, does not make for a different conclusion. In so far as it is applicable here, it does no more than to withdraw a particular class of allotments from the restrictions imposed by Congress and to authorize the immediate issue of fee simple patents for them. Although saying nothing on the point, it evidently intends that the administrative officers shall be satisfied in each instance before issuing the patent that the allotment belongs to the particular class; and so the patent when issued carries with it an implication that those officers found the allotment to be of that class. But the provision gives no warrant for thinking that this finding should have any greater effect or wider application than is accorded to the finding implied from the issue of other patents.Page 375
We conclude, therefore, that the administrative finding which this patent imports was not to be taken as decisive of the allottee's age for any purpose other than that of fixing his right to receive the full title freed from all the restrictions upon its disposal which Congress had imposed.
With those restrictions entirely removed and the fee simple patent issued it would seem that the situation was one in which all questions pertaining to the disposal of the lands naturally would fall within the scope and operation of the laws of the State. And that Congress so intended is shown by the Act of May 8, 1906, c. 2348,34 Stat. 182, which provides that when an Indian allottee is given a patent in fee for his allotment he "shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State." Among the laws to which the allottee became subject, and to the benefit of which he became entitled, under this enactment were those governing the transfer of real property, fixing the age of majority and declaring the disability of minors.Judgment affirmed.