Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Nielsen v. Oregon

Nielsen v. Or., 212 U.S. 315 (1909)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1909-02-23
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that Oregon cannot prosecute a Washingtonian for conduct that is lawful in Washington but unlawful in Oregon, given that the conduct occurred in Washington
  • finding that Oregon cannot prosecute and punish act done within territorial limits of Washington
  • stating concurrent jurisdiction avoids questions of whether acts occurred on one side or the other side of the exact boundary in a channel
  • rejecting the Oregon Supreme Court’s attempt to convict a defendant for conduct allowed under Washington law that took place within Washington’s territorial boundaries, notwithstanding a congressional grant of concurrent jurisdiction over the location of the conduct
  • the United States may adopt-seizure of property forfeitable under federal law if seized by local official

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Cited by
74 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Constitutional Law — Concurrent Jurisdiction of States Concurrent jurisdiction granted by Congress to two states over a river forming their common boundary extends to civil as well as criminal matters and is broadly a grant of jurisdiction to each state, meaning the authority of each state to apply its law to the acts of persons within the shared territory. 212 U.S. at 319-320 (citing Wedding v. Meyler, 192 U.S. 573)
  2. Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Scope of Decision In determining the effect of a grant of concurrent jurisdiction, a court properly confines itself to the precise question presented rather than resolving the broader and more difficult questions the grant may raise. 212 U.S. at 320-321
  3. Criminal Law & Procedure — Double Jeopardy Where two states have concurrent jurisdiction, and an act is malum in se and prohibited and punishable by the laws of both, the state first acquiring jurisdiction of the person may prosecute the offense, and its judgment is a finality so that one convicted or acquitted in the courts of one state cannot be prosecuted for the same offense in the courts of the other. 212 U.S. at 320
  4. Criminal Law & Procedure — Concurrent Jurisdiction — Malum Prohibitum Where an act is prohibited by one state having concurrent jurisdiction but is expressly authorized by the other state and done within that other state's territorial limits under a license issued by it, the prohibiting state cannot, by virtue of its concurrent jurisdiction, disregard that authority and prosecute and punish the person for the act. 212 U.S. at 320-321
NIELSENv. OREGON,212 U.S. 315(1909)
29 S.Ct. 383
NIELSENv. STATE OF OREGON.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON.
No. 593.
Argued January 18, 19, 1909.
Decided February 23, 1909.
The concurrent jurisdiction given by Congress to the States of Oregon and Washington over the Columbia River, by the acts of March 2, 1853, c. 90,10 Stat. 172, and of February 14, 1859, c. 33,11 Stat. 383, extends to civil as well as criminal matters, and is broadly a grant of jurisdiction to each State.Weddingv.Meyler,192 U.S. 573. In determining the effect of a grant of concurrent jurisdiction this court confines itself to the precise questions presented. Where two States have concurrent jurisdiction, the one first acquiring jurisdiction may prosecute and punish for an act which ismalum in seand punishable by the laws of both States, and the judgment is a finality so that the person prosecuted cannot be again tried in either State. But this rule does not apply to those acts which are prohibited in only one of the States. Where two States have concurrent jurisdiction over the same territory which is partly located in one State and partly in the other, one State cannot prosecute a person for an actmalum prohibitumby its own laws, and which was committed in territory within the other State by authority of the latter; and so held, that one holding a purse net license from the State of Washington cannot be prosecuted for using such net on the Washington side of the Columbia River in the courts of Oregon for violating the statutes of that State prohibiting the use of such nets.Quaere, whether such person could be prosecuted in the courts of Oregon for using such nets on the Oregon side of the river; andquaerewhether, where concurrent jurisdiction exists, prosecutions should be in the name of both States. 95 P. 720, reversed.
PLAINTIFF in error was convicted in a justice's court of the
precinct of Astoria, Clatsop County, Oregon, of maintaining
Page 316
and operating a purse net on the Columbia River, contrary to the
statutes of Oregon. This conviction was, by proper proceedings,
taken to the Supreme Court of the State and the judgment
affirmed. 95 P. 720. From that decision the case has been
brought here on error.
According to the agreed statement of facts, plaintiff in error
was an actual andbona fideresident and inhabitant of the
State of Washington and a citizen of the United States. He had a
license from the Fish Commissioner of Washington to operate a
purse net on the Columbia River, and was on said river, within
the limits of the State of Washington, operating such a purse net
at the time he was arrested and prosecuted in the courts of
Oregon.
By § 1 of the act of Congress of March 2, 1853, c. 90,
10 Stat. 172, all that part of the Territory of Oregon lying north
of the "main channel of the Columbia River" was organized into
the Territory of Washington, and by § 21 of the same act it is
provided "that the Territory of Oregon and the Territory of
Washington shall have concurrent jurisdiction over all offenses
committed on the Columbia River, where said river forms the
common boundary between said territories." Section 1 of the act
of Congress admitting Oregon into the Union (act of February 14,
1859, c. 33,11 Stat. 383), after describing in detail the
boundaries of the State, provides, "including jurisdiction in
civil and criminal cases upon the Columbia River and Snake River,
concurrently with States and Territories of which those rivers
form a boundary in common with this State." And in § 2 it is said
"the State of Oregon shall have concurrent jurisdiction on the
Columbia and all other rivers and waters bordering on the said
State of Oregon so far as the same shall form a common boundary
to said State, and any other State or States now or hereafter to
be formed or bounded by the same."
The legislative assembly of Oregon passed an act, the first
section of which is as follows:
"SEC. 1. It shall hereafter be unlawful to operate or maintain
Page 317
within any of the rivers of this State or of the Columbia River,
or in the Pacific Ocean within three miles of the mouths of any
of the rivers of this State, or of the Columbia River, any purse
net or other like seine for the purpose of catching or taking
salmon or other anadromous fish or sturgeon."
The second section makes one violating any of the provisions
of the act guilty of a misdemeanor, and prescribes the penalty.
Sess. Laws Oregon, 1907, p. 154. On the other hand, Washington
passed an act (Sess. Laws Wash., 1899, p. 194), the second
section of which reads as follows:
"SEC. 2. The use of pound nets, traps, weirs, fish wheels and
other fixed appliances, and purse nets, drag seines, and other
seines for catching salmon, is hereby authorized in all the
waters of this State wherein the same is not prohibited by
section 1, subject to the regulation and license hereinafter
provided for or otherwise required by law, and the use of the set
nets, gill or drift nets, subject to said license and regulation
for said purpose, is authorized in all the waters of this State,
except as otherwise provided by law. . . ."
The prohibition in section 1 referred to does not include the
Columbia River. Section 6 of the same act fixes the license fees
for all first-class purse seines at $50 and all second-class
purse seines at $25.
Mr. E.C. Macdonald, with whomMr. John D. Atkinson, Mr.C.C. Fulton, Mr. S.H. Piles, Mr. W.P. Bell, Mr. H.M. BrooksandMr. J.B. Alexanderwere on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

The term "concurrent jurisdiction," as used in the act of Congress herein involved, means that the two sovereignties have jurisdiction over common territory when both act in conjunction as to the laws concerning the common territory. That is, when the two States of Washington and Oregon pass the same or similar laws which define what shall be a crime if committed on either the Washington or Oregon side of the Columbia River, then they have enacted concurrent legislation, andPage 318thereupon the authorities of either State are empowered to enforce its laws by arresting any person who commits a crime on any part of the Columbia River over which the concurrent jurisdiction of the two States lies. But until the two States have passed the same, or similar, laws, neither State can enforce its laws, at least across its boundary, and act within the territorial limits of another State.In re Mattson, 69 F. 535, 542;Ex parte Des Jeiro, 152 F. 1004;Robertsv.Fullerton,117 Wis. 222(93 N.W. 1111);Central R.R. Co. of N.J. v.Jersey City(N.J.), 56 Atlantic Rep. 239.

The State of Oregon cannot arrest and punish one as an offender against her laws who was never, until his arrest, within the State of Oregon, and for an act which he had been specifically authorized to do. The definition of concurrent jurisdiction contended for by the State of Oregon in this case would lead to interminable controversies.Mr. A.M. Crawford, Attorney General of the State of Oregon, with whomMr. I.N. Van Winklewas on the brief, for defendant in error:

Jurisdiction unqualified, when applied to territory, is the sovereign authority to make, decide on, and execute laws.Weddingv.Meyler,192 U.S. 573,584,585, approvingArnoldv.Shields, 5 Dana (Ky.), 23;Danielsv.Tearney,102 U.S. 415,418, holding jurisdiction is only "The right to hear and determine." See alsoGrignon's Lesseev.Astor, 2 How. 318, 337;Cornettv.Williams, 20 Wall. 226, 249; Brown on Jurisdiction, 2d ed., § 2; 11 Cyc., p. 659; 2 Rawle's Revision Bouvier's Law Dict. 57; Anderson's Law Dict. 580; 1 Abbott's Law Dict. 671.

When a State or any sovereign power acquires jurisdiction over any territory, and that without conditions or limitations, the sovereign is vested with the authority to make, interpret and execute the laws for that territory.

The words "concurrent jurisdiction," as used in the act admitting Oregon into the Union, mean like authority conferred on each sovereign at the same time, over the same place, objectPage 319or thing, including the authority to enforce its commands or decrees over the same. Sections 1 and 2, act admitting Oregon,11 Stat. 383; 1 B. C. Codes, 73;Re The Annie M. Smull, 2 Sawyer, 226; Fed. Cas. No. 423;Carlislev.State,32 Ind. 55,56;Sherlockv.Alling,44 Ind. 184,193;Iowav.Mullen,35 Iowa 199,201,204;Minnesotav.George,60 Minn. 503,505;Weddingv.Meyler,192 U.S. 573,581;Ohiov.Stevens, 2 West. Law Jour. 66, reversed on another point,4 Ohio 386;Arnoldv.Shields, 5 Dana (Ky.), 20, 23;McFallv.Commonwealth, 2 Metcalf (Ky.), 394, 396;Memphis Cincinnati Packet Co. v.Pikey,142 Ind. 305,308;Welshv.State,126 Ind. 71,74,75; Rorer on Interstate Law, Ch. 34, Subd. 3, p. 337; 2 Rawle's Revision Bouvier's Law Dict. 57.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
By the legislation of Congress the Columbia River is made the common boundary between Oregon and Washington, and to each of those States is given concurrent jurisdiction on the waters of that river. How that jurisdiction is to be exercised, what limitations there are, if any, upon the power of either State, is not in terms prescribed. It is true in the first section of the act admitting Oregon the jurisdiction was apparently limited to "civil and criminal cases," but in the second section of that act there was given in general terms "concurrent jurisdiction." InWeddingv.Meyler,192 U.S. 573,584, construing the term "concurrent jurisdiction," as given to Kentucky and Indiana over the Ohio River, this court, reversing the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, said:

"Concurrent jurisdiction, properly so-called, on rivers is familiar to our legislation, and means the jurisdiction of two powers over one and the same place. There is no reason to give an unusual meaning to the phrase. SeeSandersv.St. Louis NewOrleans Anchor Line,97 Mo. 26,30;Opsahlv.Judd,30 Minn. 126,129,130;J.S. Keator LumberPage 320Companyv.St. Croix Boom Corp.,72 Wis. 62, and the cases last cited.

"The construction adopted by the majority of the Court of Appeals seems to us at least equally untenable. It was held that the words `meant only that the States should have legislative jurisdiction.' But jurisdiction, whatever else or more it may mean, isjurisdictio, in its popular sense of authority to apply the law to the acts of men.Vicat Vocab., sub. v. SeeRhode Islandv.Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 718. What the Virginia compact most certainly conferred on the States north of the Ohio, was the right to administer the law below low-water mark on the river, and, as part of that right, the right to serve process there with effect.Statev.Mullen,35 Iowa 199,205, 206."

Undoubtedly one purpose, perhaps the primary purpose, in the grant of concurrent jurisdiction was to avoid any nice question as to whether a criminal act sought to be prosecuted was committed on one side or the other of the exact boundary in the channel, that boundary sometimes changing by reason of the shifting of the channel. Where an act ismalum in seprohibited and punishable by the laws of both States, the one first acquiring jurisdiction of the person may prosecute the offense, and its judgment is a finality in both States, so that one convicted or acquitted in the courts of the one State cannot be prosecuted for the same offense in the courts of the other. But, as appears from the quotation we have just made, it is not limited to this. It extends to civil as well as criminal matters, and is broadly a grant of jurisdiction to each of the States.

The present case is not one of the prosecution for an offensemalum in se, but for one simplymalum prohibition. Doubtless the same rule would apply if the act was prohibited by each State separately, but where as here the act is prohibited by one State and in terms authorized by the other, can the one State which prohibits, prosecute and punish for the act done within the territorial limits of the other? Obviously, the grantPage 321of concurrent jurisdiction may bring up from time to time many and some curious and difficult questions, so we properly confine ourselves to the precise question presented. The plaintiff in error was within the limits of the State of Washington, doing an act which that State in terms authorized and gave him a license to do. Can the State of Oregon, by virtue of its concurrent jurisdiction, disregard that authority, practically override the legislation of Washington, and punish a man for doing within the territorial limits of Washington an act which that State had specially authorized him to do? We are of opinion that it cannot. It is not at all impossible that in some instances the interests of the two States may be different. Certainly, as appears in the present case, the opinion of the legislatures of the two States is different, and the one State cannot enforce its opinion against that of the other, at least as to an act done within the limits of that other State. Whether, if the act of the plaintiff in error had been done within the territorial limits of the State of Oregon, it would make any difference we need not determine, nor whether, in the absence of any legislation by the State of Washington authorizing the act, Oregon could enforce its statute against the act done anywhere upon the waters of the Columbia. Neither is it necessary to consider whether the prosecution should be in the names of the two States jointly. It is enough to decide, as we do, that for an act done within the territorial limits of the State of Washington under authority and license from that State one cannot be prosecuted and punished by the State of Oregon.

There is little authority upon this precise question, but seeIn re Mattson, U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Oregon, 69 F. 535, andEx parte Desjeiro, same court, 152 F. 1004. See alsoRobertsv.Fullerton,117 Wis. 222; Rorer on Interstate Law, p. 438, and following.The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon isreversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings notinconsistent with this opinion.Page 322