Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
United States Ex Rel. Drury v. Lewis
200 U.S. 1
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1906-01-02
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- declining to excuse the petitioner’s failure to exhaust where a factual dispute existed as to whether the petitioner was acting in furtherance of his duty to protect federal property
- custody alleged to violate Supremacy Clause
- applying state criminal law to United States Army officers
- "[T]here was a conflict of evidence as to whether Crowley had or had not surrendered, and it is conceded that if he had, it could not reasonably be claimed that the fatal shot was fired in the performance of a duty imposed by the Federal law, and the state court had jurisdiction."
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed United States Ex Rel. Drury v. Lewis. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 92 opinions
Headnotes
- Habeas Corpus — Federal Interference with State Prosecutions Although a federal circuit court has jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus for a prisoner held under a state indictment, the court ordinarily should not exercise that jurisdiction to discharge the prisoner unless the case is one of peculiar urgency; instead, the court should leave the prisoner to be dealt with by the state courts, and after a final determination by the state court, the federal courts will generally leave the petitioner to his remedy by writ of error from the Supreme Court. 200 U.S. at 7-8 (citing Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 290)
- Military & Military Justice — Jurisdiction In time of peace, the civil courts of a State have general jurisdiction over persons in the military service of the United States who are accused of a capital crime or of any offense against the person of a citizen, committed within the State; that jurisdiction is not denied where the homicide occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of a state court and the victim was a citizen not in the service of the United States, killed on property not belonging to or under the jurisdiction of the United States. 200 U.S. at 8-9
- Habeas Corpus — Jurisdiction Where Facts Are Disputed Where a petitioner for federal habeas corpus asserts that his act was committed in the lawful performance of a federal duty and that the state court therefore lacked jurisdiction, but the evidence as to the essential fact on which that claim depends (here, whether the deceased had surrendered or was a fleeing felon) is in conflict, the state court is entitled to pass upon that issue in the first instance, and its determination cannot be collaterally attacked; the claim is a matter of defense to be raised in the state court. 200 U.S. at 9-10 (citing Ex parte Crouch, 112 U.S. 178)
- Habeas Corpus — Discretion of the Circuit Court The acts of Congress relating to habeas corpus do not imperatively require the circuit courts to wrest petitioners from the custody of state officers in advance of trial in the state courts; those courts may decline to discharge in the proper exercise of discretion, and a circuit court's refusal to take petitioners from state custody before trial is a proper exercise of that discretion. 200 U.S. at 10-11
DRURYv. LEWIS,200 U.S. 1(1906)
26 S.Ct. 229
UNITED STATESex rel. DRURYv. LEWIS, WARDEN OF THE COMMON JAIL.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT
OF PENNSYLVANIA.
No. 126.
Argued December 12, 1905.
Decided January 2, 1906.
RALPH W. DRURY and John Dowd were indicted in the Court of
Oyer and Terminer for the county of Allegheny, Pennsylvania, on
two counts, the first charging them with murder, and the second
with manslaughter, in the homicide of one William H. Crowley,
September 10, 1903. They were admitted to bail in the sum of
$5,000 each, and having been subsequently surrendered, obtained a
writ ofhabeas corpusfrom the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The case on the
hearing was thus stated by Acheson, J., holding the Circuit
Court:
"On September 10, 1903, Ralph W. Drury was a commissioned
officer of the United States Army, of the rank of second
lieutenant, and had under his command a detachment of twenty
enlisted men, of whom John Dowd was one, stationed at Allegheny
Arsenal, in the city of Pittsburg, in Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania, this arsenal being a subpost of Ft. Niagara, N.Y.
From time to time before September 10, 1903, some copper down
spouts and eave troughs had been stripped from some of the
buildings on the arsenal grounds and the material stolen, and
other depredations, such as the breaking of window lights, had
been committed on the arsenal property. Lieut. Col. Robertson,
the commanding officer at Ft. Niagara, on the occasion of an
inspection of Allegheny Arsenal, in July, 1903, had directed
Lieutenant Drury to use his best endeavors to stop the
depredations, and to that end ordered him to establish a patrol
of the guards day and night upon the arsenal grounds, and to
apprehend and arrest any person or persons committing
depredations on the arsenal property. Shortly before 10 o'clock
on the morning of September 10, 1903, having received word that
some persons were stealing copper from one of the buildings on
the arsenal grounds, Lieutenant Drury took John Dowd, then on
guard duty, and another private soldier (each of the latter being
armed with a rifle and ammunition), and, passing out of
Page 3
the arsenal grounds through the gate on Butler street, the three
proceeded by way of Butler street and Almond alley towards the
Allegheny Valley Railroad. Drury informed the two men of the
reported stealing of copper and instructed them to continue down
Almond alley and to arrest any person coming from the arsenal.
Drury himself left Almond alley at the corner of Willow street
and went by Willow street to Fortieth street (which runs along,
but outside of, the arsenal wall), and proceeded down Fortieth
street to its foot, where were congregated three or four
half-grown boys or young men, among whom was William H. Crowley,
aged about 19 or 20 years. These persons fled in different
directions when they saw Lieutenant Drury approaching. Crowley
ran from the foot of Fortieth street away from the arsenal
property in the direction of Forty-first street, keeping on or
near the Allegheny Valley Railroad. When he was about one hundred
yards from the arsenal wall Crowley was shot by Dowd, who aimed
and fired his rifle at Crowley. At the time of the shooting,
Drury, Dowd, and Crowley were all off the grounds belonging to
the United States. Each one of the three then stood either upon a
street of the city, on the Allegheny Valley Railroad, or on
private property. The rifle ball struck Crowley's left thigh,
inflicting a mortal wound from which he died on the evening of
the same day — September 10, 1903.
"Thus far the facts are not open to dispute under the
testimony. But as to the circumstances attending the shooting of
Crowley the evidence is conflicting and leads to opposite
conclusions of fact as one or other version of the affair given
by the witnesses is accepted. Dowd testifies, and the petitioners
have produced other evidence tending to show, that as Crowley
filed he was called on several times by Dowd, who followed him,
to halt, with warning that unless he halted Dowd would fire; that
Crowley did not halt, but continued his flight, and to prevent
his escape behind or through a lumber pile Dowd fired, and that
Drury did not order Dowd to fire, and was not connected with the
shooting save by the fact that he ordered the
Page 4
arrest of any person coming from the arsenal. On the other hand,
two witnesses who were present (Mrs. Long and Miss Terwillerger)
testify that before the shot was fired Crowley stopped, turned
around facing the pursuing soldier (Dowd), threw up his hand,
said, `Don't shoot,' `I will come back,' or `I will give up,' and
that just then Lieutenant Drury said `Fire!' and Dowd fired the
shot that killed Crowley. The testimony of at least one other
witness tends to corroborate the account of the transaction given
by the two named women as above recited. It is not for me to say
whether or not the witnesses who have testified thus on the part
of the Commonwealth are mistaken.
"In view of all the evidence herein, should this court
interfere to prevent the trial of the petitioners upon the
indictment in the state court, take the petitioners out of the
custody of the authorities of the State, and discharge them
finally without trial by any civil court in the regular
administration of justice? This is the question which confronts
me." 129 F. 823.
The court entered an order discharging the writ and remanding
petitioners to the custody of the warden of the jail of Allegheny
County, and from that order this appeal was allowed and
prosecuted.
United States officers and other persons held in custody by state authority for doing acts which they are authorized or required to do by the Constitution and laws of the United States are entitled to be released from such custody, and the writ ofhabeas corpusis the appropriate remedy for that purpose.Inre Neagle,135 U.S. 1;In re Waite, 81 F. 359;Ohiov.Thomas,173 U.S. 276; § 761 Rev. Stat.
The petitioners upon this appeal are entitled to have this court examine the evidence and determine the facts in this case, and to decide whether or not these petitioners are entitled to be discharged from the custody of the warden.Stortiv.Massachusetts,183 U.S. 138,143.
Only a few minutes before his death Crowley had committedPage 5a felony within the arsenal grounds, a place under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, over which crime and the place where it was committed the courts of the United States had exclusive jurisdiction.
In the absence of any specific law upon the subject, the petitioners were charged with the duty of arresting persons guilty of stealing Government property under their custody. At the time of the homicide there existed a specific law of the United States under which these petitioners were acting in making Crowley's arrest. § 161 Rev. Stat.;Campbellv.Thayer, 88 F. 102, 106.
As to the responsibility of officers of the army in command of a post or station for the security of all public property in their custody or under their control, see §§ 739, 740, 764 and 766 of the Army Regulations for 1901.
If the laws of the United States imposed upon these petitioners the duty to arrest Crowley for the felony which he had committed, they were justified in making use of whatever force was necessary for the purpose of performing such duty, even to the extent of firing upon Crowley, if in no other way he could be apprehended.Rexv.Geo. Howarth, 3 Moody's Crown Cases, 207;The Queenv.Dadson, 2 Denison's Crown Cases, 35;Reginav.Murphy, 3 Crawford Dix's Circuit Cases, 20; 1 East's Pleas of the Crown, 298; 1 Hale, 481;Rexv.Finnerty, 1 Crawf. Dix's C.C. 167; 1 Hawkins, 881; 1 Russ. Crimes, 666; 3 Wharton on Crim. Law, § 2927; 1 Bishop Crim. Pro. § 159; 2 Bishop New Crim. Law, § 648;Conraddyv.People, 5 Parker (N.Y.), 234, 241;Commonwealthv.Long,17 Pa. Super. 641,647.
The petitioner Dowd was justified, under all the facts and circumstances of the case, in firing upon the felon Crowley for the purpose of effecting his arrest, and that the court of Oyer and Terminer of Allegheny County is without jurisdiction to try the petitioners on the indictment which has been found against them in that court.Brishv.Carter et al., 57 Atl. Rep. (Md.) 210;Olsonv.Leindecker, 97 N.W. Rep. (Minn.) 972;Page 6Brooksv.State, 39 S.W. Rep. (Ga.) 877;Peoplev.Glennon,74 N.Y.S. 794;Kirk Sonv.Garrett,84 Md. 383;Peoplev.Hochstin,73 N.Y.S. 626;Stapelyv.Commonwealth, 6 Binney (Pa.), 316;Brooksv.Commonwealth,61 Pa. 352;United Statesv.Fuellhart, 106 F. 911.
The evidence is conclusive that Crowley was wounded while fleeing from arrest. Even though Dowd used more force in attempting to make the arrest than he was warranted in using under the law, nevertheless since he was engaged in performing a duty imposed upon him by a law of the United States, the state courts are without jurisdiction to call him to account for the excessive use of force in performing a duty which the Federal laws commanded.Ex parte Jenkins, 2 Wall. Jr. 543;In reNeagle, supra; In re Waite, 81 F. 359.
There was no appearance for the appellee.
"The court below had jurisdiction to issue the writ and to decide the questions which were argued before it.Ex parteRoyall,117 U.S. 241;Whittenv.Tomlinson,160 U.S. 231. In the latter case most of the prior authorities are mentioned. From these cases it clearly appears, as the settled and proper procedure, that while Circuit Courts of the United States have jurisdiction, under the circumstances set forth in the foregoing statement, to issue the writ ofhabeas corpus, yet those courts ought not to exercise that jurisdiction by the discharge of a prisoner unless in cases of peculiar urgency, and that instead of discharging they will leave the prisoner to be dealt with by the courts of the State; that after a final determination of the case by the state court, the Federal courts will even then generally leave the petitioner to his remedy by writ of error fromPage 7this court. The reason for this course is apparent. It is an exceedingly delicate jurisdiction given to the Federal courts by which a person under an indictment in a state court and subject to its laws may, by the decision of a single judge of the Federal court, upon a writ ofhabeas corpus, be taken out of the custody of the officers of the State and finally discharged therefrom, and thus a trial by the state courts of an indictment found under the laws of a State be finally prevented. Cases have occurred of so exceptional a nature that this course has been pursued. Such are the casesIn re Loney,134 U.S. 372, andInre Neagle,135 U.S. 1, but the reasons for the interference of the Federal court in each of those cases were extraordinary, and presented what this court regarded as such exceptional facts as to justify the interference of the Federal tribunal. Unless this case be of such an exceptional nature, we ought not to encourage the interference of the Federal court below with the regular course of justice in the state court."
The rule thus declared is well settled and, in our judgment, it was properly applied in this case. Crowley was a citizen of Pennsylvania, not in the service of the United States, and was killed in or near a street of the city of Pittsburgh, and not on property belonging to the United States or over which the United States had jurisdiction.
The homicide occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of Oyer and Terminer, which, as Judge Acheson observed, was the only civil court which could have jurisdiction to try petitioners for the alleged unlawful killing, and the indictment presented a case cognizable by that court.
The general jurisdiction in time of peace of the civil courts of a State over persons in the military service of the United States, who are accused of a capital crime or of any offense against the person of a citizen, committed within the State, is, of course, not denied.
But it is contended on behalf of the Government that the state court was absolutely without jurisdiction to try petitioners for the killing of Crowley, because the homicide was committedPage 8by them "while in the lawful performance of a duty and obligation imposed upon them by the Constitution and laws of the United States." The argument is that Crowley had been guilty of the crime of larceny and could have been indicted and prosecuted on the charge of felony in the District Court of the United States under section 5439 of the Revised Statutes, or under section 5391, the United States having jurisdiction over the Allegheny Arsenal property and the Pennsylvania laws making what Crowley is alleged to have done a felony. Hence that it was the duty of petitioners to arrest Crowley and to surrender him to the Federal authorities for prosecution. And it is insisted that the fact is "established that Crowley met his death while attempting to escape arrest." But there was a conflict of evidence as to whether Crowley had or had not surrendered, and it is conceded that if he had, it could not reasonably be claimed that the fatal shot was fired in the performance of a duty imposed by the Federal law, and the state court had jurisdiction.
The Circuit Court was not called on to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That was for the state court if it had jurisdiction, and this the state court had, even though it was petitioners' duty to pursue and arrest Crowley (assuming that he had stolen pieces of copper), if the question of Crowley being a fleeing felon was open to dispute on the evidence; that is, if that were the gist of the case, it was for the state court to pass upon it, and its doing so could not be collaterally attacked. The assertion that Crowley was resisting arrest and in flight when shot was matter of defense, andEx parte Crouch,112 U.S. 178, is in point.
We have repeatedly held that the acts of Congress in relation tohabeas corpusdo not imperatively require the Circuit Courts to wrest petitioners from the custody of state officers in advance of trial in the state courts, and that those courts may decline to discharge in the proper exercise of discretion. We think that discretion was properly exercised in this case.Final order affirmed.Page 9