Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Wabash Railroad v. Flannigan
Wabash R.R. v. Flannigan, 192 U.S. 29 (1904)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1904-01-04
- Topic
- bankruptcy
Mr. Justice White, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. The opinion of this court, upholding the correctness of the judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Missouri in favor of Tourville, referred to in the preceding statement, was announced on December 3, 1900. Wabash R. R.
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UpLaw has not yet analyzed Wabash Railroad v. Flannigan. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
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Headnotes
- Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Writ of Error — Frivolous Federal Questions Where the Federal question asserted to be contained in the record is manifestly lacking all color of merit, the writ of error will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 192 U.S. at 37 (citing Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487, 493)
- Constitutional Law — Full Faith and Credit A claim of protection under the Full Faith and Credit Clause is without merit where the party did not, in the state proceedings, set up rights specifically based upon the judgment of the sister State, did not claim for that judgment an effect which, if denied, would have impaired its force and effect, and did not predicate any right to the relief demanded upon the effect due to that judgment. 192 U.S. at 36–37
- Constitutional Law — Due Process A due process challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment need not be considered where it was asserted for the first time in the petition for the allowance of a writ of error from the Supreme Court. 192 U.S. at 36
WABASH R.R. CO.v. FLANNIGAN,192 U.S. 29(1904)
WABASH RAILROAD COMPANYv. FLANNIGAN.
ERROR TO THE ST. LOUIS COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.
No. 115.
Submitted December 18, 1903.
Decided January 4, 1904.
THE action wherein was entered the judgment which is sought to
be reviewed by this writ of error was begun on December 20, 1900,
by the filing in the Circuit Court of the city of St. Louis of a
petition on behalf of the Wabash Railroad Company, the plaintiff
in error in this court. The defendants named in the petition were
Alexander Flannigan and Virgil Rule, the present defendants in
error. The cause of action was ultimately embodied in a third
amended petition, filed, by leave of court, on April 15, 1901.
From a recital made in the opinion of the St. Louis Court of
Appeals the following summary of the allegations of that pleading
is made:
After asserting its existence as a consolidated corporation
from a named date, plaintiff alleged that it was indebted, on
June 10, 1891, to one Tourville, for wages, in the sum of $81.98;
that an action to recover such indebtedness was instituted by
Tourville in a court of the State of Missouri on the date named,
and that a judgment was rendered in favor of
Page 30
Tourville, which had been finally affirmed by said court; that in
April, 1895, the defendant Flannigan recovered judgment against
Tourville and the railroad company in a court of the State of
Illinois, the railroad company being made garnishee in the action
on account of the original indebtedness of $81.98 to Tourville,
above mentioned; that Tourville had assigned the judgment
obtained by him in the Missouri court to the defendant Virgil
Rule, and that both the defendants Flannigan and Rule were
undertaking to collect their respective judgments from the
railroad company. The court was asked to permit a deposit in
court of the sum of $81.98 and interest, and to require the
defendants to interplead and to have determined their rights in
respect to such deposited sum. The defendant Rule was served with
summons, and a written appearance was filed on behalf of
Flannigan, who was a non-resident.
In stating the subsequent steps in the litigation we shall
omit reference to the facts which clearly have no relevancy to
the alleged Federal questions.
Following the filing of the third amended petition an
application was made for the allowance of a temporary injunction
against the defendants, prohibiting them from attempting to
enforce their respective judgments pending the determination of
the action. An order was thereupon made temporarily restraining
the defendants, and requiring them "to show cause, if any they
have, why a temporary injunction should not be issued herein, and
the relief prayed for in said third amended petition should not
be granted." A "return" to this order to show cause was filed on
behalf of the defendant Rule, and therein were set forth numerous
reasons why a temporary injunction should not issue and the
relief prayed in the third amended petition should not be
granted. Flannigan answered, admitting each and every allegation
therein, and claiming priority of lien and right of payment out
of the so-called fund of $81.98. Thereafter, on April 22, 1901,
the plaintiff filed a motion for the relief prayed for,
notwithstanding
Page 31
the aforesaid return of Virgil Rule, and numerous reasons were
stated in support of the motion. On April 29, 1901, the court
entered the following order:
"Now at this day come the parties herein by their respective
attorneys, and the order issued herein on April 15, 1901,
commanding the defendants to show cause why a temporary
injunction should not be granted against them, coming on for
hearing upon the pleadings, affidavits and proofs adduced, and
the court having duly considered the same, and being sufficiently
advised of and concerning the premises, doth order that the
prayer of plaintiff's bill be and is denied. It is further
ordered by the court that the restraining order granted against
defendants on April 15, 1901, be and is hereby dissolved."
A motion for rehearing was filed and overruled. The motion was
based upon the assumption that the order in question operated as
a judgment dismissing the petition. The fifteenth and last ground
of the motion and the first and only specific reference made to
the Constitution of the United States in the proceedings up to
that time was as follows:
"Fifteenth. Because the court erred in refusing to give full
faith and credit to the judgment of a sister State, as required
by the Constitution and laws of the United States."
On appeal the St. Louis Court of Appeals entered a judgment
affirming in all things the "judgment" of the trial court.
75 S.W. 691. No allusion was made in the opinion to any
constitutional question. Application was then made to transfer
the cause to the Supreme Court of Missouri, upon the claim that
it involved "a construction of section one of article four of the
Constitution of the United States." The application was denied. A
petition was next presented to the presiding judge of the St.
Louis Court of Appeals, praying the allowance of a writ of error
from this court. The petition was overruled, for the following
stated reasons:
"InWabash Railroad Companyv.Tourville,179 U.S. 322,
the judgment herein involved came under review. The validity of
the Tourville judgment, as we understand the opinion,
Page 32
was sustained, and its priority over that of Flannigan was
adjudged. In the face of this decision we deny the writ."
A writ of error was afterwards allowed by a justice of this
court. The error assigned embraced the following alleged Federal
questions:
"19. Your petitioner charges and avers that in said suit,
while the same was pending in said Circuit Court and in said
Court of Appeals, the construction of the following clauses of
the Constitution of the United States was drawn in question, viz:
"The following clause of section 1, article IV: `Full faith
and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts,
records and judicial proceedings of every other State.'
"Section 11, article IV: `The citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States.'
"The following clause of section 1, article XIV, of amendments
to the Constitution: `No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
law.'
"Your petitioner says that the decisions of the courts on said
clauses of the Constitution in said cause were against the
rights, title, privilege and exemption specially set up and
claimed under said clauses of said Constitution by your
petitioner."
The court has ample jurisdiction to hear and determine this controversy by reason of the constitutional question apparent upon the face of the record.Insurance Co. v.Needles,113 U.S. 574;Carpenterv.Strange,141 U.S. 87;Water Co. v.Green Bay,142 U.S. 269;Gordonv.Bank,144 U.S. 97;Cookev.Avery,147 U.S. 375;Powellv.Brunswick County,150 U.S. 440;Page 33Scottv.McNeal,154 U.S. 34;Saywardv.Denny,158 U.S. 180;Railwayv.Chicago,166 U.S. 226;Canal Co. v.Paper Co.,172 U.S. 58;Water Power Co. v.Railway Co.,172 U.S. 475.
The judgment of a sister State may become a Federal question:First. Where the existence or validity of such judgment is in dispute in a state court, and the decision impairs its integrity, or existence;Second. Where the effect of the judgment according to the law and usage of the State where rendered is in dispute in a state court, and the decision is adverse "to the claimed or contended effect of such judgment." The case at bar falls under the latter instance.Crapov.Kelley,88 U.S. 610;Dupasserv.Rochersar, 21 Wall. 130;Live StockCompanyv.Butchers Union,120 U.S. 141;Huntingtonv.Attrill,146 U.S. 657;Railwayv.Sturm,174 U.S. 710;Greenv.Buskirk, 5 Wall. 310.
By denying the relief prayed for, the court below deprived the plaintiff in error of its property "without due process of law," in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.Railway Co. v.Sturm,194 U.S. 710.
Plaintiff in error was entitled to the relief prayed for and Flannigan was entitled to a hearing on the issue of priority.
A bill of interpleader may be properly filed in any cause, as well after the adverse claims to the fund have been reduced to judgment, as prior to that time.Cheeverv.Hodgson,9 Mo. App. 565;Doddsv.Gregory,51 Miss. 351;Woodruffv.Taylor,20 Vt. 65;Provident Savings Inst. v.White,115 Mass. 112; 2 Story Eq. Jurisprudence (13th ed.), 137 note;Hamiltonv.Marks, 5 DeGex Smale, 638; 13 Eng. Law Eq. 321;Johnsonv.Maxey,43 Ala. 521;Newhallv.Kastens,70 Ill. 156;Millsv.Townsend,109 Mass. 115;Robardsv.Clayton,49 Mo. App. 610;Building Associationv.Joy,56 Mo. App. 433.
The plaintiff has never been guilty of laches.Page 34Mr. John D. JohnsonandMr. Virgil Rulefor defendant in error, Rule:
The decision of the St. Louis Court of Appeals was upon the ground that all the parties to the bill of interpleader had had their day in court, and that the questions raised wereresadjudicata. This is not a Federal question and this court is, therefore, without jurisdiction.Northern Pacific Railroadv.Ellis,144 U.S. 464;Hammondv.Johnson,142 U.S. 73;Hickmanv.Fort Scott,141 U.S. 415;Chaffinv.Taylor,116 U.S. 367;Clarkv.Keith,106 U.S. 464;Peckv.Sanderson, 18 How. 42.
In order to give this court power to revise the judgment of a state court it must appear upon the transcript that the constitutional question was raised by the pleadings and decided against plaintiff in error.Oxleyv.Butler Co.,166 U.S. 657,658;Hoydtv.Sheldon, 1 Black, 518, 521;Maxwellv.Newbold, 18 How. 511.
This court will not review the judgment of a state court except upon the decree of the highest court in the State. Rev. Stat. U.S. sec. 709;Farnsworthv.Montana,129 U.S. 104; Desty's Fed. Proc. sec. 223.
The Supreme Court of Missouri is the highest court in that State having jurisdiction in constitutional questions. Constitution of Missouri, art.6, sec.12;Statev.St. LouisCt. of App.,97 Mo. 296,299Statev.Caldwell,57 Mo. App. 447;In re Essex,44 Mo. App. 289.
The bill of interpleader does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendants, for the following reasons:
It is essential to a bill of interpleader that the plaintiff shall make known his condition as a stakeholder by bringing a suit within a reasonable time after being advised of the double claims against him.Cheeverv.Hodgson,9 Mo. App. 565;Doddsv.Gregory,61 Miss. 351;McDevittv.Sullivan,8 Cal. 592;Union Bankv.Kerr, 2 Md. Ch. 460; Ency. P. P. 462Barnesv.Bamberger,196 Pa. 123;Brackettv.Graves, 51 N.Y. St. Rep. 895.Page 35
It is an essential to a bill of interpleader that the right of either defendant to the fund should not have been previously determined by a judgment at law against the plaintiff.McKinneyv.Kuhn,59 Miss. 186;Risherv.Roush,2 Mo. 95;Frenchv.Robrchard,5 Vt. 43;Holmesv.Clark,46 Vt. 22;Mitchellv.N.W. Mfg. Co.,26 Ill. App. 295;Carrollv.Parks, 1 Baxt. 269;Yarboroughtv.Thompson, B.S. M. 291;Haseltinev.Brickley, 16 Gratt. 116;Cornishv.Tanner, 1 Young J. 333;Prov. Ins. Co. v.White,115 Mass. 112.
A bill of interpleader must show that the plaintiff is ignorant of the rights of the parties who are called upon to interplead. Ency. P. P. 465, n. 2;Barkerv.Barker,42 N.H. 78;Shawv.Coster, 8 Paige, 339;Morganv.Fillmore, 18 Abb. Pr. 219;Mohawk, etc., R. Co. v.Chute, 4 Paige, 384;Pfisterv.Wade,56 Cal. 43;Illingworthv.Rowe,52 N.J. Eq. 360;Triggv.Hitz, 17 Abb. Pr. 436;Del., etc., R.R. Co. v.Corwith, 16 Civ. Pro. Rep. (N.Y.) 312;Heckmerv.Gilligan,28 W. Va. 750.
A judgment debt of one jurisdiction is not subject to a bill of interpleader in another jurisdiction.Cranev.McDonald,118 N.Y. 657;Snodgrassv.Butler,54 Miss. 45;Fultonv.Chase, 6 N.Y.S. 126;Gibsonv.Goldwaite,7 Ala. 281;Stonev.Reed,152 Mass. 179;Boston,etc., v.Skillings,132 Mass. 418;Fairbanksv.Bilknap,135 Mass. 179;Kylev.Mary Lee Coal Co.,112 Ala. 606;Morristownv.Binnings,26 N.J. Eq. 345;Bartlettv.Sutton, 23 F. 257.
The Circuit Court had no power to enforce its judgment against the person of defendant Flannigan, hence a temporary injunction as against him would have been wholly without effect, unless he chose to obey it. Rev. Stat. Mo. 1899, sec. 598d; Sheedyv.Second Nat. Bank,62 Mo. 17.
The Missouri court would have no power to decree that the judgment of the Illinois court was void or that it was not void.Carpenterv.Strange,141 U.S. 88.
A court of one jurisdiction cannot enjoin the collection of aPage 36judgment of another court of competent jurisdiction, in the absence of any allegation of fraud in obtaining such judgment.Scrutchfieldv.Souter,119 Mo. 621;Nelsonv.Brown,23 Mo. 13;Keithv.Plemmons,28 Mo. 104;Pettusv.Elgin,11 Mo. 411;Mellierv.Bartlett,89 Mo. 137;Haehlv.Wabash R. Co.,119 Mo. 325;State ex rel. v.Eggers,152 Mo. 487.
The controversy in the present action relates to the same judgments which were under consideration in this court in the prior action, and the purpose of the railroad company in this, as in the previous case, was to limit the amount which might be collected by the holders of the respective judgments against it to a sum which in the aggregate would not be in excess of the indebtedness to Tourville upon his original claim. In substance, therefore, the present action is but an attempt by indirection to do that which the Supreme Court of Missouri and this court have held in the prior action could not be done.
The constitutional questions now urged on behalf of plaintiff in error are that the dismissal of its petition for interpleader was a denial of full faith and credit to the garnishment judgment rendered by the Illinois court, and that the denial of the relief prayed for also violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The objection last stated need not be further noticed, as it was asserted for the first time in the petition for the allowance of a writ of error from this court. We think it unavoidably results also that the claim of the protection of the due faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States here relied on is without merit. Nowhere in its petition for interpleader or in the proceedings had thereunder in the Missouri courts did the railroad company set up rights specifically based upon the Illinois judgment, claim for that judgment an effect which, if denied to it, would have impaired its force and effect, nor did the railroad company predicate any right to the relief demanded upon the effect due to the Illinois judgment. The relief asked by the railroad company in substance tended, on the contrary, to lessen the force and effect both of the Missouri and Illinois judgments. It was sought to change the status of the company from that of a general debtor forPage 38the amount due upon each judgment and to engraft upon the judgments a limitation to a single satisfaction out of a specific fund. In its petition the railroad company expressly alleged its inability to determine whether the Illinois or the Missouri judgment possessed a priority of right to payment out of the so-called fund. Clearly, also, even the owner and holder of the Illinois judgment could not, in reason, contend that the judgment of the Missouri court complained of had the effect of denying full faith and credit to the judgment of a sister State. As the settled rule in this court is that where the Federal question asserted to be contained in a record is manifestly lacking all color of merit, the writ of error must be dismissed,Swaffordv.Templeton,185 U.S. 487,493, and cases cited, it results that the writ or error in this case must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.Writ of error dismissed.