Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Dixie Tobacco Co.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Dixie Tobacco Co., 228 U.S. 593 (1913)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1913-05-12
- Topic
- general
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court. This is an action brought by the defendant in error to recover for damage to tobacco shipped by it on the railroad at Bedford City, Virginia, to Marshall, Texas. The plaintiff got a verdict and judgment, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeals (111 Virginia, 813), the case having, been taken there on the ground that the act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 584, 595, amending § 20 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 386, is unconstitutional. This section requires any common carrier receiving property for trans *595 portation from a point in one State to a point in another to issue a receipt or bill of lading for the same; makes the receiving carrier liable for loss caused by any common carrier in transitu; and provides that no contract shall exempt it from the liability thus imposed.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Dixie Tobacco Co.. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 17 opinions
Headnotes
- Transportation Law — Carrier Liability Under the Carmack Amendment, a common carrier receiving property for interstate transportation must issue a receipt or bill of lading, is liable for loss caused by any common carrier in transit, and cannot by contract exempt itself from that liability; stipulations in a bill of lading that no carrier shall be liable for damages not occurring on its portion of the through route are void. 228 U.S. 593 (citing Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.S. 186; Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481)
- Transportation Law — Carrier Liability An initial carrier's liability under the Carmack Amendment for damage occurring on a connecting carrier's line does not depend on whether the carrier voluntarily designated the through route connections; the rule applies equally where the initial carrier had no established through route or rate with the connecting carrier and the shipper chose the route. 228 U.S. 593
- Constitutional Law — Due Process Imposing liability on an initial carrier for damages caused by others after it has been compelled by statute to accept goods destined beyond its line and to issue a through bill of lading does not deprive the carrier of property without due process of law, as the acceptance is no less voluntary than in cases where through routes are merely presumed. 228 U.S. 593
NORFOLK W. RY. CO.v. DIXIE TOBACCO CO.,228 U.S. 593(1913)
33 S.Ct. 609
NORFOLK WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANYv. DIXIE TOBACCO COMPANY.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA.
No. 265.
Argued April 28, 1913.
Decided May 12, 1913.
THE facts, which involve the constitutionality of the Carmack
Amendment when applied to interstate shipments on through routes
where the connecting carriers are designated by the shipper, are
stated in the opinion.
Obeying the canon of construction that of two possible constructions, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the constitutional construction will be adopted, this court has construed the Carmack Amendment to fasten liability on the primary carrier only if that carrier has by some voluntary act accepted liability to destination.Lake Shore Mich. SouthernR. Co. v.Smith,173 U.S. 684;A.C.L.R.R. Co. v.RiversideMills,219 U.S. 186;G., H. S.A.R.R. Co. v.Wallace,223 U.S. 481.
An initial carrier cannot refuse a shipment designated for a point beyond its own line.A.C.L.R.R. Co. v.Page 594Riverside Mills, supra; Seasongoodv.Tenn. Ohio RiverTransp. Co., 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1142;Inmanv.St. L.Southwestern Ry. Co.,14 Tex. Civ. App. 39; Hutchinson on Carriers, 3d ed., § 226;Galveston Comm. Assn. v.A., T.S.F. Ry. Co., 25 I.C.C. Rep. 216.
At common law a carrier was not obliged to issue a bill of lading, but the Carmack Amendment creates a substantive duty to issue a receipt or bill of lading which shall describe the true place of destination for every interstate shipment.Johnsonv.Stoddard,100 Mass. 306;Galveston, Harrisburg SanAntonio Ry. Co. v.Wallace,223 U.S. 481;Enterprise Transp.Co. v.Penna. R.R., 12 I.C.C. Rep. 327.
Plaintiff in error in issuing the bill of lading with final destination (Marshall, Texas) shown therein complied with the express requirement of the statute and did not act voluntarily.
The Carmack Amendment does not apply to the plaintiff in error as it by no voluntary act assumed a relation with or liability for loss on any connecting carrier.
No appearance for defendant in error.
The bill of lading stipulated that no carrier should be liable for damages not occurring on its portion of the through route. There was evidence that the tobacco was damaged after it left the railroad company's hands; and the defendant asked an instruction that if the jury believe that it delivered the tobacco in good order to the next carrier the verdict should be in its favor. This instruction was refused and the defendant excepted. There was evidence also that the plaintiff chose the route for the tobacco, being partly by sea and a different one from that which the railroad would have adopted, which would have been all rail. The railroad had no through route or rate established with the line of steamers by which the tobacco went. Instructions were asked and refused, subject to exception, that the bill of lading controlled, and that the above statute, so far as it attempts to invalidate limitations or liabilities like that quoted above, is void.
The Supreme Court of Appeals followed the ruling inAtlanticCoast Line R.R. Co. v.Riverside Mills,219 U.S. 186(to which may be addedGalveston, Harrisburg San Antonio Ry. Co. v.Wallace,223 U.S. 481), as conclusive. The plaintiff in error contends that these cases may be distinguished on the ground that in both of them it was to be presumed that the carrier was a voluntary party to a through route and rate, whereas here the stipulation against liability beyond its line and the fact that it had no through route with the steamship company exclude that presumption. It argues that as it was bound to accept goods destined beyond its line for delivery to the next carrier and was required by the statute to give a through bill of lading, if on such compulsory acceptancePage 596it is made answerable for damages done by others its property is taken without due process of law. But in the former case there was the same stipulation in the bill of lading, and the supposed through routes were only presumed. In the second case the carrier is spoken of as voluntarily accepting goods for a point beyond its line, but there too there was the same attempt to limit liability, and in the present case the acceptance was voluntary in the same degree as in that. There is no substantial distinction between the earlier decisions and this.Judgment affirmed.