Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

In Re Commonwealth of Massachusetts

In Re Commonwealth of Mass., 197 U.S. 482 (1905)

Type: Opinion
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: Federal
Date: 1905-04-10
Topic: general

How later courts describe this case

“[I]n cases over which we possess neither original nor appellate jurisdiction we cannot grant prohibition or mandamus or cer-tiorari as ancillary thereto.”

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Cited by: 14 opinions

Headnotes

Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court The Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over a controversy unless it is a controversy between a State and a citizen of another State; a citizen of the District of Columbia is not a citizen of a State for purposes of that jurisdictional requirement. 197 U.S. 482
Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Since the passage of the Act of February 9, 1893, establishing the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, the Supreme Court generally cannot review the judgments and decrees of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia directly by appeal or writ of error, except for cases arising under the bankruptcy law. 197 U.S. 482
Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Ancillary Writs In cases over which the Supreme Court possesses neither original nor appellate jurisdiction, it cannot grant prohibition, mandamus, or certiorari as ancillary thereto; the power to issue such writs under section 716 of the Revised Statutes extends only to writs necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction the court already possesses. 197 U.S. 482

IN RE MASSACHUSETTS,197 U.S. 482(1905)

25 S.Ct. 512

In reCOMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, PETITIONER.

ORIGINAL.

No. 15.

Argued February 27, 28, 1905.

Decided April 10, 1905.

In a proceeding brought by a State on petition for writs of prohibition, mandamus or certiorari, to restrain the justices of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia from proceeding further in an action brought by a citizen of the District of Columbia against the Secretary of the Treasury to enjoin him from issuing to the Governor of the petitioning State a duplicate warrant,held, that this court has no original jurisdiction and as the controversy was not one between a State and citizens of another State, and under the act of February 9, 1893,27 Stat. 434, establishing the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, this court has no appellate jurisdiction as it cannot review judgments and decrees of the Supreme Court of the District directly by appeal or writ of error. In cases over which this court has no original or appellate jurisdiction it cannot grant prohibition, mandamus or certiorari as ancillary thereto.

BY an act of Congress of the United States approved July 27,

1861,12 Stat. 276, c. 21, it was provided:

"That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby,

directed, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise

appropriated, to pay to the Governor of any State, or to his duly

authorized agents, the costs, charges, and expenses properly

incurred by such State for enrolling, subsisting, clothing,

supplying, arming, equipping, paying, and transporting its troops

employed in aiding to suppress the present insurrection against

the United States, to be settled upon proper vouchers, to be

filed and passed upon by the proper accounting officers of the

Treasury."

On March 20, 1888, the legislature of Massachusetts passed the

following resolution:

"Resolved, that the Governor and council are hereby

authorized to employ the agent of the Commonwealth for the

prosecution of war claims against the United States, to prosecute

Page 483

also the claim of the Commonwealth for a refund of the direct tax

paid under act of Congress approved August fifth in the year

eighteen hundred and sixty-one, and of the interest paid upon war

loans during the period from eighteen hundred and sixty-one to

eighteen hundred and sixty-five, also to fix his compensation

which shall be paid out of any amount received therefrom."

On July 12, 1899, the executive council of the Commonwealth

passed a resolution authorizing the attorney general to employ

John B. Cotton to prosecute said claim. Mr. Cotton was a citizen

of the District of Columbia.

Thereupon a form of contract was prepared and executed by the

then Governor of Massachusetts, in behalf and under the seal of

the Commonwealth, and by Cotton; and a duplicate original thereof

was deposited with the Secretary of the Treasury of the United

States.

The prosecution of the claim was at once entered upon, and

after five years was finally adjudicated, audited and passed.

On or about May 2, 1904, the Treasury Department issued and

delivered to Cotton, as the duly authorized agent of the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts, war settlement warrant No. 11343,

payable "to the Governor of the State of Massachusetts, or

order," for the sum of $1,611,740.85, and addressed "P.O.

address, c.o. John B. Cotton, agent and att'y, Washington, D.C."

Mr. Cotton notified the state attorney general of the delivery

of the warrant to him, and that he was entitled to a lien upon

the warrant for the amount of his fees under his contract; and

the Governor was informed to the same effect. Mr. Cotton also

notified the Secretary of the Treasury that he claimed a lien

upon the warrant for compensation in accordance with his

contract. Subsequently, the Governor, Hon. John L. Bates,

addressed a communication to the Secretary of the Treasury, in

which he demanded that the warrant be cancelled and that a

duplicate thereof be forwarded to him as Governor of the

Page 484

Commonwealth. The Secretary declined to comply with the demand.

Later Mr. Cotton filed a bill in the Supreme Court of the

District of Columbia against "Leslie M. Shaw, Secretary of the

Treasury, and John L. Bates, Governor of the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts," in which he asserted his right to an attorney's

lien upon the papers of his client, the Commonwealth of

Massachusetts, including the warrant in question, and prayed,

among other things, that said Leslie M. Shaw might be restrained

and enjoined from cancelling the warrant which had been delivered

to him, and from drawing or issuing a duplicate thereof to said

Bates, and "that the defendant, John L. Bates, may be restrained

and enjoined from asking, demanding or receiving from the

defendant, Leslie M. Shaw, or any of his assistants, subordinates

or clerks, a second or duplicate warrant as aforesaid."

The State of Massachusetts was not named as a party to this

suit, and no relief was prayed against the State.

Upon the filing of this bill one of the justices of the

Supreme Court of the District of Columbia entered a rule on the

Secretary of the Treasury, requiring him to show cause why the

relief prayed against him should not be granted, which was duly

served, but has not yet come on for hearing. No process was

served upon defendant Bates, who has since cased to be Governor,

and he has never appeared in the suit, nor has the Commonwealth

of Massachusetts intervened therein in any way.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts then filed a petition in

this court, on leave, for writs of prohibition, mandamus and

certiorari, to restrain the justices of the Supreme Court of the

District of Columbia from taking further proceedings or

entertaining jurisdiction in the equity suit.

In response to a rule entered on that petition, the Chief

Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the

District of Columbia showed cause, and submitted, for reasons set

forth, that, as the case stood, the court ought not to be

prevented from exercising jurisdiction.

Page 485

Mr. Herbert Parker, Attorney General of the State of Massachusetts, andMr. Frederick H. Nashfor petitioner:

The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia has no jurisdiction of the bill in equity filed in that court and the lack of jurisdiction appears on the face of the bill. The only court where the dispute between Cotton and the Commonwealth can be adjudicated is the Supreme Court of Massachusetts where the Commonwealth has consented to be impleaded. 11th Amendment, Const. U.S.; Rev. Laws Mass. c. 201;Hagoodv.Southern,117 U.S. 52,71;Cunninghamv.Railroad Company,109 U.S. 446;Rhode Islandv.Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 718;Grignon'sLesseev.Astor, 2 How. 338;Floridav.Georgia, 17 How. 478, 507.

Massachusetts is an indispensable party to the suit and in its absence jurisdiction is lacking.Mallowv.Hinde, 12 Wheat. 193;Findleyv.Hinde, 1 Pet. 241;Shieldsv.Barrow, 17 How. 130;Barneyv.Baltimore, 6 Wall. 280;Ribonv.Railway Co., 16 Wall. 446;Gregoryv.Stetson,133 U.S. 579;Californiav.So. Pac. R.R. Co.,157 U.S. 229,249.

As to necessity of having both parties before the court and subject to its jurisdiction seePricev.Forrest,173 U.S. 410;Sanbornv.Maxwell,18 App.D.C. 245,253;Minnesotav.Nor. Securities Co.,184 U.S. 199;Williamsv.Bankhead, 19 Wall. 563;Doddv.Una,40 N.J. Eq. 672,709; Calvert's Parties in Eq., 10; Daniell Ch. Pr., 3d Am. ed., 285;In reAyers,123 U.S. 443,505.

As to the Eleventh Amendment this case comes withinLouisvillev.Jumel,107 U.S. 711;Cunninghamv.MaconBrunswick R.R. Co.,109 U.S. 446;Hagoodv.Southern,117 U.S. 52;In re Ayers,123 U.S. 443;Christianv.AtlanticN.C.R.R. Co.,133 U.S. 233;Belknapv.Schild,161 U.S. 10;Fitzv.McGhee,172 U.S. 516;Smithv.Reeves,178 U.S. 436;Minnesotav.Hitchcock,185 U.S. 373. And not withinUnited Statesv.Peters, 5 Cranch, 115;Osbornv.Bank ofUnited States, 9 Wheat. 738;Davisv.Gray, 16 Wall. 203;Board of Liquidationv.McComb,92 U.S. 531;United Statesv.Page 486Lee,106 U.S. 196;Virginia Coupon Cases,114 U.S. 270;Pennoyerv.McConnaughy,140 U.S. 1;In re Tyler,149 U.S. 164;Reaganv.Farmers' Loan Trust Co.,154 U.S. 389;Scottv.Donald,165 U.S. 108;Tindalv.Wesley,167 U.S. 204;Smythv.Ames,169 U.S. 517;Illinois Central R.R. Co. v.Adams,180 U.S. 28;Missouri R.R. Co. v.MissouriRailroad Commissioners,183 U.S. 53.

The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia having no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the bill, by reason of the exemption from suit of an indispensable party, the Commonwealth's remedy for the usurpation of jurisdiction is a writ of prohibition to the judges of that court.

If this suit is removed the Commonwealth can apply for mandamus to compel the Secretary to issue another warrant.Redfieldv.Windham,137 U.S. 636;Robertsv.UnitedStates,176 U.S. 221.

The Commonwealth should not appeal, and none of its officers can appear, in any court outside of its own jurisdiction.UnitedStatesv.Lee,106 U.S. 196,205;Hagoodv.Southern,117 U.S. 52,71;Georgiav.Jesup,106 U.S. 458;South Carolinav.Wesley,155 U.S. 542.

This court has power to issue the writ of prohibition to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, that being the appropriate remedy.In re Vidal,179 U.S. 126;Ex parteJoins,191 U.S. 93;Andersonv.Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227;Exparte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505; Rev. Stat. § 716;Re Chetwood,165 U.S. 443;Re Tampa Ry. Co.,168 U.S. 583;Bronsonv.LaCrosse R.R. Co., 1 Wall. 405. In every case where the remedy has been denied there has been a meritorious reason without dealing with the court's power to issue it. SeeAsphalt Co. v.Morris, 132 F. 945; act of February 9, 1893,27 Stat. 434;United Statesv.Schenz,102 U.S. 378.

If this court declines to issue a writ of prohibition, then the petitioner's only remedy is a writ of mandamus to command the judges of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to dismiss the suit. Certiorari is desired, if necessary as anPage 487auxiliary writ.Re Hollon Parker,131 U.S. 221;Re ChateaugayIron Co.,128 U.S. 544;Ex parte Parker,120 U.S. 737;Exparte Morgan,114 U.S. 174;Ex parte Burtis,103 U.S. 238;Exparte Railway Co.,101 U.S. 711;Ex parte Flippin,94 U.S. 348;In re Hohorst,150 U.S. 653.

Mandamus is a remedy when the case is outside of the exercise of the inferior court's discretion and outside of the jurisdiction of the court.Virginiav.Rives,100 U.S. 313;Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364, 375;Ex parte Newman, 14 Wall. 152, 165;Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505;In re W. G.R.R.Co.,140 U.S. 91;Gainesv.Rugg,148 U.S. 228;In reGrossmayer,177 U.S. 48;Virginiav.Paul,148 U.S. 107.Mr. Frederic D. McKenneyandMr. John D. Flannery, with whomMr. William HitzandMr. William Frye Whitewere on the brief, for respondents:

This court has no power to issue the writ of prohibition. High on Extra. Leg. Rem., 3d ed., § 767b; Ex parte Gordon, 1 Black, 503;Ex parte Christy, 3 How. 292. This is not a controversy between a State and citizen of another State.Hepburnv.Ellzey, 2 Cr. 445;Met. R.R. Co. v.Dist. ofColumbia,132 U.S. 1,9;Hooev.Jamieson,166 U.S. 395.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

This court has no original jurisdiction over this controversy, in any view, because it is not a controversy between a State and a citizen of another State.Hepburnv.Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445;Hooev.Jamieson,166 U.S. 395. And it has not appellate jurisdiction, because since the passage of the act of February 9, 1893,27 Stat. 434, c. 74, establishing the court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, this court, generally speaking, and not including cases arising under the bankruptcy law,Audubonv.Shufeldt,181 U.S. 575, cannot review the judgments and decrees of the Supreme Court of the District, directly by appeal or writ of error.Page 488

By section 716 of the Revised Statutes, this court and the Circuit and District Courts "have power to issue all writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."

By section 688, prohibition may issue "in the District Courts, when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," but there is no similar provision in respect of other courts. And it has been repeatedly held, as to the Circuit Courts, that they have no power under section 716 to issue writs of prohibition and mandamus, except when necessary in the exercise of their existing jurisdiction.Bath Countyv.Almy, 13 Wall. 244, 248;McClungv.Silliman, 6 Wheat. 598, 601.

This is equally true of this court, that is to say, that in cases over which we possess neither original nor appellate jurisdiction we cannot grant prohibition or mandamus or certiorari as ancillary thereto.Rule discharged; petition denied.