Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage District

Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 233 U.S. 75 (1914)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1914-04-06
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • despite valid local concerns, State lacks constitutional power to compel a railroad to remove a railroad bridge over which its interstate trains passed, given dominant requirements of interstate commerce
  • railroad cannot be ordered by the state to remove railroad bridges or raise them to higher heights and noting that the state cannot invoke the “convenient apologetics of the police power” in order to justify “a direct interference with commerce among the states.” Id. at 79, 34 S.Ct. 564.

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Kaw Valley Drainage District. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
65 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Civil Procedure — Pleadings In determining the sufficiency of a pleading, a court will read the pleading as alleging what it fairly would convey to an ordinarily intelligent lawyer by a fairly exact use of English speech. 233 U.S. 75, 78 (citing Swift Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 395)
  2. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Scope of Review A reviewing court must take a judgment under review as it stands on its face; where the judgment is absolute and unconditional, it cannot be qualified by speculation as to what may in fact happen. 233 U.S. at 78
  3. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause An unconditional order of a state court requiring removal of a bridge that is a necessary part of a line of interstate commerce is a direct interference with interstate commerce, a subject matter under the exclusive control of Congress. 233 U.S. at 78
  4. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause Interstate commerce is not a matter left to the control of the states until further action by Congress, and the freedom of that commerce from state interference is not confined to legislative enactments but extends to interference by any ultimate organ of the state. 233 U.S. at 78 (citing Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 125 U.S. 530; Williams v. Talladega, 226 U.S. 404, 415–416)
  5. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause The principle barring state interference with interstate commerce applies to railroads under the commerce clause, including where Congress has authorized the maintenance of railroad lines by permissive statute. 233 U.S. at 78–79 (citing Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328, 334; Mississippi R.R. Commission v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 203 U.S. 335)
  6. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause A state cannot avoid the rule prohibiting interference with interstate commerce by invoking the police power; a direct interference with interstate commerce cannot be justified on that ground, as the state may do nothing that directly burdens or impedes interstate traffic or impairs the usefulness of a carrier's facilities for such traffic. 233 U.S. at 79 (quoting Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142, 154; citing Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 349)
  7. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause Destroying bridges across which interstate railroad lines necessarily pass is at least as direct an interference with interstate commerce as prohibiting the importation or export of goods would be. 233 U.S. at 79 (citing Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465; Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1; West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 262)
  8. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause Where local welfare does not require the removal of interstate railroad bridges but would merely be helped by raising them, and where the state court cannot order the bridges raised, the court's inability to order them raised does not justify a judgment that they be destroyed, even in the avowed expectation that the desired result will follow. 233 U.S. at 79–80
  9. Contracts Law — Interpretation A consent by a drainage district, a board created to exercise the police power, to the construction of a permanent bridge, declaring it a lawful structure and reserving the right to require an additional span, is to be construed as a license rather than an abdication of the district's continuing power to require subsequent elevation of the bridge. 233 U.S. at 80
KANSAS SOUTHERN RY.v. KAW VALLEY DIST.,233 U.S. 75(1914)
34 S.Ct. 564
KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANYv. KAW VALLEY DRAINAGE DISTRICT.
KANSAS CITY TERMINAL RAILWAY COMPANYv. SAME.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.
Nos. 313, 314.
Argued March 19, 20, 1914.
Decided April 6, 1914.
This court will read pleadings as alleging what they fairly would convey to an ordinarily intelligent lawyer by a fairly exact use of English speech.Swift Co. v.United States,196 U.S. 375This court must take the judgment under review as it stands and if it is absolute and not conditional it cannot be qualified by speculation as to what may in fact happen. An out and out order of a state court to remove a bridge that is a necessary part of a line of interstate commerce is an interference with such commerce and with a matter that is under the exclusive control of Congress. Interstate commerce is not a matter that is left to the control of the States until further action by Congress; nor is the freedom of that commerce from interference by the States confined to laws only; it extends to interference by any ultimate organ. A direct interference by the State with interstate commerce cannot be justified by the police power; and soheldthat the destruction of a bridge across which an interstate railroad line necessarily passes cannot be justified by the fact that it helps the drainage of a district.Quaere, whether a consent by a Drainage District to the construction of a railroad bridge is not to be regarded as a license rather than an abdication of the continuing powers of the District to require subsequent elevation of the bridge.87 Kan. 272, affirmed.
THE facts, which involve the construction and validity,
Page 76
under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, of orders
of the state courts of Kansas directing railroad companies to
remove bridges on lines of interstate commerce, are stated in the
opinion.
Mr. Samuel W. Moore, with whomMr. Samuel W. SawyerandMr. James M. Soubywere on the brief, for plaintiffs in error.Mr. Thomas A. Pollockfor defendant in error.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.
These cases arise upon petitions for mandamus filed by the defendant in error, the Kaw Valley Drainage District the allegations are that the Kansas River flows through the District, is a navigable stream, and in 1903 overflowed its banks, flooded a large part of Kansas City, Kansas, and caused great loss; that the harbor lines established by the United States and the lines for a levee along the banks established by the plaintiff substantially coincide; that the defendants respectively own bridges across the river which at their present elevation cause it to overflow; and that the plaintiff in pursuance of the power given to it by the State has ordered the defendants respectively to raise these bridges to specified heights and to remove the old ones, which the defendants have refused to do. On these petitions alternative writs issued, and thereupon the defendants made return, each making a general denial and setting up that its railway tracks across the bridge were used in commerce among the States and that such commerce would be cut off and destroyed by enforcement of the order, and claiming the protection of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, (cl. 3). They each alleged also that to raise the bridges would require a raising of the grades of the streets for the approaches, and that the right to raise them depended on the consent of Kansas City, which the city refused to give; that the raising would cut in two intersectingPage 77tracks of other roads, that this could not be done without the consent of such roads, which they also refused; that the raising would do permanent damage to private property abutting on the streets that would have to be raised, and that the plaintiff had taken no steps to compensate the owners; that the damage to the defendant would exceed large sums mentioned; and that the plans for the new bridges have not been approved by the Secretary of War. Act of March 3, 1899, c. 425, § 9.30 Stat. 1121, 1151. Each defendant relies upon the Fourteenth Amendment. The Terminal Company also alleged a contract with the Drainage District which was thought to preclude its present requirement, and to be protected by the Constitution, Art. I, § 10. The cases were heard on the alternative writs and the returns, and the Supreme Court of the State issued peremptory writs requiring the defendants to clear the channel to specified heights.87 Kan. 272.

Motions to dismiss were presented at the last term but were denied, as the record shows not only that rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States were specially set up and claimed, but that the questions concerning them are not of a kind to be dismissed.

The Supreme Court recognized that it could not order the bridges to be raised to the required height without the authority of the Secretary of War. Therefore we may lay on one side the somewhat surprising answer made to the allegations that the consent of the city and other railroads was necessary and was refused — the suggestion, namely, that if the defendants wanted to do it they would find some way of reaching their end. SeeLouisville Nashville R.R. Co. v.Central Stock Yards Co.,212 U.S. 132,144. It was not suggested that the railroads had the power to reach the result by eminent domain. SeeAtlanticCoast Line R.R. Co. v.North Carolina Corporation Commission,206 U.S. 1,27. We lay on one side also variousPage 78over-refined objections to the defendants' pleadings made in the argument here, saying only that we read them as alleging what they fairly would convey to an ordinarily intelligent lawyer by a fairly exact use of English speech.Swift Co. v.UnitedStates,196 U.S. 375,395. But the court went on, on the assumption that it would lead to the elevation of the bridges and seemingly for the purpose of accomplishing indirectly what it admitted that it could not do directly, to make an unqualified absolute order, as we have said, that the defendants should clear the channel of all obstructions on their lines up to the specified heights — in other words to remove the bridges as they stand.

These judgments must be taken as they read upon their face. They are not conditional orders to raise the bridge if the defendants can obtain the consent of parties not before the court and of one authority at least not subject to its control. They cannot be qualified by speculation as to what is likely to happen in fact. They are out and out orders to remove bridges that are a necessary part of lines of commerce by rail among the States. But that subject-matter is under the exclusive control of Congress and is not one that it has left to the States until there shall be further action on its part. The freedom from interference on the part of the States is not confined to a simple prohibition of laws impairing it, but extends to interference by any ultimate organ. It was held that under the permissive statute authorizing telegraph companies to maintain lines on the post roads of the United States a State could not stop the operation of the lines by an injunction for failure to pay taxes.Western UnionTelegraph Co. v.Attorney General of Massachusetts,125 U.S. 530.Williamsv.Talladega,226 U.S. 404,415,416. It would seem that the same principle applies to railroads under the commerce clause of the Constitution, especially if taken in connection with the somewhat similar statute now Rev.Page 79Stats., § 5258. And so it is held.Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v.Wharton,207 U.S. 328,334.Mississippi R.R. Commissionv.Illinois Central R.R. Co.,203 U.S. 335.

The decisions also show that a State cannot avoid the operation of this rule by simply invoking the convenient apologetics of the police power. It repeatedly has been said or implied that a direct interference with commerce among the States could not be justified in this way. "The state can do nothing which will directly burden or impede the interstate traffic of the company, or impair the usefulness of its facilities for such traffic."Illinois Central R.R. Co. v.Illinois,163 U.S. 142,154.Austinv.Tennessee,179 U.S. 343,349.AtlanticCoast Line R.R. Co. v.Wharton,207 U.S. 328,334. To destroy the bridges across which these railroad lines necessarily pass is at least as direct an interference with such commerce as to prohibit the importation of cattle or oleomargarine, or the export of natural gas.Hannibal St. Joseph R.R. Co. v.Husen,95 U.S. 465.Schollenbergerv.Pennsylvania,171 U.S. 1.Westv.Kansas Natural Gas Co.,221 U.S. 229,262. Furthermore in the present case it is not pretended that local welfare needs the removal of the defendants' bridges at the expense of the dominant requirements of commerce with other States, but merely that it would be helped by raising them. The fact that the court cannot order them to be raised does not justify a judgment that they be destroyed even in the avowed expectation that what it wants but cannot command is all that will come to pass.

A strong argument was made for the plaintiffs in error that they never had been allowed their day in court, as matters put in issue by them, such as the necessity of the change, were assumed against them. It was urged with seeming justice that, granting that, as was said by the court, the order of the Drainage District wasprima faciecorrect, still when that order was challenged in the pleadings, it could not be assumed to be valid at a hearing uponPage 80the writs and returns. But we express no opinion upon this point or upon claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, as what we have said sufficiently decides the cases. The argument of the Terminal Company upon the contract with the Drainage District does not impress us. By way of compromise the Terminal Company's predecessor agreed to build a permanent bridge according to a plan, and the Drainage District "hereby consents to the construction of said permanent bridge . . . and declares that the same when constructed shall constitute a lawful structure . . . not waiving any right . . . to require the construction of an additional span." This coming from a board created to exercise police power not unnaturally would be construed rather as a license than as an abdication of a continuing duty, on which we are asked to take notice that new light had been shed by a subsequent flood that has given rise to cases before this court. But for the reasons that we have given the judgments must be reversed.Judgments reversed.