Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Singer Sewing MacHine Co. v. Brickell
Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Brickell, 233 U.S. 304 (1914)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1914-04-06
- Topic
- general
Mr. Justice Pitney, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. With respect to the business conducted in Russell Gounty, the decree of the District Court is not now directly under review; but, at any rate, it was clearly correct under Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 389.
Citator
Singer Sewing MacHine Co. v. Brickell has been questioned or limited by later authorities: relies on overruled authority: 23 L. Ed. 478 (overruled by United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960)). Read them before relying on it. 99 later decisions cite it.
- Authority status
- caution
- Cited by
- 99 opinions
Headnotes
- Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause Where orders for goods are taken in one State and transmitted to another State for acceptance or rejection, and the goods are filled from stock in that other State, the business is interstate commerce and cannot be subjected to a state license tax. 233 U.S. 304 (citing Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389)
- Constitutional Law — State Taxation — Presumption of Constitutionality In determining whether a state tax statute is constitutional, there is a presumption that the legislature intended to tax only that which it had the constitutional power to tax, and the statute will be sustained if full and fair effect can be given to its provisions as confined wholly to intrastate business. 233 U.S. 304
- Constitutional Law — Severability Although a state license statute that is void in part may be wholly void where its provisions are not separable, the statute may be sustained so far as it relates to business wholly intrastate and held inapplicable as to interstate commerce. 233 U.S. 304
- Constitutional Law — Equal Protection A state classification distinguishing merchants selling sewing machines at regularly established places of business from a manufacturer selling them by traveling salesmen is not so unreasonable and arbitrary as to deny equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment. 233 U.S. 304
- Constitutional Law — Equal Protection A State has a wide range of discretion in establishing classes for revenue taxes, and its laws will not be set aside as discriminatory if there is any rational basis for the classification; a law uniformly applicable to all persons pursuing a given occupation will not be struck down merely because persons engaged in other, similar occupations ought to be similarly taxed. 233 U.S. 304
- Constitutional Law — State Taxation of Foreign Corporations A foreign corporation that is properly taxable on intrastate business in many counties of a State cannot obtain immunity from all such taxation by establishing in one county a system of business that involves transactions in interstate commerce. 233 U.S. 304
- Tax Law — Statutory Construction — License Exemption Where a statute imposing a license tax on the business of selling sewing machines by traveling salesmen exempts "merchants selling the above enumerated articles at their regularly established places of business," a corporation engaged in both itinerant sales and sales at established stores is subject to the tax on its itinerant sales, notwithstanding that machines sold at its stores are delivered by wagon. 233 U.S. 304
SINGER SEWING MACHINE CO.v. BRICKELL,233 U.S. 304(1914)
34 S.Ct. 493
SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANYv. BRICKELL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF ALABAMA.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF ALABAMA.
No. 458.
Argued January 12, 1914.
Decided April 6, 1914.
APPELLANT, which is a New Jersey corporation carrying on a
mercantile business in many places in the State of Alabama in the
sale and renting of sewing machines, in part from regularly
established places of business and in part by means of delivery
wagons going from place to place in the respective counties in
which its stores are located, filed its bill of complaint against
appellees, who are the agents of the State charged with the
administration of the tax laws, and therein sought to restrain by
Page 306
injunction the enforcement against it of the state tax prescribed
by § 32 of an act for providing revenues, approved March 31, 1911
(Session Acts, p. 180), which reads as follows:
"Sec. 32. Sewing Machines. — Each person, firm or corporation
selling or delivering sewing machines either in person or through
agents, shall pay fifty dollars annually, for each county in
which they may sell or deliver said articles. And for each wagon
and team used in delivering or displaying the same an additional
sum in each county of twenty-five dollars annually; but this
section shall not apply to merchants selling the above enumerated
articles at their regularly established places of business."
And also to enjoin the enforcement of county taxes, amounting
to fifty per centum of the state tax prescribed by the above
section, which might be imposed in the several counties for
county purposes under § 33F of the same act.
The bill, as amended, besides showing diverse citizenship of
the parties, avers that complainant is qualified under the state
laws to do business within the State as a foreign corporation,
and has established, in thirty counties of the State, thirty-six
regular places of business or stores, which are conducted by it;
that complainant buys sewing machines and parts to supply
breakage and defects therein and a variety of sewing machine
accessories without the State, causes them to be shipped to its
places of business within the State, and keeps them at these
places for sale to the general public.
In each of the counties, except the County of Russell, the
business is conducted as follows: a resident agent is employed
for the purpose of making contracts for the sale and renting of
machines in that county and that county only; machines are
delivered to such agents and placed aboard wagons and taken by
the agents into the
Page 307
rural districts for the purpose of soliciting customers either to
purchase or to rent machines; when a buyer is found the machine
is delivered by the agent to the customer, who either pays cash
for it or executes an instalment note in which the company
retains title to the machine, or an instalment note secured by a
mortgage upon the machine and other property; such sale on credit
is made subject to the approval of the company, and if not
approved the instalment note is returned to the maker and the
machine returned to the company. If the agent makes a contract
for the sale of the machine for cash this also is subject to the
approval or disapproval of complainant. The final consummation of
all sales is at one of complainant's established places of
business. The same agents are engaged also in renting machines
and collecting the rent arising therefrom, and the greater
portion of their time is consumed in such renting, this
constituting at least seventy per centum of the business done by
complainant in the State. Rented machines are placed aboard
wagons and taken by the agents into the rural districts. Each of
these agents is attached to some one of the stores or places of
business operated by complainant, and the machines handled by the
agent are sent to him from the place of business to which he is
attached, or taken from that place of business by him upon the
wagon which he drives. Besides this, complainant sells and rents
machines at its regularly established places of business and
delivers such machines to the buyers or renters by the use of
wagons and teams; and in those counties where complainant has
established places of business, machines sold or rented at those
places are delivered by the same agents and with the same wagons
that are used in carrying machines into the rural districts. It
is averred that the machines are of the average weight of 135
pounds. That there are many other merchants in the State who sell
sewing machines of a different manufacture
Page 308
at their places of business, and the average weight of these also
is about 135 pounds; that on account of their weight it is the
custom and practice of complainant, and of the other merchants
also, to make delivery by the use of wagons and teams whether the
sales are made at their places of business or otherwise, and that
it is impracticable to conduct the business without delivery by
wagon.
With respect to the business conducted in Russell County,
Alabama, it is averred that complainant operates a regularly
established place of business in the City of Columbus, Georgia,
where sewing machines and accessories are kept for sale, and in
connection with this business agents are employed to deliver
machines and accessories in Russell County, which adjoins the
Georgia state line; and that complainant does not sell or deliver
any sewing machines or accessories in Russell County except in
the following manner, namely, its agents use wagons and teams in
going about and displaying sample machines, and thereby obtain
orders for machines and accessories, which orders are transmitted
by the agents to the complainant at Columbus, Georgia, for
acceptance or rejection, and if accepted the machines or other
articles so ordered are taken out of stock there, placed upon
wagons, and thereby delivered to the purchasers in Russell
County.
The bill is based upon the contention that § 32 of the tax law
violates the Constitution of the United States in that it is a
regulation of interstate commerce, and contravenes the "due
process" and "equal protection" clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and also that it violates the constitution of Alabama;
and, finally, that appellant is within the exception of the
statute.
To the original bill (prior to the amendments) demurrers were
filed, and were sustained as to the whole bill except paragraph
6, which set forth the mode of conducting complainant's business
in Russell County. As to this the court held that the facts
showed a case of interstate
Page 309
commerce, and that the act had no application to it.
199 F. 654.
The amendments having been made, the amended bill was
submitted upon the same demurrers, which were made to apply to
the bill as amended. Again the court sustained the demurrers
except as to paragraph 6 relating to Russell County, and as to
this overruled them. Defendants then filed an answer admitting
the allegations of paragraph 6, and the cause was submitted upon
bill and answer, with the result that by final decree relief was
accorded to complainant as to the license tax sought to be
collected in Russell County, and in other respects relief was
denied and the bill dismissed. Because of the constitutional
questions, a direct appeal to this court was taken under Judicial
Code, § 238.
This court has jurisdiction of a direct appeal from the District Courts of the United States when the constitution or law of a State is claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States. Judicial Code, § 238.
Although the appellant may insist that the law which is impeached has no application to his case, or that theresdoes not, for any reason, come within its terms, yet, if he insistsbona fidethat, though such defenses fail, the unconstitutionality of the law protects him, the court has jurisdiction, since "the question is (was) a substantial one, and is (was) directly presented, and its determination (is) required," unless other defenses succeed.Smootv.Heyl,227 U.S. 518.
When the constitutional question does not arise except on the condition of a preliminary question of general law being decided in favor of the appellant, then it cannot be said to be directly and necessarily involved and the court has no jurisdiction, as inEmpire Co. v.Hanley,205 U.S. 255;Page 310Cosmopolitan Mining Co. v.Walsh,193 U.S. 460;Caseyv.H. T.C. Ry.,150 U.S. 170;Sloanv.United States,193 U.S. 614;Musev.Arlington H. Co.,168 U.S. 430.
When the constitutional point is directly presented and is necessarily involved in any decision against the appellant, though he may have preliminary points which might protect him without considering the constitutional question, the court has jurisdiction of the appeal, as is expressly decided in theSmootCase, supra. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.Austin,168 U.S. 685;Mayorv.Vicksburg,202 U.S. 453;Fieldv.Barber AsphaltCo.,194 U.S. 618;Burtonv.United States,196 U.S. 283;Ill. Cent. R.R. v.McKendres,203 U.S. 554.
When the constitutional question is duly presented in the lower court the jurisdiction of this court does not depend upon the question whether the right claimed under the Constitution of the United States has been upheld or denied in the court below; and the jurisdiction of this court is not limited to the constitutional question, but extends to the whole case. CasessupraandHolderv.Aultman,169 U.S. 81,88;Whittenv.Tomlinson,160 U.S. 231,238;Loebv.Columbia c.,179 U.S. 472;Chappellv.United States,160 U.S. 499,509;Hornerv.United States, No. 2,143 U.S. 570,577.
When there is no full, adequate and complete remedy at law, there is an unqualified right to appeal to equity, and especially so when in that way only a multitude of ruinous and vexatious law suits, about a single matter, can be avoided.Boycev.Grundy, 3 Pet. 210;West. Union Tel. Co. v.Andrews,216 U.S. 165;Ex parte Young,209 U.S. 123;Smythv.Ames,169 U.S. 466;Walla Wallav.Water Co.,172 U.S. 1,12;Meyerv.Wells, Fargo Co.,223 U.S. 298.
The equal protection of the laws is denied when, all questions of police power being out of the way, a lawfulPage 311business, or the use of property in a lawful way, is palpably and unjustly discriminated against in favor of other business or other use of the same property by the same or other owners.
A business may be taxed for revenue or may be forbidden or regulated under the police power, and so with the use of property, but a business cannot be taxed on account of the manner of conducting it by one citizen while the same business conducted in a different and perhaps less efficient manner by other citizens is exempted. And so as to property. The use of wagons and teams for transporting sewing machines, for sale or display, cannot be taxed merely because they are used in such work while untaxed when not so used and when the same transportation and display may be effected without taxation in any other way.Ala.Con. Coal Co. v.Herzberg, 55 So. 305;Montgomeryv.Kelly,142 Ala. 552;Meffordv.Sheffield,148 Ala. 539;Phoenix Carpet Co. v.State,118 Ala. 143.
Legislation cannot restrict or coerce industry as to its channels from pure whimsicality, or from any motive disconnected from the due exercise of the police power and from taxation for revenue according to constitutional formulas. Casessupraand see Constitution of Alabama, §35.
A business or property cannot be taxed as a whole and then separately as to its constituents. As a tax on wagons and separately on the spokes of the wheels.Montgomeryv.Kelly,142 Ala. 552;Meffordv.Sheffield,148 Ala. 539;Mobilev.Richards,98 Ala. 594;Gambillv.EndrichBros.,143 Ala. 506.
No state statute can stand which by its terms will burden or regulate interstate commerce. And the courts cannot by judicial limitation preserve the statute in part by restricting its terms to a legitimate field of operation.Civil Rights Cases,109 U.S. 3;United Statesv.Reese,92 U.S. 214;Page 312Howardv.Illinois Cent. R. Co.,207 U.S. 463;West.Un. Tel. Co. v.Kansas,216 U.S. 1;Crutcherv.Kentucky,141 U.S. 47,62;Norf. West. Ry. v.Pennsylvania,136 U.S. 114,118;Leloupv.Mobile,127 U.S. 640;Galveston c. R.Co. v.Texas,210 U.S. 217;Brimmerv.Rebman,138 U.S. 78-81;Buttsv.Mar. Mins. T. Co.,230 U.S. 126.
Contracts are made, and the "business of selling" is done, at the place where the contract receives the final assent of the mind which concludes the negotiation, converting it into a contract or sale.Holderv.Aultman,169 U.S. 81,88.Mr. Robert C. Brickell, Attorney General of the State of Alabama, for appellees.
But it is argued that the courts cannot properly sustain a statute which in direct terms applies to all commerce, by restricting it to cases of actual interference with interstate dealings. To quote from the brief: "All such laws as will necessarily affect interstate commerce when it arises are void. We do not have to await actual results on actual commerce to pronounce them void. . . . And, of course, a statute of this character, which is void as a whole, from its unity of character, will as readily be so declared in a case in which only intrastate commerce may be actually involved as otherwise. The lower court wasPage 313thus clearly in error in limiting the invalidity of the statute to the dealing in Russell County."
This argument, we think, misses the point. The statute under consideration does not in direct terms or by necessary inference manifest an intent to regulate or burden interstate commerce. Full and fair effect can be given to its provisions, and an unconstitutional meaning can be avoided, by indulging the natural presumption that the legislature was intending to tax only that which it constitutionally might tax. So construed, it does not apply to interstate commerce at all. The statute provides for a license or occupation tax. Normally, as the averments of the bill sufficiently show, the occupation may be and is conducted wholly intrastate, and free from any element of interstate commerce. The fact that, as carried on in Russell County, a like occupation is conducted with interstate commerce as an essential ingredient, is wholly fortuitous.
Nor has the tax that "unity of character" upon which the argument necessarily depends. The cases cited in support of the insistence that the act must be adjudged totally void because if applied in Russell County it would burden interstate commerce are readily distinguishable. InUnited Statesv.Reese,92 U.S. 214,221, there was a penal statute couched in general language broad enough to cover wrongful acts without as well as within the constitutional inhibition, and it was held that the court could not reject the unconstitutional part and retain the remainder, because it was not possible to separate the one from the other. InTrade-Mark Cases,100 U.S. 82,99, the court upon the same principle declined to sustain in part a trade-mark law, so framed as to be applicable by its terms to all commerce, by confining it to the interstate commerce that alone was subject to the control of Congress. InLeloupv.Port of Mobile,127 U.S. 640,647, the court held a general license tax, imposed by the StatePage 314of Alabama upon the business of a telegraph company in part interstate and in part internal, to be unconstitutional, and held that since the tax affected the whole business without discrimination it could not be sustained with respect to that portion of the business that was internal and therefore taxable by the State. To the same effect areNorfolk c. R.R. Co. v.Pennsylvania,136 U.S. 114,119;Crutcherv.Kentucky,141 U.S. 47,62;Galveston c. Ry. Co. v.Texas,210 U.S. 217;Western Union Telegraph Co. v.Kansas,216 U.S. 1,27. InWilliamsv.Talladega,226 U.S. 404,419, there was a state license tax that operated without exemption or distinction upon the privilege of carrying on a business, a part of which was that of an essential governmental agency constituted under a law of the United States. It was held that the tax necessarily included within its operation this part of the business, and since this was unconstitutional the whole tax was rendered void.
The statute now under consideration differs materially, in that it deals separately with the business as conducted in each county of the State, and provides for separate taxes to be laid for each county. And the facts as averred in the bill of complaint show that with respect to all of the counties in which appellant does business, excepting only the County of Russell, there is no element of interstate commerce. In each county there is a store or regular place of business, from which all of the local agents for the same county are supplied with sewing machines and appurtenances that are to be taken into the rural districts for sale or renting, and all transactions that enter into the sale or renting are completely carried out within a single county.
It would be going altogether too far to say that appellant, being properly taxable, and without the least interference with interstate commerce, in twenty-nine counties of the State, could obtain immunity from all such taxationPage 315by establishing in one county a system of business that involved transactions in interstate commerce.
So far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the argument is confined to the "equal protection" clause. It is said there is no sufficient ground for a distinction, with respect to taxing the occupation, between the business of selling sewing machines from a regularly established store and the business of selling them from a delivery wagon. But there is an evident difference, in the mode of doing business, between the local tradesman and the itinerant dealer, and we are unable to say that the distinction made between them for purposes of taxation is arbitrarily made. In such matters the States necessarily enjoy a wide range of discretion, and it would require a clear case to justify the courts in striking down a law that is uniformly applicable to all persons pursuing a given occupation, on the ground that persons engaged in other occupations more or less like it ought to be similarly taxed. This is not such a case.Connollyv.Union Sewer Pipe Co.,184 U.S. 540,559,562;Cookv.Marshall County,196 U.S. 261,274;Armour PackingCo. v.Lacy,200 U.S. 226,235;Southwestern Oil Co. v.Texas,217 U.S. 114,121.
InQuartlebaumv.State,79 Ala. 1,4, a previous statute (sub-section 20 of § 14, act of December 12, 1884; Session Acts 1884-5, p. 17), which imposed an annual license fee of $25 upon "each sewing machine . . . company selling sewing machines . . . either themselves or by their agents, and all persons who engage in the business of selling sewing machines . . . but when merchants engaged in a general business, keep sewing machines . . . they shall not be required to pay the tax herein provided," was sustained against the criticism that it discriminated between two classes of persons engaged in the business of selling sewing machines, namely, between persons who were "merchants engaged in a general business," and persons not so engaged;Page 316the court saying as to the former, "If sewing machines be part of their stock in trade, they are taxed for them as for other merchandise. Their business is in its nature stationary, and there is little or no risk in levying taxes upon their business, on the rule of percentage. That rule may be wholly unsuited and ineffectual for other pursuits, and other lines of business. Much must be left to the discretion of the Legislature, for exact equality of taxation can never be reached." And seeBallouv.State,87 Ala. 144,146.
The contention that the statute violates the state constitution is grounded upon two sections of the Bill of Rights, viz., § 1, "That all men are equally free and independent; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;" and § 37, "That the sole object and only legitimate end of government is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property; and when the government assumes other functions, it is usurpation and oppression."
The bearing of these provisions upon the case in hand is not clear. The argument seems to be that since the tax law in question is not a police measure but a revenue measure, the discriminations are arbitrary. To quote from the brief: "Selling sewing machines is the business, and it is taxed highly, and it may be in fact prohibitorily, when it is done by the use of wagons and teams, and not at all when done at stores." There are other suggestions of a like import. They seem to be sufficiently answered by what has been already said respecting the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State has a wide range of discretion with respect to establishing classes for the purpose of imposing revenue taxes, and its laws upon the subject are not to be set aside as discriminatory unless it clearly appears that there is no rational basis for the classification.Page 317
The cases cited from the state courts lend no support to appellant's argument.City of Mobilev.Craft,94 Ala. 156;Mayor and Aldermen of Tuscaloosav.Holczstein,134 Ala. 636, andGambillv.Endrich Bros.,143 Ala. 506, involved the construction of certain municipal charters and the powers of the respective municipalities thereunder, and have no direct bearing upon the present question. InMontgomeryv.Kelly,142 Ala. 552,559, a municipal ordinance requiring each merchant who issued trading stamps in connection with his business to pay a license tax of $100, viewed in the light of another ordinance that fixed a license fee of $1,000 upon trading stamp companies, was held to be "A palpable attempt under the guise of a license tax, to fix a penalty on the merchant, for conducting his business in a certain way," and therefore unconstitutional.Meffordv.City of Sheffield,148 Ala. 539, sustained a city ordinance that imposed a tax of $200 on wholesale dealers in illuminating oil, while fixing the license tax on dealers in goods, wares, or merchandise in general at $10.Alabama Consolidated Coal Co. v.Herzberg, 59 So. 305, declared unconstitutional § 33A of the Revenue Act of March 31, 1911, p. 181, which undertook to impose upon persons, firms, or corporations conducting a store at which their employes trade on checks, orders, or the like, an annual license fee varying according to the number of persons employed; the court saying, p. 306: "The tax is not, therefore, imposed upon the business, or upon all engaged in a similar business, but is based solely upon the manner in which a party may conduct the business; and the foregoing section is repugnant to the state and Federal constitutions under the authority ofCity of Montgomeryv.Kelly,142 Ala. 552."
The other state decisions to which we are referred have been examined, and we are unable to find in them any basis for declaring § 32 of the Act to be in contravention of the state constitution.Page 318
Finally, it is said that since it appears from the averments of the bill that all sales of sewing machines by appellant's agents in the field are executory only, and require the approval of appellant at its regularly established places of business, located in the various counties of the State, which are headquarters for all agents with their wagons and teams, it at the same time sufficiently appears that appellant is a merchant conducting a regular business at each of said stores, and therefore within the saving clause of § 32 of the Act in question, which declares that "This section shall not apply to merchants selling the above enumerated articles at their regularly established places of business."
It is quite plain, however, from a reading of the entire section, that the business of selling sewing machines by traveling salesmen is intended to be taxed, and the business of selling them at established places of business is intended to be left untaxed, so far as this section is concerned, although the machines sold at these places be delivered by wagons. Complainant is engaged in doing business of both kinds; and with respect to the itinerant sales it is subject to the tax under the section referred to.Decree affirmed.