Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Frank v. Vollkommer
Frank v. Vollkommer, 205 U.S. 521 (1907)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1907-04-29
- Topic
- general
Mr. Chief Justice- Fuller, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. Counsel for plaintiffs in error contended below that the state courts had no jurisdiction becausé the suit was brought to determine title to property or a fund in the possession of the District Court of the United States. The bankruptcy act of July 1, 1898, provided that “suits by the trustee shall only be brought or prosecuted in the courts where the bankrupt, whose estate is being administered by such trustee, might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings in bankruptcy had not been instituted, unless by consent of the proposed defendant.” 30 Stat. 544, c. 541, § 236. In Bardes v.
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Headnotes
- Bankruptcy Law — Jurisdiction Under § 23b of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, suits by a trustee must be brought in the courts where the bankrupt could have brought or prosecuted them had bankruptcy not intervened, unless the proposed defendant consents; the bankruptcy court has no jurisdiction, absent consent, to adjudicate a trustee's suit to recover property of the estate or property transferred in fraud of the Act, and such suits must be prosecuted in the state courts or in the federal circuit courts where diversity of citizenship exists. 205 U.S. at 526–528 (citing Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524)
- Bankruptcy Law — Jurisdiction The amendment of February 5, 1903, granting the bankruptcy court and any state court that would have had jurisdiction absent bankruptcy concurrent jurisdiction over a trustee's recovery actions, applies only to cases commenced after its effective date; it does not govern a case begun in 1902, and in any event it confers concurrent, not exclusive, jurisdiction. 205 U.S. at 528–529
- Bankruptcy Law — Jurisdiction The possession of a temporary receiver in bankruptcy of the proceeds of property, deposited as a special fund to await the court's further order, does not deprive a state court of its conceded jurisdiction over a plenary suit by the trustee to set aside a fraudulent chattel mortgage on that property; the state court, where the bankrupt could have sued absent bankruptcy, may adjudicate the mortgage's validity and declare the special fund free of its lien, leaving the bankruptcy court to give effect to the decree. 205 U.S. at 530–532
- Bankruptcy Law — Jurisdiction A state court's decree setting aside the bankrupt's fraudulent chattel mortgage and freeing the special fund from its lien, where the decree is self-executing and does not interfere with the bankruptcy court's possession, violates no principle of comity and does not constitute interference with the bankruptcy court. 205 U.S. at 531
- Bankruptcy Law — Jurisdiction The bankruptcy court's constructive possession of the bankrupt's property, arising upon adjudication, does not by itself deprive the state courts of jurisdiction over a trustee's suit, any more than the temporary receiver's possession of a special fund does. 205 U.S. at 531
- Bankruptcy Law — Trustee's Standing — Presumption from Record Where the record shows that all proceedings in the bankruptcy court were in evidence before the state trial court, and it appeared necessary that the trustee represent judgment creditors to attack the validity of the bankrupt's chattel mortgage, it will be presumed on review that the trial court found, upon all the evidence, that the trustee represented the required claims of creditors, even though that evidence was not returned to the reviewing court; the objection comes too late when raised for the first time on appeal. 205 U.S. at 532–533
FRANKv. VOLLKOMMER,205 U.S. 521(1907)
27 S.Ct. 596
FRANKv. VOLLKOMMER.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.
No. 184.
Argued January 26, 28, 1907.
Decided April 29, 1907.
THIS was a suit commenced in December, 1902, in the Supreme
Court of New York for the County of Kings by Joseph Vollkommer,
Jr., as trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of Jacob Vogt,
bankrupt, against Solon L. Frank and Samuel Frank, doing business
as S.L. S. Frank, and Jacob Vogt, to set aside an alleged
chattel mortgage on certain horses, harness, wagons, etc., given
by Vogt to defendants Frank, April 16, 1902, as fraudulent, and
intended to hinder, delay and defraud creditors.
The mortgagees had taken possession, and creditors immediately
thereafter filed petitions in bankruptcy against Vogt in the
District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
New York, whereupon and on June 30, 1902, one Stoutenburgh was
appointed temporary receiver and duly qualified as such.
As alleged in the complaint, by agreement between the Franks
and the petitioning creditors, which was approved by the District
Court and entered of record therein July 2, A.D. 1902, it was
provided that the property in question should be sold at public
auction on July 3 by the temporary receiver; "that the expenses
of the sale be paid out of the proceeds thereof; that the said
temporary receiver deposit the net proceeds of said sale at the
People's Trust Company of Brooklyn as a special fund, there to
await the further order of the court upon due notice to all
creditors who have or may hereafter appear; that the lien, if
any, of the alleged chattel mortgage of the said defendants Frank
be transferred to and attached to said special fund, or deposit,
in lieu of and to the same extent as if attached to the said
property thereinbefore directed to be sold; that in pursuance
thereof, said sale was had on the third of July, A.D. 1902, and
the net proceeds thereof, amounting to about $5,482.47, were on
or about the 10th day of July, 1902, duly deposited in the
People's Trust Company of Brooklyn, as provided by said
agreement."
July 10, A.D. 1902, Vogt was duly adjudicated an involuntary
bankrupt, and on November 12, A.D. 1902, Vollkommer,
Page 523
Jr., was appointed trustee in bankruptcy of Vogt, duly qualified
November 21, and entered upon the duties of his office as
trustee. He thereafter filed this complaint against the Franks
and Vogt, setting up the proceedings and averring that defendants
Frank claimed a lien upon the special fund to the whole extent
thereof, which constituted a cloud on plaintiff's title to the
fund, and he demanded judgment that the chattel mortgage be
declared null and void and cancelled and discharged of record,
and that the special fund be declared free of the incumbrance of
the alleged chattel mortgage, and from any lien or claim by the
Franks under the mortgage or otherwise. The trial court held that
the mortgage was made "with the intent and purpose of said Vogt
and said defendants Frank to hinder, defeat, defraud and delay
said Vogt's creditors"; and decreed the annulment of the
mortgage, and that it was "no lien upon the moneys, viz.,
$5,481.47, deposited on July 9th, 1902, by Arthur T.
Stoutenburgh, temporary receiver, in the People's Trust Company
of Brooklyn, New York, under an order of the District Court of
the United States for the Eastern District of New York made July
2d 1902." The case was carried to the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court and the decree was affirmed. Leave to appeal to the
Court of Appeals was denied by the Appellate Division, and
subsequently by an Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals. This
writ of error was then allowed.
Plaintiffs in error had a contractual right to have all questions concerning the title to the proceeds of the receiver's sale determined by the bankruptcy court which appointed the receiver under whose direction the sale took place, and in whose custody the proceeds were deposited.Havens Co. v.Pierek, 120 F. 244, 245;Guaranty Co. v.North Chicago Ry.Co., 130 F. 801, 813.
Irrespective of the order on which plaintiffs in error had a right to rely, the state court had no power to make any orderPage 524affecting the title to a fund in the possession of a United States court.
Every court with equitable powers, in whose possession property is placed, whether tangible property or a fund, has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of all claims to a lien upon the same, and to distribute that fund amongst the rightful owners. No other court has any power to interfere with such property.
This rule of general as well as of Federal jurisprudence applies to proceedings in bankruptcy. The prosecution of this suit in the state court might have been enjoined by the court of bankruptcy. The judgment is, consequently, subject to reversal by this court.Covellv.Heymen,111 U.S. 176,182.
There is no difference in principle, nor in practical importance, so far as this rule is concerned, between a suit where the state court directs its officer to exercise physical interference with property in the custody of the Federal tribunal, and one in which the decree of the state court affects the title only to the same, without taking manual possession thereof.
In each case, the judgment of the court which acquired prior jurisdiction is impeded, clogged and interfered with. It is, moreover, for the interests of justice that conflicts between decrees of coordinate tribunals should be avoided; and that the parties should not be tempted by the hope of thus gaining some apparent and at least temporary advantage, to indulge in "an unseemly scramble of litigants to speed cases in the respective courts of their preference."Sharonv.Terry, 36 F. 337, 359,infra.
Where a sheriff sells land, he merely delivers a deed, which purports to confer title thereto, and he exercises no physical control over the same. Yet, such a sale will be enjoined by the court of the United States with prior jurisdiction.Julianv.Central Trust Co.,93 U.S. 193.
This rule has been applied to bankruptcy proceedings.
It is imperatively necessary that the state courts should be obliged to respect this rule in cases affecting funds in the possessionPage 525of the courts of bankruptcy, in order that the supremacy of the United States, when exercising that power expressly granted by the Federal Constitution, may be recognized.
In such cases the courts of the United States can even interfere with property in the possession of the state courts.Tefftv.Sternberg, 40 F. 2, 6;Moranv.Sturges,154 U.S. 256;The Willamette Valley, 66 F. 565;ReWatts and Sachs,190 U.S. 1,32.Mr. Francis B. Mullinfor defendants in error:
The text-writers and the cases declare in unequivocal terms for the jurisdiction of the state courts in cases similar to the one at bar.Bardesv.Hawarden Bank,178 U.S. 524, and two cases following; Collier on Bankruptcy, 5th ed., 272,infra;Wallv.Cox,181 U.S. 244; Brandenburg on Bankruptcy, 3d ed., § 581;Jonesv.Schermerhorn,53 A.D. 494;Silbersternv.Stahl,32 Misc. 353, aff'd63 A.D. 614; aff'd171 N.Y. 649;Smallv.Muller,67 A.D. 143;Bryanv.Madden,109 A.D. 876.
Notwithstanding the possession of the fund by the bankruptcy court, it is perfectly proper, and consistent with comity, as has been said already, to permit the trustee to sue in the state court, to avoid the mortgage. Such a suit does not interfere with the possession of the fund. Where the suit in the state court asks for relief which might be an interference with the possession of the Federal court, this does not warrant enjoining the suit, where the principal relief sought would not be a direct interference.Guaranty Trust Co. v.North Chicago St. R. Co., 130 F. 801.
The imperfect and partial possession of the funds in this case is not sufficient to change the ordinary rule giving the state courts jurisdiction. In every bankruptcy case, as soon as an adjudication is made, the bankruptcy court is constructively in possession of all the property of the bankrupt.State Bankv.Cox, 16 Am. Bk. Rep. 32;York Mfg. Co. v.Cassell, 15 Am. Bk. Rep. 638;S.C.,201 U.S. 344;Muellerv.Page 526Nugent,184 U.S. 1;Re Granite City Bank, 137 F. 818. But notwithstanding this possession the state courts have universally entertained actions by the trustee.
InBardesv.Hawarden Bank,178 U.S. 524, we held that the bankruptcy court, except by the consent of the defendant, had no jurisdiction to try and determine a suit brought by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover property alleged to be part of the bankrupt's estate, or to have been transferred by him in fraud of the act, but that such suits must be prosecuted either in the state courts or in the Circuit Courts of the United States where diversity of citizenship existed. The act of 1898 was amended by the act of February 5, 1903,32 Stat. 797, c. 487, section 19 of which provided that the act should "not apply to bankruptcy cases pending when this act takes effect, but such cases shall be adjudicated and disposed of conformably to the provisions of the said act of July first, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight."
The present case was commenced in 1902, and besides the amendment gave the bankruptcy court concurrent and not exclusive jurisdiction.
We give in the margin1quotations from the acts of July 1,Page 5271898, and February 5, 1903, the amendments made by the latter act being italicized.
Undoubtedly the state court, in which the trustee broughtPage 528this suit, was the court "where the bankrupt, whose estate is being administered by such trustee, might have brought or prosecuted them [suits], if proceedings in bankruptcy had not been instituted," and its jurisdiction under the applicable general rule must be conceded.
But plaintiffs in error contend that the possession by the bankruptcy court of the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged chattels deprives the state court of its conceded jurisdiction to set aside the mortgage as fraudulent.
The contention is wholly inadmissible. The mortgaged property consisted of horses, vehicles, harness, etc., and the order of sale of the temporary receiver, agreed to by plaintiffs in error, was evidently in the interest of all parties, and provided for the deposit of the proceeds, not in the general funds of the estate, but as a special fund, to which the lien, if any, of the chattel mortgage was transferred, and clearly contemplated a plenary suit to determine the validity thereof, which, at that time, there being no diversity of citizenship, and no such possession as might lead to a different result, could only be commenced in the state court. The trustee himself commenced it there and obtained the decree, which was in its nature self-executing, and merely set aside the mortgage, and, as incident thereto, declared that the special fund was free from its lien, and, without seeking to interfere with the possession, left it to the bankruptcy court to carry the decree into effect by placing the money in the custody of its officer, the trustee.Page 529
No principle of comity was violated and there was no interference with the bankruptcy court.First National Bankv.Title Trust Company,198 U.S. 280;Davisv.Friedlander,104 U.S. 570;Eysterv.Gaff,91 U.S. 521;Claflinv.Houseman,93 U.S. 130;Re Platteville Foundry MachineCompany, 147 F. 828;Guaranty Trust Companyv.NorthChicago Street Railroad Company, 130 F. 801;ReSpitzer, 130 F. 879;Bindseilv.Smith,61 N.J. Eq. 645;Skiltonv.Codington,185 N.Y. 80. In the latter case the Court of Appeals by Cullen, C.J., in sustaining the jurisdiction of the state court, admirably expounds the applicable principles, with a full citation of authorities. That was a suit against the trustee, while the present case was brought by the trustee.
The possession of the temporary receiver of the special fund was not in the circumstances in any sense sufficient to change the ordinary rule giving the state courts jurisdiction any more than the constructive possession in every case created by adjudication.Muellerv.Nugent,184 U.S. 1;York Mfg.Companyv.Cassell,201 U.S. 344.
It is objected that the trustee had no right to attack the validity of the chattel mortgage because it did not appear that he represented any but simple contract creditors. But the record before us shows that the entire record of the proceedings in the bankruptcy court was in evidence before the trial court, though it was not returned here, so that if it were necessary that the trustee should represent judgment creditors, which we do not decide that it was, it must be presumed that the trial court in passing upon all the evidence found that he did. This may explain why the point was not made in the trial court, and it comes too late here.Judgment affirmed.Page 530
- Page 526 SEC. 23b:"Suits by the trustee shall only be brought or prosecuted in the courts where the bankrupt, whose estate is being administered by such Page 527 trustee, might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings in bankruptcy had not been instituted, unless by consent of the proposed defendant,except suits for the recovery of propertyunder section sixty, subdivision b, and section sixty-seven,subdivision e."
SEC. 60b:"If a bankrupt shall have given a preference within four months before the filing of a petition, or after the filing of the petition and before the adjudication, and the person receiving it, or to be benefited thereby, or his agent acting therein, shall have had reasonable cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give a preference, it shall be voidable by the trustee, and he may recover the property or its value from such person.""If a bankrupt shall have given a preference, and the personreceiving it, or to be benefited thereby, or his agent actingtherein, shall have had reasonable cause to believe that it wasintended thereby to give a preference, it shall be voidable bythe trustee and he may recover the property or its value fromsuch person. And, for the purpose of such recovery, any court ofbankruptcy, as hereinbefore defined, and any state court whichwould have had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened,shall have concurrent jurisdiction."
SEC. 67e:"That all conveyances, transfers, assignments, or incumbrances of his property, or any part thereof, made or given by a person adjudged a bankrupt under the provisions of this act subsequent to the passage of this act and within four months prior to the filing of the petition, with the intent and purpose on his part to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, or any of them, shall be null and void, as against the creditors of such debtor, except as to purchasers in good faith and for a present fair consideration; and all property of the debtor conveyed, transferred, assigned, or incumbered as aforesaid shall, if he be adjudged a bankrupt, and the same is not exempt from execution and liability for debts by the law of his domicile, be and remain a part of the assets and estate of the bankrupt and shall pass to his said trustee, whose duty it shall be to recover and reclaim the same by legal proceedings or otherwise for the benefit of the creditors. And all conveyances, transfers, or incumbrances of his property made by a debtor at any time within four months prior to the filing of the petition against him, and while insolvent, which are held null and void as against the creditors of such debtor by the laws of the State, Territory, or District in which such property is situate, shall be deemed null and void under this act against the creditors of such debtor if he be adjudged a bankrupt, and such property shall pass to the assignee and be by him reclaimed and recovered for the benefit of the creditors of the bankrupt.For the purpose of such recovery any court ofbankruptcy as hereinbefore defined, and any state court whichwould have had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened,shall have concurrent jurisdiction."
SEC. 70e:"The trustee may avoid any transfer by the bankrupt of his Page 528 property which any creditor of such bankrupt might have avoided, and may recover the property so transferred, or its value, from the person to whom it was transferred, unless he was abonafideholder for value prior to the date of the adjudication. Such property may be recovered or its value collected from whoever may have received it, except abona fideholder for value.For the purpose of such recovery any court of bankruptcyas hereinbefore defined, and any state court which would have hadjurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened, shall haveconcurrent jurisdiction."
SEC. 19 of act of February 5, 1903:"That the provisions ofthis amendatory act shall not apply to bankruptcy cases-pendingwhen this act takes effect, but such cases shall be adjudicatedand disposed of conformably to the provisions of the said act ofJuly first, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight." ↩