Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky

Adams Express Co. v. Ky., 214 U.S. 218 (1909)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1909-05-24
Topic
general

Mr. Justice Brewer, after, making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. The jurisdiction of this court is' not open to dispute. Defendant contended That the Kentucky statute as applied to *222 the transportation.of liquor from State to State was in conflict with the section of the Federal Constitution vesting jurisdiction' in Congress over interstate commerce. This contention was denied by the state court, and thus a question arose under the Federal Constitution decided adversely to the plaintiff in error.

Citator

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Authority status
pending
Cited by
25 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause A question under the Federal Constitution arises for Supreme Court review where a state court denies a contention that a state statute, as applied to the transportation of liquor from one State to another, conflicts with the federal constitutional provision committing regulation of interstate commerce to Congress.
  2. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause Liquor is a recognized article of commerce, and however obnoxious or hurtful it may be in the judgment of many, it is not thereby removed from the protection of the commerce clause.
  3. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause The right to send liquors from one State into another, and the act of sending them, is interstate commerce, the regulation of which the Constitution commits to Congress; a state law that denies that right, or substantially interferes with or hampers it, conflicts with the Constitution of the United States.
  4. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause The interstate transportation of goods is not complete until delivery to the consignee, and state power does not attach to an interstate shipment while the merchandise is in transit, until its arrival at the point of destination and delivery there to the consignee.
  5. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause State legislation enacted in the exercise of the police power that directly regulates commerce must yield where it conflicts with powers belonging exclusively to Congress, because the Constitution and laws of the United States are the supreme law of the land.
  6. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause Any exercise of state authority, in whatever form manifested, that directly regulates interstate commerce is repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution.
  7. Constitutional Law — Commerce Clause A shipment of goods from one State to another is a transaction of interstate commerce within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, and a state statute attempting to regulate such interstate commerce cannot be sustained.
Mr. Justice Brewer,

after, making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The jurisdiction of this court is' not open to dispute. Defendant contended That the Kentucky statute as applied to *222 the transportation.of liquor from State to State was in conflict with the section of the Federal Constitution vesting jurisdiction' in Congress over interstate commerce. This contention was denied by the state court, and thus a question arose under the Federal Constitution decided adversely to the plaintiff in error. Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359.

Liquor, however obnoxious and hurtful it may be in the judgment of many, is a recognized article of commerce. license Cases, 5 How. 504, 577; Leisy v. Hardin, 435 U. S. 100, 110.

In Vance v. Vandercook Company (No. 1), 170 U. S. 438, 444, Mr. Justice White, delivering the opinion of the court, said:

“Equally we|l established is the proposition that the right to send liquors from one State into another, and the act of sending the same, 'is interstate commerce, the regulation whereof has been committed by the Constitution of the United States to Congress, and, hence, that a state law which denies such a right, or substantially.interferes with or hampers the same, is in conflict with the Constitution.of the United States.”

That the transportation is not complete until delivery 'to the consignee is also settled. , _ .

In Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, 426, it was held that the Wilson Act “was not intended to and did not cause the power •of the State to attach to -.an interstate commerce shipment, whilst the merchandise was ;in transit under'such 'shipment,, .and until its arrival at the'point of destination and delivery there to the consignee.”

This legislation is in the exercise of the police :power, á powér which, generally speaking, belongs to the State, and is-an attempt in virtue of that power to directly regulate commerce, but in case of conflict between the powers claimed by the'State and those which belong exclusively to.Congress, the former must, yield, for the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof are “the supreme law. of the land.”

*223 Section 5258 of .the Revised Statutes of the United States provides:

“Every railroad company in the United States . .' . is hereby, authorized to carry upon and over its road . . ,. all passengers '. . . freight, and property on their way from any State to' another State, and to receive compensation therefor.” New Orleans Gas Company v. Louisiana Light Company, 115 U. S. 650; Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557.

In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 334, it was declared “that any exercise of state authority, in whatever form manifested, which directly regulates interstate commerce, is repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution.”

In Adams Express Company v. Kentucky, 206 U. S. 129, 135, it was said:

“ The testimony showed that the package, containing a gallon of whiskey, was shipped from Cincinnati, Ohio, to George Meece, at East Bernstadt, Kentucky. The transaction was therefore one of interstate commerce, and within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. The Kentucky statute is obviously an attempt to regulate such interstate commerce. This is hardly questioned by the Court of Appeals, and is beyond dispute under the decisions of this court.”

Clearly within the cases above cited the statute before us as applied to transportation from State to State cannot be sustained.'

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Hart County, Kentucky, is reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion.

Me. Justice Haelan dissents.