Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co. v. United States

Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co. v. United States, 215 U.S. 266 (1909)

Type: Opinion
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: Federal
Date: 1909-12-13
Topic: general

Mr. Justice Harlan, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. We perceive no error in the judgment now under review. *275 The main contention of the defendants is that it was error to permit the United States to file its supplemental bill. We do not accept this view of the trial court’s duty. When the cause was last here the court expressed the conviction that if the case was finally disposed of on the record as it then was great wrong might be done to the United States and to all interested in preserving the navigability of the-Rio Grande.

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Cited by: 23 opinions

RIO GRANDE DAM c. CO.v. UNITED STATES,215 U.S. 266(1909)

30 S.Ct. 97

RIO GRANDE DAM AND IRRIGATION COMPANYv. UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO.

No. 49.

Argued December 3, 1909.

Decided December 13, 1909.

Where a case is opened that further evidence may be produced, it is also open for the amendment of the original pleadings or for additional pleadings appropriate to the issues; and permission by the lower court to file such supplemental complaint is not inconsistent with the mandate of this court remanding the case with directions to grant leave to both sides to adduce further evidence. Under the provisions of the Code of New Mexico allowing supplemental pleadings alleging facts material to the issue, the fact that the defendant corporation has, since the suit was brought by the Government to enjoin it from so building a dam as to interfere with the navigability of an international river, failed to exercise its franchise in accordance with the statute, is germane to the object of the suit and may be pleaded by supplemental complaint.Page 267The allowance of amendments of supplemental pleadings must at every stage of the cause rest with the discretion of the court, which discretion must depend largely on the special circumstances of each case, nor will the exercise of this discretion be reviewed in the absence of gross abuse. Attorneys of record are supposed to be present during the terms of the court in which their causes are pending, and are chargeable with notice of proceedings transpiring in open court. In this case the action of the trial court in taking a supplemental complaint for confessed in the absence of any pleading after the time therefor had elapsed, sustained, there appearing to be no excuse for the default and no irregularity appearing in the order permitting the filing of the complaint or in the service thereof. The fact that for a time work was enjoined at the instance of the Government does not excuse the delay in completing work under statutory permission within the time prescribed where the delay exceeds the limit after deducting all the time for which the injunction was in force. 13 New Mexico, 386, affirmed.

THE general object of this suit — which was brought by the

United States in one of the courts of New Mexico on the

twenty-fourth day of May, 1897 — was to obtain an injunction to

prevent the Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company from

constructing and maintaining a dam across, and a reservoir over

and near, the Rio Grande River at a certain point in that

Territory. In the court of original jurisdiction the suit was

dismissed and the dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court of

the Territory; but that judgment was reversed by this court, with

instructions to set aside the decree of dismissal and to inquire

whether the intended acts of the defendants in the construction

of a dam and appropriating the waters of the Rio Grande would

substantially diminish the navigability of that stream within the

limits of present navigability; and, if so, to enter a decree

restraining those acts to the extent that they would so diminish.

United Statesv.Rio Grande Irrigation Company,174 U.S. 690,

708,710. The mandate of this court to that effect was executed

by the Supreme Court of the Territory, and the cause went back to

the court of original

Page 268

jurisdiction with directions to proceed in accordance with that

mandate.

The cause was again heard in the court of original

jurisdiction, that court, denying a motion, in behalf of the

United States, for a continuance in order that it might more

fully prepare its case. The suit, on final hearing, was again

dismissed, and that judgment was sustained by the Supreme Court

of the Territory. But this court reversed the decree of the

latter court and remanded the cause with instructions to reverse

the decree of the court of original jurisdiction, and with

directions "to grant leave to both sides to adduce further

evidence."United Statesv.Rio Grande Dam Irrigation Co.,

184 U.S. 416,424,425. The mandate of this court to the above

effect was executed, and the case was again placed on the docket

of the court of original jurisdiction.

For a full statement of the issues and facts up to this point

in the litigation reference is made to the opinions of this court

as reported in174 U.S. 690, and184 U.S. 416.

The record shows that on the seventh day of April, 1903 —

after the last decision in this court — the United States, by

leave of the court of original jurisdiction, filed a

supplementalcomplaint, which set forth the then status of the

case. That complaint referred to the defendant's plea, stating

that it had complied with the requirements of the act of Congress

approved March 3d 1891, repealing timber culture laws and for

other purposes,26 Stat. 1095, 1102, c. 561, §§ 20, 21, and "had

acquired a right to construct said dam and divert said water by

reason of compliance with the terms of said Act." It then

proceeded: "II. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant's plea

above referred to, claiming a right to construct said dam under

the said act of Congress, approved March 3d 1891, c. 561, was

filed on June 26, A.D. 1897, and that its articles of

incorporation and proof of its incorporation, and the map and

survey of its reservoir had been filed and approved by the

Secretary of the Interior long prior to the filing of said plea,

as appears from an inspection of said plea itself. III. Plaintiff

Page 269

further alleges that in and by section twenty of the said act of

March 3d 1891, above referred to, it was provided `that if any

section of said canal, or ditch, shall not be completed within

five years after the location of said section, the rights herein

granted shall be forfeited as to any uncompleted section of said

canal, ditch or reservoir, to the extent that the same is not

completed at the date of the forfeiture,' and that although five

years since the filing and approval of said articles of

incorporation, proofs of organization, maps and surveys have long

since elapsed, defendant has not complied with the requirements

of said act, but has failed to construct or complete within the

period of five years after the location of said canal and

reservoir any part or section of the same, and the same has by

reason thereof become forfeited. IV. Plaintiff further alleges

that during all of said time, except from May 24th, 1897, to

____ 1897, the date when the temporary injunction was

dissolved, the said defendants have been in no wise hindered,

restrained or prevented from complying with the provisions of

said act by any judicial order or process whatsoever. V.

Wherefore, plaintiff prays to be permitted to file this

supplemental bill of complaint, and that the same be considered

upon the hearing of this cause, and that the defendants be

decreed to have forfeited all the rights they may have had, or

claimed under and by virtue of said act of March 3d 1891, not

hereby admitting, however, that the defendants ever acquired any

rights under and by virtue of said act. Plaintiff further prays

that the injunction, and all other relief prayed for in and by

said amended bill of complaint, be granted, and that said

injunction be made perpetual, and that it have and recover its

costs expended in this cause, and thus plaintiff will ever pray."

A copy of this supplemental complaint was served on the

attorney of the defendants on the day (April 7th, 1903) it was

filed. More than forty days thereafter, on the twenty-first day

of May, 1903, a decree was entered finding the allegations of the

supplemental complaint — no demurrer, answer or other

Page 270

pleading having been filed thereto — "are confessed and are

true." The court further found "that the articles of

incorporation and the map, survey of the reservoir of the

defendant corporation, the Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company,

were filed with the Secretary of the Interior prior to the

twenty-sixth day of June, A.D. 1897, and were, prior to said

date, approved by the Secretary of the Interior; and it further

finds that the said defendants have not completed its said

reservoir or said ditch, or any section thereof, within five

years after the location of the said reservoir and its said ditch

line, or within five years after the approval of the same by the

Secretary of the Interior; and the court further finds that five

years since the filing and approval of the said articles of

incorporation, proof of organization, maps and surveys of the

said reservoir and ditch line of the defendants had long since

elapsed prior to the filing of the said supplemental bill and

that the defendants had not complied with the requirements of the

act of Congress, approved March 3, 1901, under which the same

were filed, but have failed to construct or complete within the

period of five years after the location of the said canal and

reservoir any part or section of the same." And it was adjudged

"that the rights of the said defendants, or either of them, to so

construct and complete the said reservoir and said ditch, or any

part thereof, under and by virtue of the said act of Congress of

March 3, 1901, be and the same are hereby declared to be

forfeited. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed by the

court by reason of the premises that an injunction be, and the

same is hereby granted against the said defendants, enjoining

them from constructing or attempting to construct the said

reservoir, or any part thereof, and that the same be made

perpetual." (By an amended decree filed October 5th, 1903, and

enterednunc pro tuncas of May 21st, 1903, the date given as

March 3d 1901, in the decree was made to read March 3d 1891, in

order to conform to the actual date of the act of Congress

intended to be referred to both by the United States and by the

court.)

Page 271

A statute of New Mexico, in force at the time and before the

above decree was rendered, provided: "Every pleading, subsequent

to the complaint, shall be filed and served within twenty days

after service of the pleading to which it is an answer, demurrer,

or reply." Compiled Laws of New Mexico, 1907, Title 33; Code of

Civil Procedure, c. 1, art. 4, sub. sec. 46.

On the thirty-first of October, 1903, the defendants moved the

court to vacate the order allowing the supplemental bill to be

filed, and that they be permitted to come in and answer the

supplemental bill. This motion was denied and upon appeal to the

Supreme Court of the Territory the action of the trial court on

this point was sustained. The former court, at the same time,

March 2d 1906, adjudged that the right of the defendants, or

either of them, to construct and complete its reservoir and

ditch, or any part thereof, within the time required by the act

of Congress of March 3d 1901, was forfeited. It was also

adjudged that the defendants be enjoined from constructing, or

attempting to construct, the said reservoir or any part thereof.

The injunction was made perpetual. From that judgment the present

appeal was prosecuted.

Mr. William W. BrideandMr. Frederick S. Tyler, with whomMr. Charles A. Douglaswas on the brief, for plaintiffs in error:

The lower court erred in permitting a supplemental complaint to be filed. This court has many times frowned upon such acts.Southardv.Russell, 16 How. 547;Ex parte Dubuque, 1 Wall. 69;Amesv.Kimberly,136 U.S. 629;Re Gamewell Co., 73 F. 908;Westv.Brashear, 14 Pet. 51;Masonv.Harpers Ferry,20 W. Va. 223;Boggsv.Willard,70 Ill. 315;Reesv.McDaniels,131 Mo. 681;Gagev.Bailey,119 Ill. 539;Choteauv.Allen,114 Mo. 56;Mackallv.Richards,116 U.S. 47;Re SandfordTool Co.,160 U.S. 255;Sibbaldv.United States, 12 Pet. 488;Tex. Pac. Ry. v.Anderson,149 U.S. 237.

The direction to allow further proof was specific and thePage 272court below varied that direction — and this can be corrected by mandamus or appeal.United Statesv.Fossatt, 21 How. 445;Re Sandford Tool Co.,160 U.S. 255. The supplemental bill was improperly so called; it was not, nor was its purpose, related to the original bill but it set up independent cause of action. This is not permissible.Accumulator Co. v.Electric Co., 44 F. 602, 607; 2 Street's Fed. Eq. Prac., §§ 1170, 1171; 1 Foster's Fed. Prac., 4th ed., 631;Trust Co. v.StreetRailway, 74 F. 67;Putneyv.Whitmire, 66 F. 385;Staffordv.Howlett, 1 Paige (N.Y.), 200; Vansile's Eq. Plead., § 263;Milnerv.Milner, 2 Edw. Ch. (N.Y.) 114;Higginsonv.C., B. Q.R.R., 102 F. 197; Fletcher's Eq. Plead. 892.

The supplemental bill must be germane to the original bill, and if the original bill shows no ground for relief it cannot be aided by a supplemental bill setting up matters that have since arisen.Minnesota Co. v.St. Paul Co., 6 Wall. 742; Story Eq. Plead., § 339;Hughesv.Carue,135 Ill. 519;Maynardv.Green, 30 F. 643;Proutyv.Lake Shore Ry.,85 N.Y. 275;Sneadv.McCoull, 12 How. 407.

The notice was insufficient. Equity Rule 57, and cases cited in Desty's Rules, 7th ed., p. 110.The Solicitor Generalfor the United States, appellee:

The trial court properly allowed complainant's supplemental bill to be filed. Nothing in the previous decisions of this court was incompatible with the filing of the supplemental bill or with the subsequent proceedings upon it. Allowance of the filing of a supplemental bill is within the discretion of the trial court.Berliner Gramophone Co. v.Seaman, 113 F. 750, 754;Jacobv.Lorenz,98 Cal. 332,337;Farmers' LoanTrust Co. v.Bankers' Merchants' Telegraph Co.,109 N.Y. 342. And, in general, granting or refusing leave to file a new plea, or to amend a pleading, is discretionary and is not reviewable on appeal except for gross abuse of discretion.Mandevillev.Wilson, 5 Cranch, 15, 17;Page 273Gormleyv.Bunyan,138 U.S. 623;Chapmanv.Barney,129 U.S. 677;Waldenv.Craig, 9 Wheat. 576;Chiracv.Reinicker, 11 Wheat. 280;Ex parte Bradstreet, 7 Pet. 634.

Notice of complainant's application for leave to file its supplemental bill was served upon the defendants' attorney; and no evidence to the contrary is found in the record. But the omission of notice would not be material error, because a copy of the bill was at once served upon the attorney for defendants and they had full opportunity thereupon to move to strike it off the file or demur. As defendants failed in any way to attack the filing of the bill or to demur or plead in any way to it within the time allowed by § 2685, New Mexico Code of Civil Procedure, it was the duty of the trial court to take the billproconfessoand to enter the decree.

Notice of an application for leave to file a supplemental bill is not in all cases necessary. It is a matter of discretion with the court whether to require such notice.Eagerv.Price, 2 Paige Ch. 333, 335;Lawrencev.Bolton, 3 Paige, 294, 295;Barriclov.Trenton Mut. Life Fire Ins. Co.,13 N.J. Eq. 154,155;Winn Rossv.Albert et al., 2 Md. Ch. 42;Taylorv.Taylor, 1 Mac. G. 397.

Whether or not a bill is not supplemental in character, is waived by failure to demur, plead or object thereto within the time allowed. The proper method of objecting on the ground of want of supplemental matter is by demurrer. 2 Daniell Ch. Pl. Pr., 6th Am. ed., p. 1535;Bowyerv.Bright, 13 Price, 316;Staffordv.Howlett, 1 Paige Ch. 200.

The supplemental bill does not set up matter foreign to the original case in alleging forfeiture of defendants' rights in their dam and reservoir sites. Forfeiture could not be claimed in the original bill because it was not true when the bill was filed. It is certainly proper to add the claim of forfeiture to the original bill when the cause of forfeiture occurred after the suit was begun. Matter may be introduced by supplemental bill which could have been added to the original bill if then available.Winn Rossv.Albert et al., 2 Md. Ch. 42, 48;Page 274Hardinv.Boyd,113 U.S. 756. As to scope allowable to a supplemental bill, seeJonesv.Jones, 3 Atk. 110;Eagerv.Price, 2 Paige, 333;Saundersv.Frost, 5 Pick. 275;Fisherv.Holden,84 Mich. 494;Jacobv.Lorenz,98 Cal. 332;Hasbrouckv.Shuster, 4 Barb. 285;Candlerv.Pettit, 1 Paige Ch. 168;Winn Rossv.Albert et al., 2 Md. Ch. 42;Mutterv.Chauvel, 5 Russ. 42;Reevev.NorthCarolina Land Timber Co., 141 F. 821;Jenkinsv.Int. Nat. Bank,127 U.S. 484.

The rule that a bad title set up in the original bill cannot be aided by supplemental bill setting up a new and distinct title obtains only when complainant's original title is wholly bad; it does not prevent the assertion of a new title when it adds to or supplements the first title, instead of contradicting it.WinnRossv.Albert, supra. And seeJacquesv.Hall, 3 Gray, 194, 197;Candlerv.Pettit, 1 Paige, 168;Edgarv.Clevenger,3 N.J. Eq. 258;Lowryv.Harris,12 Minn. 255,266;Reevev.Timber Co., 141 F. 821, 834. There is no inconsistency between the supplemental and original bills in this case. The purpose of each was to restrain defendants' construction and use of the proposed dam and reservoir.

Even if the supplemental bill had been improperly allowed to be filed, it was right to deny defendants' motion to vacate the allowance of the filing of the bill and the decree that had been entered or to open defendants' default and permit them to plead. Defendants' inaction and laches deprived them of any claim to relief; their motion was too late under the New Mexico statute; the supplemental character of complainant's bill was not questionable by motion but only by demurrer; and the answer which defendants asked leave to interpose failed itself to show any defense against default.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

We perceive no error in the judgment now under review.Page 275The main contention of the defendants is that it was error to permit the United States to file its supplemental bill. We do not accept this view of the trial court's duty. When the cause was last here the court expressed the conviction that if the case was finally disposed of on the record as it then was great wrong might be done to the United States and to all interested in preserving the navigability of the Rio Grande. Hence, the cause was sent back that each side might adduce further evidence, if they had any to adduce. When the Government asked to file its supplemental bill the suit was of course reinstated on the docket of the court of original jurisdiction for such action as might be proper or necessary. The case having been opened that further evidence might be produced, it was certainly open for an amendment of the original pleadings or for such additional pleadings as might be appropriate to the issues between the parties. The parties were not limited to the production merely of evidence. The defendants, in the discretion of the court, could have been allowed, upon a proper showing and before taking further proof, to amend their pleadings, and equally the Government, before taking further proof, could have been allowed to file a supplemental complaint.Marine Ins. Co. v.Hodgson, 6 Cranch, 206, 218. Besides, subsection 87 of the New Mexico Civil Code would seem to be broad enough to cover the question of power. It provides: "A party may be allowed, on motion, to make a supplemental complaint, answer or reply, alleging facts material to the cause, or praying for any other or different relief, order or judgment." The facts set forth in the supplemental complaint were manifestly not foreign to the Government's original cause of action. In every substantial sense those facts were material. Strictly speaking, they may have constituted new matter, but they did not present a new cause of action.Jenkinsv.International Bank of Chicago,127 U.S. 484. They grew out of and were connected with the same transaction from which this litigation arose, and were germane to the object of the suit. That object was to restrain the defendantsPage 276from constructing and maintaining dams, reservoirs, canals or ditches that would obstruct the navigable portion of the Rio Grande River. If all the grounds of relief set out in the supplemental complaint did not exist when the original complaint was filed, they were alleged to exist when the supplemental complaint was tendered, and being connected with the original cause of action it was right to bring them, in proper from, to the attention of the court when determining whether the Government was entitled to the relief it asked. So the Supreme Court of the Territory held, and so we hold. There was, plainly, no abuse of discretion or of the established rules of practice in permitting the supplemental complaint to be filed. The allowance of amendments of equity pleadings must "at every stage of the cause, rest in the discretion of the court; and that discretion must depend largely on the special circumstances of each case."Hardinv.Boyd,113 U.S. 756,761.

Upon the question of the diligence or want of diligence of the parties, it may be said that the supplemental complaint was tendered at a time when the court was open; the leave to file was given in open court; and the defendant's attorney was served with a copy of that complaint on the very day it was tendered and filed. On this part of the case the Supreme Court of the Territory said that attorneys of record are presumed to be present during terms of the court in which their causes are pending, and in contemplation of law were chargeable with notice of all proceedings transpiring in open court in respect of such causes; also, that "under the facts of this case, counsel are presumed to have been present, and to have such notice as the law requires of matters transpiring in open court on the day on which leave was granted to file the supplemental complaint, and the same was filed and served upon them.Youngev.Broxson,23 Ala. 684;Sandersv.Savage,63 S.D. 218. The court was vested with discretion by the last clause of sec. 104,supra, [Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by c. 11 of Laws of 1901] which does not seem to have been abused, nor was there any abuse of the general discretionPage 277to allow an amended or supplemental bill in equity conferred upon the courts of the United States, as may be seen by reference to the case ofBerliner Gramophone Co. v.Seamon, 113 F. 750, in which it was held that, `the granting of leave to file an amended and supplemental bill is a matter within the discretion of the court, and its action will not be reviewed in an appellate court unless there has been a gross abuse of this discretion.'"

The objection that the trial court erred in taking the supplemental complaint for confessed cannot be sustained. That objection was thus properly disposed of by the Supreme Court of the Territory: "There being no error or irregularity in the court's order allowing the supplemental complaint to be filed, the same having been done in open court, and a copy of the same having been served upon one of the attorneys of record on the same day on which it was filed, the statute required an answer or other proper pleading to be filed within twenty days from the date of such filing, and in the event of failure to plead, or secure additional time to plead, neither of which were done in this case, it was perfectly regular for the court to render decree.Gregoryv.Pike, 29 F. 588. Appellants seek to be relieved from their own default by alleging neglect on the part of their attorneys. . . . There being service of a copy of the supplemental complaint upon one of the attorneys of record on the day on which it was filed it was entirely regular for the court to render the decree when applied for 44 days after such service, in the absence of any appearance or pleading by the appellants."

Some stress is laid on the fact that the Government obtained an injunction to prevent the defendants from constructing its reservoir and dam. That fact, it is contended, estops the Government from relying on the five-years' limitation prescribed by the above act of March 3d 1891, c. 561. But this view is without merit. The preliminary injunction referred to was dissolved July 31st, 1897, and was never reinstated. The supplemental bill was taken as confessed onPage 278May 21st, 1903, and a perpetual injunction was then awarded against the defendants. So that between the dissolution of the preliminary injunction and the granting of the perpetual injunction more than five years elapsed, during which the defendants were not impeded or hindered by any injunction against them. This is sufficient to show that the point just stated is without merit. We need not, therefore, consider the larger question, whether the five-years' limitation prescribed by Congress in the above act of March 3d 1891, could have been disregarded or enlarged either by the action or non-action of the parties or by any order of injunction made by the court in the progress of the cause.

There are some minor questions in the case, but they are not of substance and need not be noticed. We perceive no error of law in the record, and the judgment isAffirmed.

MR. JUSTICE McKENNA did not participate in the consideration or determination of this case.