Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Joy v. City of St. Louis
Joy v. City of St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332 (1906)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1906-04-02
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- no federal question merely because land is under a federal patent
- assignment of federal land patent decided by state law
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Joy v. City of St. Louis. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 92 opinions
Headnotes
- Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Jurisdiction Arising Under Federal Law Where diversity of citizenship does not exist, a plaintiff cannot establish that his case arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States so as to confer jurisdiction on the circuit court unless it necessarily appears from his own statement of his claim, in proper pleading form, that the suit really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy as to a right depending upon the construction or effect of the Constitution or a federal law or treaty; jurisdiction cannot be made to appear by the plaintiff's assertion in his pleading that the defense raises or will raise a federal question. 201 U.S. 332 (citing Gold-Washing Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 203; Tennessee v. Union Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454)
- Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Federal Question Jurisdiction The mere fact that the plaintiff's title comes from a patent or under an act of Congress does not, for that reason alone, show that a federal question arises; nor does a stated dispute between the parties over the construction of the patent or the acts of Congress raise a federal question where the allegation of such dispute is unnecessary to averring or proving the plaintiff's cause of action. 201 U.S. 332 (citing Blackburn v. Portland Gold Mining Co., 175 U.S. 571; Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505)
- Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Construction of Government Grants — Accretion While a federal court construes grants of the United States without reference to the rules of construction the States have adopted for their own grants, the incidents or rights attaching to ownership of property conveyed by the United States bordering on a navigable stream are determined by the law of the State in which it is situated, subject to the limitation that the State's rules do not impair the efficacy of the grant or the use and enjoyment of the property by the grantee. 201 U.S. 332 (citing Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1)
- Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Federal Question Jurisdiction In ejectment, whether land contained in an original patent reached to a river under the distances called for is a question of fact, and whether the patentee is entitled to land formed by accretion from the river is a question of local and not federal law; accordingly, where diversity of citizenship does not exist, an action for land made by accretion cannot be maintained in the circuit court as a case arising under the laws of the United States, even if the original title derives from a patent and acts of Congress. 201 U.S. 332 (citing Sweringen v. St. Louis, 185 U.S. 38; St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Commissioners, 168 U.S. 349)
- Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Appellate Jurisdiction over Federal Questions Although a case may not be one of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction on the plaintiff's statement as arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, if the case is brought in a state court, federal questions may arise during the trial, and the party who specially sets up a federal right that is denied may have the question reviewed by the Supreme Court on writ of error under § 709, Rev. Stat. 201 U.S. 332
JOYv. ST. LOUIS,201 U.S. 332(1906)
26 S.Ct. 478
JOYv. CITY OF ST. LOUIS.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
MISSOURI.
No. 204.
Argued March 9, 1906.
Decided April 2, 1906.
THIS is an action of ejectment to recover certain lands in the
City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, described in the petition,
which was filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Eastern District of Missouri. The petition was dismissed by
Page 333
the court solely upon the ground that the court was without
jurisdiction, and the trial judge so certified the fact. The
plaintiff sued out a writ of error and brought the case directly
here for review under the fifth section of the act of 1891. 1
Comp. Stat. 549.
The petition sets forth in detail the title of the plaintiff
in error to the premises which he seeks to recover in this
action. It is therein stated that a confirmation of a concession
was made by the commissioners appointed pursuant to an act of
Congress, approved March 2, 1805, entitled "An act for the
ascertaining and adjusting the titles and claims to land, within
the Territory of Orleans, and the District of Louisiana," such
concession having been made to one Louis Labeaume, of 360 arpents
of land, by the lieutenant governor of the Spanish Province of
Upper Louisiana, on February 15, 1799, and it was duly surveyed
and certified April 10, 1799. The land remained an outlot,
adjoining and belonging to the former town or village (now city)
of St. Louis, and said outlot was owned, claimed, inhabited,
cultivated and possessed by Labeaume prior to the twentieth day
of December, 1803. By virtue of the first section of an act of
Congress, approved June 13, 1812, entitled "An act making further
provision for settling the claims to land in the Territory of
Missouri," the title in fee simple to said concession, survey,
confirmation and outlot was confirmed and granted to Labeaume.
Pursuant to an act of Congress, approved March 3, 1807,
letters patent of the United States were issued to Labeaume,
bearing date the twenty-fifth day of March, 1852, which letters
purported and were sufficient to grant to Labeaume, or his legal
representatives, the premises mentioned in the patent. On the
sixth day of June, 1874, those from and under whom plaintiff
derives title to the real estate sued for were the owners of the
concession, and by an act of Congress, entitled "An act obviating
the necessity of issuing patents for certain private land claims
in the State of Missouri, and for other purposes," approved June
6, 1874, it is provided that the right, title and
Page 334
interest of the United States in and to all of the lands in the
State of Missouri, which had been confirmed by Congress, or
officers acting under and by authority of Congress, were granted,
released and relinquished by the United States, in fee simple, to
the respective owners of the equitable titles thereto, their
heirs and assigns, forever, as fully and completely in every
respect whatever as could be done by patents issued therefor
according to law.
By virtue of these matters and by mesne conveyances from
Labeaume it was averred that plaintiff became the owner of the
land in question, and that a controversy had arisen between the
plaintiff and the defendants herein as to the proper construction
and legal effect of the letters patent and the acts of Congress,
approved June 13, 1812, and June 6, 1874, and the plaintiff
herein averred in his petition —
"that under and by virtue of said confirmation, act of Congress
approved June 13th, 1812, letters patent and act of Congress
approved June 6th, 1874, said river (Mississippi) is the western
boundary of said outlot, confirmation to Louis Labeaume, and said
Soulard survey and survey number 3333, and that the said Louis
Labeaume or his legal representatives were thereby granted all of
the land lying on said west bank of said river, between the
northern and southern boundary lines of said outlot,
confirmation, Soulard's survey and United States survey number
3333, to said river, and that they were thereby constituted
riparian proprietors and owners of all the land along said river
bank between said north and south lines of said outlot,
confirmation, and surveys, and were thereby vested with the title
to, and ownership of, all land thereafter formed by accretions or
gradual deposits from the said river along said west bank
thereof, between said north and south lines of said outlot,
confirmation and surveys, where a large body of land was formed
by accretions to said outlot, confirmation and surveys.
"That said claim of plaintiff as to the proper construction
and legal effect of said confirmation, acts of Congress approved
Page 335
June 13th, 1812, and June 6th, 1874, respectively, and patent, is
disputed by defendants, and contested by them in regard to the
title of the land hereinafter described, and which land is a
portion of the land formed by accretions or gradual deposits from
said river, along said west bank thereof, between said north and
south lines of said outlot, confirmation and surveys, and which
thereby became a portion of the land granted by said letters
patent and acts of Congress approved June 13th, 1812, and June
6th, 1874, respectively, and is the land herein sued for."
It is then averred that the proper construction and legal
effect of the confirmation, acts of Congress and letters patent
constitute the controlling question in the case, upon the correct
decision of which plaintiff's title to the premises sought to be
recovered herein depends, and he "therefore avers that this suit
arises under the law of the United States, and said confirmation
made and letters patent issued in pursuance thereof, and said
acts of Congress, approved June 13, 1812, and June 6, 1874,
respectively."
"He further states that as such legal owner of the premises he
was entitled to the possession of the same under and by virtue of
said confirmation, letters patent and acts of Congress, approved
June 13, 1812, and June 6, 1874, respectively, on the 16th day of
June, 1896, which are described as follows:" The plaintiff then
gives a description of the land in controversy, which he alleges
to be a portion of the accretions of the outlot, confirmation and
surveys already mentioned.
It was also alleged that the defendants entered upon the
premises on the sixteenth of June, 1896, claiming to own the same
as a wharf, under and by virtue of section 9 of an act of
Congress approved June 12, 1866, entitled "An act authorizing
documentary evidence of title to be furnished to the owners of
certain lands in the City of St. Louis."
Plaintiff then demanded judgment for the recovery of the
premises, and five thousand dollars for the unlawful withholding
of the same, and one hundred dollars for monthly rents and
Page 336
profits, from the rendition of judgment until the possession of
the premises is delivered to plaintiff.
The manufacturing company defendant filed an answer, denying
each and every allegation of the petition. It also set up that it
held the premises under the City of St. Louis and that the city
(and the defendant holding under it) has had open, continuous,
notorious and adverse possession of the premises, under claim and
color of title, for more than ten years next before the filing of
said petition.
The City of St. Louis filed a separate plea to the
jurisdiction of the court, and asserted that it had no
jurisdiction to try and determine the cause, because no Federal
question or question of any kind giving jurisdiction to the court
under the statutes and laws of the United States is involved in
the issues in this cause. It further set up the facts in relation
to the case ofSweringenv.St. Louis, in which the plaintiff
therein claimed title to and possession of the property next
immediately north of the premises herein claimed by plaintiff,
under the same patent of the United States as that under which
the plaintiff herein claims, and the history of the litigation is
given, and the decision of the case in this court is referred to,
which is to be found reported in185 U.S. 38.
The petition is a statutory one in ejectment and sets out in detail and with great particularity the claims of plaintiff in error. It follows and elaborates the petition in form and substance, epitomized in the case ofCookev.Avery, in stating the claims of plaintiff in error under said acts of Congress, the dispute and denial of said claims by defendants in error, and that said claims constitute the controlling question in the case and upon the proper construction and legal effect of which his rights depend, and it sufficiently states a Federal question.Cookev.Avery,147 U.S. 375;Carondeletv.St.Louis, 1 Black, 180;Lake Superior c. Co. v.Cunningham,155 U.S. 354;Wisconsin Central Railway Co. v.Forsythe,159 U.S. 46;SpokanePage 337Falls and Northern Railway Co. v.Ziegler,167 U.S. 65;Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.Soderberg,188 U.S. 526;Doolanv.Carr,125 U.S. 618,620.
There is a sufficient statement to show that the construction and legal effect of the acts of Congress and patent as to the right to alluvion and the extent to which land was, or might have been, conveyed by them was required, and therefore presented a Federal question.Security Land Exploration Co. v.Burns,193 U.S. 167,171;Jefferisv.East Omaha Land Co.,134 U.S. 178,182;Packerv.Bird,137 U.S. 661,662. This conflict of grants, the allegation of an entry by a claimant claiming to own the land under one of them, having been made to identify the premises with the conflicting grants, presents a Federal question and it has been the source of much litigation.Rossv.Doe, 1 Pet. 655, 664;Baldwinv.Stark,107 U.S. 463,464;Shivelyv.Bowlby,152 U.S. 1,9;Hussmanv.Durham,165 U.S. 144,147;Pickeringv.Lomax,145 U.S. 310,313;Glasgowv.Baker,128 U.S. 560,571;Wallacev.Parker, 6 Pet. 680, 686;Neilsonv.Lagow, 7 How. 772, 775;Bellv.Hearne, 19 How. 252, 263;Cousinv.Labatut, 19 How. 202, 207;Bertholdv.McDonald, 22 How. 334, 338;Littlev.Arkansas, 22 How. 193, 202;Magwirev.Tyler, 1 Black, 195, 202;Reichartv.Felps, 6 Wall. 160, 165;Silverv.Ladd, 6 Wall. 440;French-Glenn Live Stock Co. v.Springer,185 U.S. 47,54;Mobile Transportation Co. v.Mobile,187 U.S. 479,482;Keanv.Calumet Canal Co.,190 U.S. 452,458;Lavagninov.Uhlig,198 U.S. 443,450;Gleasonv.White,199 U.S. 54.
If plaintiff in error on a trial in the court below should fail to produce sufficient evidence to vest a legal title in Labeaume, under act of June 13, 1812, then the only question would be whether the patent or the first section of the act of Congress of June 6, 1874,18 Stat. 62, vested it in him, and in the event of a contest between them in regard to the title, it would present a Federal question.Campbellv.Laclede GasLight Co.,119 U.S. 445,446.Sweringenv.St. Louis,Page 338185 U.S. 38, has no bearing on this case. SeeSuttonv.Dameron,100 Mo. 141,149.Mr. Charles Claflin Allen, with whomMr. Charles W. BatesandMr. Henry W. Allenwere on the brief, for defendants in error:
There being no allegation of diversity of citizenship, the only question involved is, whether the petition discloses a cause of action arising under the laws of the United States so as to give the court below jurisdiction of the cause. The jurisdiction of that court is defined by act of August 13, 1888,25 Stat. 433.
In order to give the lower court jurisdiction the necessary facts to confer jurisdiction must be stated in the petition itself, and, unless the jurisdictional facts affirmatively appear from the record, the presumption upon writ of error or appeal, is that the court below was without jurisdiction.King Iron BridgeMfg. Co. v.Otoe County,120 U.S. 225;Third StreetSuburban Ry. Co. v.Lewis,173 U.S. 457;Florida Central Ry.Co. v.Bell,176 U.S. 321;Minnesotav.Northern SecuritiesCo.,194 U.S. 48.
No jurisdiction is shown by the record in this case. It does not appear on the face of the record that some title, right, privilege or immunity, on which the recovery depends, will be defeated by one construction of the Constitution or a law of the United States, or sustained by an opposite construction.Starinv.New York,115 U.S. 257;Germania Ins. Co. v.Wisconsin,119 U.S. 473;Cookev.Avery,147 U.S. 375.
Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by alleging that defendant intends to dispute the validity of some law of the United States or to assert a defense based on some such law.Tennesseev.Union Planters' Bank,152 U.S. 454;Florida Central R.R.Co. v.Bell,176 U.S. 321;Chappellv.Waterworth,155 U.S. 102;Walkerv.Collins,167 U.S. 57;Sawyerv.Kochersperger,170 U.S. 303;Arkansasv.Coal Co.,183 U.S. 185;Little York Gold Washing Water Co. v.Keyes,96 U.S. 199.
In an action of ejectment the plaintiff must recover, if at all,Page 339upon the strength of his own title. The weakness of his adversary's cannot avail him.McNittv.Turner, 16 Wall. 352. The plaintiff cannot confer Federal jurisdiction by anticipating the defendant's claims of title, which the court may never be called upon to consider, or by raising fictitious disputes with himself.McGuirev.Blount,199 U.S. 142;Wattsv.Lindsey, 7 Wheat. 158. The law concerning ejectment is the same in Missouri as in the United States courts.Huntv.Searcy,167 Mo. 158.
The original jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States under the act of August 13, 1888,25 Stat. 433, is quite different from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under § 709 of the Revised Statutes. Cases, therefore, in which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction on writ of error to a state Supreme Court are not authorities on the questions of jurisdiction here involved.Carsonv.Dunham,121 U.S. 421.
The fact that one of the parties has derived his title directly under an act of Congress does not, for that reason alone, present a Federal question.Blackburnv.Portland GoldMining Co.,175 U.S. 571; see alsoShoshone Mining Co. v.Rutter,177 U.S. 505.
The fact that the language of a grant from the United States may have to be construed in the usual and ordinary way applicable to instruments conveying title in order to determine the correct measurements of the land conveyed does not raise a Federal question.Sweringenv.St. Louis,185 U.S. 38.
The many cases cited by plaintiff in error, in which this court passed the question of jurisdictionsub silentio, are no authority in the case at bar.Newv.Oklahoma,195 U.S. 252;United Statesv.More, 3 Cranch, 159.
Plaintiff, in setting up the various acts of Congress and claiming that differences may exist between them is disputing with himself — not with the defendants. They resulted in a patent from the United States, the validity of which is not disputed. All plaintiff needs to show is one title, good in him, to make outa prima faciecase and he cannot rely upon possible defects in that title in order to raise a Federal question.Langdeauv.Page 340Hanes, 21 Wall. 521;Morrowv.Whitney,95 U.S. 551;Wrightv.Roseberry,121 U.S. 488.
It is a long-settled rule, evidenced by many decisions of this court, that the plaintiff cannot make out a case as arising under the Constitution or the laws of the United States unless it necessarily appears by the complaint or petition or bill in stating plaintiff's cause of action. InGold-Washing Co. v.Keyes,96 U.S. 199,203, it was said that before the Circuit Court can be required to retain a cause under its jurisdiction, under section 5, act of 1875, it must in some form appear upon the record, by a statement of facts, in legal and logical form, such as is required in good pleading, that the suit is one which really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy, as to a right which depends upon the construction or effect of the Constitution, or some law or treaty of the United States. That was a case of a petition for a removal of a suit from the state to the Federal court. But it has been held that whether there is a right of removal in such cases depends upon whether the Circuit Court could have exercised original jurisdiction.Third Streetc. Co. v.Lewis,173 U.S. 457;Arkansasv.Coal Co.,Page 341183 U.S. 185;Boston c. Mining Co. v.Montana c. Co.,188 U.S. 632,640. This original jurisdiction, it has been frequently held, must appear by the plaintiff's statement of his own claim, and it cannot be made to appear by the assertion in the plaintiff's pleading that the defense raises or will raise a Federal question. As has been stated, the rule is a reasonable and just one that the complainant in the first instance shall be confined to a statement of his cause of action, leaving to the defendant to set up in his answer what his defense is, and, if anything more than a denial of plaintiff's cause of action, imposing upon the defendant the burden of proving such defense. This principle was given effect to inTennesseev.UnionPlanters' Bank,152 U.S. 454;Musev.Arlington Hotel Co.,168 U.S. 430;Third Street c. Co. v.Lewis,173 U.S. 457;Arkansasv.Coal Co., 183 U.S.supra; Filhiolv.Maurice,185 U.S. 108;Boston c. Co. v.Montana c. Co., 188 U.S.supra.
The mere fact that the title of plaintiff comes from a patent or under an act of Congress does not show that a Federal question arises. It was said inBlackburnv.Portland c. Co.,175 U.S. 571, that "this court has frequently been vainly asked to hold that controversies in respect to lands, one of the parties to which had derived his title directly under an act of Congress, for that reason alone presented a Federal question." The same principle was held inShoshone Mining Co. v.Rutter,177 U.S. 505, and also inDe Lamar's Gold Mining Co. v.Nesbitt,177 U.S. 523.
To say that there is a dispute between the parties as to the construction of the patent or of the several acts of Congress referred to, does not raise a Federal question, because a statement that there is such dispute is entirely unnecessary in averring or proving plaintiff's cause of action. His source of title, as set forth in the petition, might not be disputed, and the defense might rest upon the defense of adverse possession, as set up in the answer. If defendants contented themselves on the trial with proof of such defense, then no question of a Federal nature would have been tried or decided.Page 342
In those cases where the dispute necessarily appears in the course of properly alleging and proving the plaintiff's cause of action, the situation is entirely different. In this case the real dispute, as stated by the plaintiff, is whether plaintiff is entitled to the land formed by accretion, which has taken place many years since the patent was issued and since the acts of Congress were passed. There is no dispute as to the terms of the patent or of the acts of Congress. The language of the averment in the petition (which is set out in full in the foregoing statement of facts) shows that the controversy in dispute is not at all in regard to the land covered by the letters patent or by the acts of Congress, and no dispute is alleged to exist as to such land, but the dispute relates to land, "which land is a portion of the land formed by accretions or gradual deposits from said river, along said west bank thereof, between said north and south lines of said outlot, confirmation and surveys, and which thereby became a portion of the land granted by said letters patent and acts of Congress approved June 13, 1812, and June 6, 1874, respectively."
Now, whether the land contained in the original patent reached to the Mississippi river as its eastern boundary, under the distances called for by the patent, would be a question of fact, as was stated inSweringenv.St. Louis,185 U.S. 38, and whether the plaintiff is, upon the facts set forth, entitled to the accretion, is a question of local or state law, and is not one of a Federal nature.St. Anthony Falls c. Co. v.St. PaulWater Commissioners,168 U.S. 349,359, and cases cited. InPackerv.Bird,137 U.S. 661, it was held that while the Federal court would construe grants of the General Government without reference to the rules of construction adopted by the States for grants by them,yet whatever incidents or rightsattached to the ownership of the property conveyed by the UnitedStates bordering on a navigable streamwould be determined by the States in which it is situated, subject to the limitation that their rules do not impair the efficacy of the grant, or the use and enjoyment of the property by the grantee. To the same effect isPage 343Shivelyv.Bowlby,152 U.S. 1. In the opinion in that case, at page 57, it is said: "By the law of the State of Oregon, therefore, as enacted by its legislature and declared by its highest court, the title in the lands in controversy is in the defendants in error; and, upon the principles recognized and affirmed by a uniform series of recent decisions of this court, above referred to, the law of Oregon governs the case."
As this land in controversy is not the land described in the letters patent or the acts of Congress, but, as is stated in the petition, is formed by accretions or gradual deposits from the river, whether such land belongs to the plaintiff is, under the cases just cited, a matter of local or state law, and not one arising under the laws of the United States.
The question before us is wholly different from the case of a writ of error to a state court founded upon section 709 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. A Federal question may appear in the course of the trial, and some right specially claimed or set up under a Federal statute may have been denied, and the party against whom the decision was made can have the question reviewed by this court under that section.
InCookev.Avery,147 U.S. 375, this question was not decided. It was not referred to in the course of the opinion, and it is no authority for the plaintiff's contention herein. It was simply held that there was an issue between the parties which depended upon the laws of the United States and the rules of the Circuit Court, and their construction and application were directly involved.
In any aspect in which this case may be viewed, we think it was not one over which the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, and for that reason its order dismissing the petition isAffirmed.Page 344