Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Hartman v. Butterfield Lumber Co.

Hartman v. Butterfield Lumber Co., 199 U.S. 335 (1905)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1905-11-27
Topic
general

Mr. Justice Brewer, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. For the purposes of this case it may be conceded that the contract made before the patent was, by virtue of the policy of the United States as disclosed in its statutes, void, and could not have been enforced by the Norwood and Butterfield Company, but the contract was not inherently vicious or immoral. It was simply void because in conflict with the Federal statutes. Anderson v.

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Headnotes

  1. Real Property Law — Validity of Conveyance of Patented Land A contract made before the issuance of a patent, though void by virtue of the policy of the United States as disclosed in its statutes and unenforceable while executory, is not inherently vicious or immoral; upon issuance of the patent full legal title passes to the patentee, who may convey the land as he sees fit and cannot thereafter repudiate a voluntary conveyance of the interest he had agreed to convey.
  2. Contracts Law — Executed Contracts An executed contract, voluntarily executed without fraud or duress, is generally binding and cannot be repudiated by the party who executed it.
  3. Contracts Law — Statute of Frauds The defense of the statute of frauds cannot be set up against an executed contract, because no rule of law prevents a party from performing a promise that could not be legally enforced, or permits a party who is morally but not legally bound to do an act, once the act is done, to recall it to the prejudice of the promisee on the plea that the promise, while still executory, could not have been enforced by action.
  4. Real Property Law — Persons Acquiring Interest After Conveyance One whose interest in land is acquired subsequently to a conveyance thereof by the owner has no higher right to question the conveyance than the grantor had.
  5. Bankruptcy Law — Fraudulent Transfers The rule that a subsequent grantee stands in no better position than his grantor to challenge an earlier conveyance does not conflict with the rule that a conveyance fraudulent against creditors may be set aside at their instance, since creditors' rights exist prior to the conveyance, or the conveyance was made with the purpose of defrauding them out of debts subsequently contracted; a later grantee who held no claim against the grantor at the time of the conveyance, took with knowledge of it, and whose conveyance was not made to defraud future creditors, cannot invoke that exception.
Mr. Justice Brewer,

after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

For the purposes of this case it may be conceded that the contract made before the patent was, by virtue of the policy of the United States as disclosed in its statutes, void, and could not have been enforced by the Norwood and Butterfield Company, but the contract was not inherently vicious or immoral. It was simply void because in conflict with the Federal statutes. Anderson v. Carkins, 135 U. S. 483. When the patent issued the full legal title passed to the patentee. He could do with the land that which he saw fit, sell or give it away, and if he voluntarily conveyed it he could not thereafter repudiate the conveyance. He may well have thought that having received money from the company to enable him to pay for the land it was equitable that he should convey that interest which he had agreed to convey. At any rate, he had a right to exercise a choice in the matter, and having exercised it he at least cannot complain. Whether the Government could challenge the conveyance we need not determine, for if it had any right to interfere, it has not chosen to do so. Jt is generally true that an executed contract, voluntarily executed, without fraud or duress, is binding and cannot be repudiated by the party who executed it. In Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 497, Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the court, tints stated the law:

*338 “It is well settled by the authorities that the defense of the statute of frauds cannot be set up against an executed contract. Dodge v. Crandall, 30 N. Y. 294, 304; Brown v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, 117 N. Y. 266, 273; Madden v. Floyd, 69 Alabama, 221, 225; Gordon, Rankin & Co. v. Tweedy, 71 Alabama, 202, 214; Huntley v. Huntley, 114 U. S. 394, 400; Browne on Statute of Frauds, § 116. This rule proceeds and rests upon the principle .that there is ‘no rule of law which prevents a party from performing a-promise which could not be legally* enforced, orvwhich will permit a party, morally but net legally bound to do a certain act or thing, upon the act or thing being done, to recall it to the prejudice of the promisee, on the plea that.the.promise, while still executory, could not by reason of some technical rule of law have been enforced by action.’ Newman v. Nellis, 97 N. Y. 285, 291. ” St. Louis Hay &c. Co. v. United States, 191 U. S. 159, 163.

It is also well settled that one whose interest in land is acquired subsequently to a conveyance thereof by the owner has no higher right to question the conveyance than the grantor had. This does not conflict with the rule that a conveyance fraudulent against creditors may be set aside at their.instance; for their rights exist prior to the conveyance, or if not, the conveyance was made with the purpose on the part of the grantor of defrauding them out' of debts subsequently contracted. Nothing of that kind appears here. Hartman, at the time of the conveyance, had no claim against the patentee. The conveyance was not made with the purpose of subsequently contracting a debt and defrauding him out of payment thereof. His trust deed was executed after the conveyance to the Nor-wood and Butterfield Company and for the purpose of securing debts thereafter to be contracted, and he took with knowledge of the conveyance.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi was right, and it is

Affirmed.