Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad v. Wisconsin

238 U.S. 491

Type: Opinion
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: Federal
Date: 1915-06-21
Topic: general

Mr. Justice Lamar, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. There have been two statutes in Wisconsin relating to *498 letting down the upper berth when the lower was occupied. The first 1 left the matter to the decision of the occupant of the lower berth. The second 2 absolutely prohibits the upper from being let down before it is engaged or occupied.

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad v. Wisconsin. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by: 52 opinions

CHI., MIL. ST. P.R.R.v. WISCONSIN,238 U.S. 491(1915)

35 S.Ct. 869

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE AND ST. PAUL RAILROAD COMPANYv. STATE OF WISCONSIN.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN.

No. 177.

Argued March 8, 1915.

Decided June 21, 1915.

A State cannot authorize an individual to take salable property from another without pay — it amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law. An owner's right to his property is protected even though he may not be actually using it, and the State cannot, under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an owner of property to allow a third party to have free use thereof until such time as a buyer appears. A state statute that does not purport to be a health measure cannot be sustained as such. A state statute which is not a reasonable exercise of the police powerPage 492and yet operates to take property cannot be justified on the ground that the party whose property it takes may be able to get an increase in the rates obtained for property not taken. The taking of property and a fixed right to compensation must coincide. While the right of the State to regulate public carriers in the interest of the public is very great, it does not warrant unreasonable interference with the right of management or the taking of the carrier's property without compensation. The reserved right of altering and amending the charter of a corporation does not confer mere arbitrary power or authorize the taking of the corporation's property without compensation. The statute of Wisconsin imposing penalties on sleeping car companies if, the lower berth of a sleeping car being occupied, the upper berth was let down before it was actually engaged, is unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an arbitrary taking of property without compensation; nor can it be justified as a health measure under the police power of the State or as amendment or alteration of the charter of the corporation under the reserved power of the State in that respect.152 Wis. 348, reversed.

IN 1911 the State of Wisconsin passed a statute imposing a

penalty upon Sleeping Car Companies if, — the lower berth being

occupied — the upper berth was let down before it was actually

engaged. Suit was brought against the plaintiff in error for the

recovery of the statutory penalty, based on the fact that on the

night of August 11, 1911, James T. Hall boarded the Company's

sleeping car at Portage, Wisconsin. He engaged lower berth,

Section 11 and occupied the same, as an intrastate passenger,

between Portage, Wisconsin, and Star Lake, Wisconsin. The upper

berth of No. 11 was not engaged or occupied, but was let down and

kept down during the night by the porter.

The Company answered that its cars, like those of others in

the United States, were so arranged as to provide units

consisting of lower berths, upper berths, sections, drawing rooms

and compartments; that the lower berth and upper berth units are

so arranged that when

Page 493

prepared for occupancy each of said units is a compartment

separated from all other space in the car; that the charge for

the use of each of said units is fixed by tariffs established by

the State of Wisconsin and by the Interstate Commerce Commission

respectively. Under the Wisconsin law the rate from Portage to

Star Lake was $1.50 for a lower berth, $1.20 for the upper berth,

and $2.70 for the section. It was averred and admitted that Hall,

while demanding of the defendant's conductor "that the upper

berth be put back and kept there, so that he might have the use

of the entire section, paid for the use of the lower berth only

and did not offer to pay the tariff for the entire section."

The Railroad Company further averred that it operated sleeping

cars over its system of more than 7,000 miles of interstate

roads, and that the Interstate Commerce Commission had prescribed

rates for each of said sleeping car units on trains running to

and from the State of Wisconsin. The rate fixed for the upper was

80 per cent. of the charge for the use of the lower; the price

for the whole section being the sum of the two rates. No order

had been made by the Interstate Commission which prohibits the

use of the upper berth while the lower berth is occupied. It was

averred that a compliance with the Wisconsin statute would

convenience the occupant of the particular lower berth only, and

would not add to the comfort or promote the health, safety or

convenience of the other occupants of the car, but would

injuriously affect passengers occupying lower berths.

The Company insisted that the statute was arbitrary and

unreasonable; not designed to accomplish a legitimate public

purpose and contrary to natural justice. It claimed that the

statute denied to it the equal protection of the laws; took its

property without due process of law in violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment and attempted to regulate interstate

commerce.

Page 494

There was a hearing before the court without a jury. Some of

the averments in the Railroad's answer were admitted to be true.

In addition witnesses were sworn whose testimony — admitted over

objection — was to the effect that — while the Company had a

pecuniary interest in having the upper berth kept down when the

lower was occupied yet, — such lowering was necessary to secure

the comfort of the occupant of the lower berth and to prevent him

or her from being wakened or disturbed if it became necessary to

put down the upper berth and arrange it so that it could be

occupied by a passenger who had purchased such upper space during

the night. The evidence was to the effect that the opening of the

curtains, the glare of the light, the noise of lowering the

berth, the work of arranging the bedding for the upper berth and

securing the holding wires would necessarily inconvenience the

man or woman occupying the lower berth; deprive him or her of the

privacy to which they were entitled and interrupt the rest and

sleep to secure which they had engaged the berth.

There was evidence that an ordinary sleeping car was better

ventilated than an ordinary passenger coach, said to be due to

the fact that the coach not only carried more passengers but did

not have the ventilating appliances in use on sleeping cars.

There was in addition much evidence, admitted over objection,

to prove the methods by which and the extent to which sleeping

cars were ventilated. It appeared that a car of ordinary size

contained about 5,000 cubic feet of air and that, by means of a

series of suction ventilators, operated by the movement of the

train, the air therein was sucked through openings in the top of

the car. The faster the movement the more rapid the suction. By

measuring the air escaping through the ventilators, it had been

shown that when the train was running at 35 miles an hour the air

in the sleeping car was renewed every two minutes. This air was

replaced by that coming through doors, end

Page 495

openings for ventilating purposes, screens or windows as the case

might be. There was also testimony that when the upper berth was

down and the curtains closed the air came in and went out of the

lower berth through windows, screens, air spaces, and numerous

openings between the curtain and the bed.

There was evidence that while the circulation in the lower

berth was not so good as that in the aisle, yet the air in the

car and in such lower berth was not injurious to health as

demonstrated by repeated chemical analyses of samples of air

taken from such lower berths, from the aisles and from other

portions of the cars. There was evidence, and contention based on

common knowledge, that the letting down of the upper berth did

not affect the health or convenience of the occupants of the car

or of either berth. This was demonstrated by the absence of

injurious effects and the fact that lower berths with the upper

berths down had thus been constantly used by travellers since

sleeping cars were invented.

There was further evidence that the car in question was

arranged substantially like those operated by sleeping car

companies throughout the United States. In all of them the upper

berth was regularly put down when the lower was occupied, unless

the whole section was engaged by one person. There was a further

contention that this was true in every State in the Union, — no

one of which prohibited the letting down of the upper when the

lower was occupied.

The court found as a fact —

"That the closing of upper berths in sleeping-cars has very

little effect upon the circulation of air in such sleeping-cars

when all lower berths are made up and ready for occupancy.

"That the lowering of upper berths does not endanger the

lives, health or safety of persons occupying lower berths in

sleeping-cars.

Page 496

"That the closing of the upper berth will be a convenience to

the person occupying the berth below the same and will add to the

comfort of such person alone and not to that of the public

generally.

"That the defendant has a right to charge for the use of the

space occupied by the upper berth and that such right is the

property of the defendant."

He concluded, as matter of law, that the State was not

entitled to recover the penalty and dismissed the complaint. The

case was then taken to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, which

(152 Wis. 348) said that "`the trial court held that the

evidence showed a compliance with the act would affect the

convenience and comfort of the traveling public in but a slight

degree,' but that . . . the court's view of the evidence was

evidently the result of the court's erroneous idea of what, in

the legal sense, is essential to present an occasion or exigency

involving the general welfare." The court further said "that in

the light of common knowledge the evidence in the case tends to

show that the effects of the regulation contribute to the comfort

and convenience of the traveling public and thereby contribute to

promote their health and general welfare," that the regulating

"statute was a legal exercise of the police power;" and that the

regulations only incidentally affect interstate commerce. The

"law permits berths to be occupied and used when any person

desires them and thus the defendant is secured against loss for

services it may be able to furnish the public. . . ." It

thereupon reversed the judgment of the trial court. The Railroad

Company then brought the case here assigning as error that the

judgment sustaining the statute deprived it of property without

due process of law, interfered with its management of cars and

made a discrimination between the privileges accorded state and

interstate passengers in the same car at the same time.

Page 497

Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, with whomMr. Burton HansonandMr.Gustavus S. Fernaldwere on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

Chapter 272 of the 1911 laws of Wisconsin deprives plaintiff in error of its property without due process of law, and denies to it the equal protection of the laws in taking its property for public use without compensation, and is therefore in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

Chapter 272 of the 1911 laws of Wisconsin is a regulation of commerce among the States, and is void under § 8 of Art. I of the Constitution of the United States.

Numerous authorities of this and other courts support these contentions.Mr. Walter Drew, Deputy Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin, with whomMr. W.C. Owen, Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin, was on the brief, for defendant in error:

The highest court of the State has construed the statute and held it constitutional.

The Wisconsin Upper Berth Law is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State in behalf of the public health and welfare.

The law does not violate any rights of the plaintiff in error guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment nor is it unconstitutional as a regulation of interstate commerce.

The law is a valid exercise of the power reserved to the state legislature by § 1 of Art. XI of the state constitution to alter the corporate franchise of the plaintiff in error.

Numerous authorities of this and other courts support these contentions.

MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

There have been two statutes in Wisconsin relating toPage 498letting down the upper berth when the lower was occupied. The first¹left the matter to the decision of the occupant of the lower berth. The second²absolutely prohibits the upper from being let down before it is engaged or occupied.

Concerning the act of 1907, which provided that the occupant of the lower "should have the right to direct whether the unoccupied upper should be opened or closed," the Supreme Court (Statev.Redmon,134 Wis. 89,103) held that the statute was "not a police regulation, but an unwarranted interference with property rights; an attempt . . . to give any person at his option who pays for a part of a section in a sleeping car the use, free of charge, of the balance thereof; an obvious . . . attempt . . . to appropriate the property of one for the benefit of another in violation of several constitutional safeguards that might be referred to, but particularly the guarantee that no person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." . . . "It follows that the arbitrary appropriation in the name of law of the space of an upper berth in a sleeping car for the greater comfort and safety, as regards the health of the occupant of the lower berth at his option, . . . is highly oppressive. . . ."

1. But the language of the Act of 1911, now under review,Page 499does not remove the fundamental objection to that class of legislation. For as the State could not authorize the occupant of the lower berth totakesalable space without pay, neither can the present statute compel the Company togivethat occupant the free use of that space until it is actually purchased by another passenger. The owner's right to property is protected even when it is not actually in use, and the Company cannot be compelled to permit a third person to have the free use of such property until a buyer appears.

2. While this principle is recognized, it is said that this Act of 1911 was not passed for the purpose of benefiting the occupant of the lower berth, but as a health measure and in the interest of all the occupants of the car. But the statute does not purport to be a health measure, and cannot be sustained as such. For if lowering the upper berth injuriously interfered with the ventilation of the car and the health of the passengers it would follow that upper berths should not be lowered; and if it was harmful to let down the uppers it would be even more harmful to permit additional passengers to come into the car and occupy them. The testimony of witnesses and common knowledge coincide with the trial court's finding of fact that the lowering of upper berths does not endanger the lives, health or safety of persons occupying the lower berth and that keeping the upper closed will not add to the comfort of the public generally.Lake Shore c.Ry. v.Smith,173 U.S. 692. There are some inconveniences and discomforts incident to traveling on a sleeping car, but none of those resulting from the lowering of the upper berth are of a character that can be treated as a nuisance either in law or in fact. For lowering the upper berth is not only not treated as a nuisance or a serious inconvenience and discomfort to passengers, but the language of the statute itself recognizes that the sleeping car company might lawfully sell all of the upper berths and have each of themPage 500occupied. The same is true of the order of the State Commission fixing a rate of $1.50 for the lower berth, $1.20 for the upper berth, and $2.70 for the section. This treats that the space in the section is salable, as a whole or in parts; and, if the space is thus lawfully salable, it is property entitled to protection.

3. The State Supreme Court citedLawtonv.Steele,152 U.S. 133;Lake Shore M.S. Ry. v.Ohio,173 U.S. 285;Atlantic Coast Linev.North Carolina Corp. Comm.,206 U.S. 1;New York, N.H. H.R.R. v.New York,165 U.S. 628; and after discussing the extent of the police power and the conditions under which it can be exercised, held that it was a reasonable exercise of such power to prohibit the upper berth from being lowered if not engaged or occupied, saying that "if compliance with this [statutory] command imposes extra burdens, they are not of such an unusual nature as to be oppressive; and if it involves additional costs in the conduct of the business, then the defendant can readily be secured against such loss by having the rate adjusted to meet this burden." But if the statute is not a reasonable exercise of the police power and yet operates to take property, such taking cannot be justified on the ground that the Companymaybe able to secure an increase in rates. For, without considering any other question involved, it is sufficient to say that the taking and a fixed right to compensation must coincide, though in some cases the time for payment may be delayed.Sweetv.Rechel,159 U.S. 380,400.

4. The plaintiff also insists that the requirement that the upper berth should not be let down until actually engaged also deprives the Company of its right of management and prevents it from conducting its business so as to secure the privacy of the man or woman occupying the lower berth. It is not necessary to refer to the evidence on that subject because it is a matter of common knowledge that to let down the upper berth during the night wouldPage 501necessarily be an intrusion upon the privacy of those occupying lower berths. For the glare of the lights and the noise of lowering the upper berth would disturb any except the soundest sleepers. In this respect the statute would lessen the ability of the Company to furnish the place of sleep and rest which it offers to the public. A sleeping car may not be an "inn on wheels," but the operating company does engage to furnish its patrons with a place in which they can rest without intrusion upon their privacy. Holding out these inducements and seeking this patronage, the Company is entitled to the privilege of managing its business in its own way so long as it does not injuriously affect the health, comfort, safety and convenience of the public. The right of the State to regulate public carriers in the interest of the public is very great. But that great power does not warrant an unreasonable interference with the right of management or the taking of the carrier's property without compensation.Lake Shore Michigan Ry. v.Smith,173 U.S. 684;Northern Pacific Ry. v.State of North Dakota,236 U.S. 585;State of Washington ex rel. Oregon R.R. v.Fairchild,224 U.S. 510,529;Missouri Ry. v.Nebraska,164 U.S. 403,417;Great Northernv.R.R. Commission, just decided,ante, p. 340.

5. In the brief of counsel for the State it is argued that the statute can be sustained as a valid exercise of the State's reserved power to alter the charter of the Company. That question does not seem to have been raised in the state court, nor was its decision based on that proposition. Indeed such a ruling would seem to have been opposed toState ex rel. Northern Pacificv.R.R. Commission,140 Wis. 157, and theWater PowerCases,148 Wis. 124, where it was held that the right to amend a charter does not authorize the taking of the Company's property without just compensation. The same view has been repeatedly expressed in the decisions of this court. For example inShieldsv.Ohio,95 U.S. 324, it was saidPage 502that "the power of alteration and amendment is not without limit. The alterations must be reasonable . . . and consistent with the scope and object of the act of incorporation." . . . Again inStearnsv.Minnesota,179 U.S. 223,259, it was held that the reserved right to amend a corporate charter "does not confer mere arbitrary power, and cannot be so exercised as to violate fundamental principles of justice by . . . taking of property without due process of law."Lake Shore c. Ry. v.Smith,173 U.S. 690;Stanislaus Co. v.San Joaquin Co.,192 U.S. 201;Sinking-Fund Cases,99 U.S. 720;Millerv.State, 15 Wall. 498; see alsoDelaware, Lackawanna c. v.Board of PublicUtilities,85 N.J.L. 28,38, where it was held that, under such a power, the Company could not be required to furnish free transportation to certain designated officials. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to discuss the assignments relating to interstate commerce.

The judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for further proceedings not in conflict with this opinion.Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE McKENNA and MR. JUSTICE HOLMES dissent.Page 503

Page 498 "An act . . . relating to the health and comfort of occupants of sleeping-car berths.

"SEC. 1. Whenever a person pays for the use of a double lower berth in a sleeping-car, he shall have the right to direct whether the upper berth shall be open or closed, unless the upper berth is actually occupied by some other person; and the proprietor of the car and the person in charge of it shall comply with such direction." Laws of 1907, c. 266. ↩
Page 498 "1. Whenever a person shall engage and occupy a lower berth in a sleeping-car, and the upper berth of the same section shall at the same time be neither engaged nor occupied, the upper berth shall not be let down, but shall remain closed until engaged or occupied." Laws of 1911. ↩