Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Ambrosini v. United States
Ambrosini v. United States, 187 U.S. 1 (1902)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1902-10-20
- Topic
- general
Mb. Chief Justice Fullísb, after making the foregoing statement, delivered’ the opinion of the court. By the dramshop act the general assembly of Illinois legislated, as was stated in the title of the act, “against the evils arising from the sale of intoxicating liquors,” not by prohibiting the traffie altogether, but by regulating it in protection of the public. The act concerning cities authorized municipal action subject to the general law. 'The legislation was enacted in the exercise of the police power for the safety, welfare and health of the community, and it is conceded that that power is a power reserved by the States, free from Federal restriction in any particular material here.
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- Cited by
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Headnotes
- Constitutional Law — Intergovernmental Tax Immunity The general principle of intergovernmental tax immunity is that, just as the means and instrumentalities employed by the Federal Government to carry into operation its granted powers are exempt from state taxation, so the means and instrumentalities of the States are exempt from taxation by the Federal Government; the principle rests on the law of self-preservation, because a government whose means of conducting its strictly governmental operations are subject to the control of another and distinct government exists only at the mercy of the latter. 187 U.S. 1 (citing Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113)
- Tax Law — Stamp Taxes — Exemptions Bonds required by a state dramshop statute and a municipal ordinance as a condition precedent to the issuance of liquor licenses are governmental instrumentalities of the State and city, employed to secure enforcement of the liquor laws, prompt payment of fines and penalties, and a remedy for injuries to persons, property, or means of support, and are not mere individual undertakings to secure a personal privilege, even though the regulated business itself is not governmental. 187 U.S. 1
- Constitutional Law — Intergovernmental Tax Immunity — State Instrumentalities The grant of a liquor license is the exercise of a strictly governmental function, and the giving of a bond required as a prerequisite to that license is part of the same transaction; to tax the license would impair the efficiency of state and municipal action and assume the power to suppress such action, and taxation of the bond, considered together with the license, involves the same consequences. 187 U.S. 1
- Tax Law — Stamp Taxes — Statutory Exemption Under section 17 of the War Revenue Act of 1898, which exempts bonds issued in the exercise of functions strictly belonging to States and municipal corporations in their ordinary governmental capacity, bonds required by a State and city and issued for the benefit of the public rather than for the benefit of the individuals who executed them fall within the exemption and are not subject to the stamp tax, being no more taxable than the licenses they accompany. 187 U.S. 1 (30 Stat. 448, c. 448, § 17)
AMBROSINIv. UNITED STATES,187 U.S. 1(1902)
23 S.Ct. 1
AMBROSINIv. UNITED STATES.
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT
OF ILLINOIS.
No. 14.
Argued December 4, 1901.
Decided October 20, 1902.
THIS was a writ of error brought to reverse a judgment of the
District Court imposing a fine on a finding of guilty of an
offence under section seven of the act of Congress entitled "An
act to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures, and for
other purposes,"30 Stat. 448, c. 448, otherwise known as the War
Revenue Act of 1898. The indictment contained two counts. The
first charged that defendant on August 30, 1898, executed a
certain bond in the penal sum of $3000 to the People of the State
of Illinois without affixing to the bond a fifty-cent revenue
stamp, alleged to be required by said act of Congress. The second
count charged that defendant on August 30, 1898, executed a
certain bond to the city of Chicago in the penal sum of $500
without affixing thereto a fifty-cent revenue stamp, alleged to
be required by the act. The bonds were set forthin extenso. A
motion to quash the indictment was made and overruled, and, a
jury being waived, the cause was submitted to the court for
trial, defendant found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine. The
opinion is reported 105 F. 239.
Sections 6, 7 and 17 of the act are as follows:
"SEC. 6. That on and after the first day of July, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, there shall be levied, collected, and
paid, for and in respect of the several bonds, debentures, or
certificates of stock and of indebtedness, and other documents,
instruments, matters, and things mentioned and described in
Schedule A of this act, or for or in respect of the vellum,
parchment, or paper upon which such instruments, matters, or
things, or any of them, shall be written or printed by any person
or persons, or party who shall make, sign, or issue the same, or
for whose use or benefit the same shall be made, signed, or
issued, the several taxes or sums of money set down in figures
Page 3
against the same, respectively, or otherwise specified or set
forth in the said schedule. . . .
"SEC. 7. That if any person or persons shall make, sign, or
issue, or cause to be made, signed, or issued, any instrument,
document, or paper of any kind or description whatsoever, without
the same being duly stamped for denoting the tax hereby imposed
thereon, or without having thereupon an adhesive stamp to denote
said tax, such person or persons shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall pay a fine of not
more than one hundred dollars, at the discretion of the court,
and such instrument, document, or paper, as aforesaid, shall not
be competent evidence in any court."
"Sec. 17. That all bonds, debentures, or certificates of
indebtedness issued by the officers of the United States
Government, or by the officers of any State, county, town,
municipal corporation, or other corporation exercising the taxing
power, shall be, and hereby are, exempt from the stamp taxes
required by this act:Provided, That it is the intent hereby to
exempt from the stamp taxes imposed by this act such State,
county, town, or other municipal corporations in the exercise
only of functions strictly belonging to them in their ordinary
governmental, taxing, or municipal capacity:Provided further,
That stock and bonds issued by cooperative building and loan
associations whose capital stock does not exceed ten thousand
dollars, and building and loan associations or companies that
make loans only to their shareholders, shall be exempt from the
tax herein provided."
Schedule A contained this provision: "Bond: For indemnifying
any person or persons, firm, or corporation who shall have become
bound or engaged as surety for the payment of any sum of money,
or for the due execution or performance of the duties of any
office or position, and to account for money received by virtue
thereof, and all other bonds of any description, except such as
may be required in legal proceedings, not otherwise provided for
in this schedule, fifty cents."
The bonds, to which it was alleged the stamps should have been
affixed, were bonds required by the laws of Illinois to be given
as a condition of the issue of licenses to keep dram shops
Page 4
or sell intoxicating liquors in the State of Illinois and in the
city of Chicago.
Sections one, two and five of an act of the general assembly
of the State of Illinois, entitled "An act to provide for the
licensing of and against the evils arising from the sale of
intoxicating liquors," read:
"§ 1. That a dram-shop is a place where spirituous or vinous
or malt liquors are retailed by less quantity than one gallon,
and intoxicating liquors shall be deemed to include all such
liquors within the meaning of this act.
"§ 2. Whoever, not having a license to keep a dram-shop,
shall, by himself or another, either as principal, clerk or
servant, directly or indirectly, sell any intoxicating liquor in
any less quantity than one gallon, or in any quantity to be drank
upon the premises, or in or upon any adjacent room, building,
yard, premises or place of public resort, shall be fined not less
than twenty dollars ($20) nor more than one hundred dollars
($100), or imprisoned in the county jail not less than ten nor
more than thirty days, or both, in the discretion of the court."
"§ 5. No person shall be licensed to keep a dram-shop, or to
sell intoxicating liquors, by any county board, or the
authorities of any city, town or village, unless he shall first
give bond in the penal sum of $3000, payable to the People of the
State of Illinois, with at least two good and sufficient
sureties, freeholders of the county in which the license is to be
granted, to be approved by the officer who may be authorized to
issue the license, conditioned that he will pay to all persons
all damages that they may sustain, either in person or property,
or means of support, by reason of the person so obtaining a
license selling or giving away intoxicating liquors. The officer
taking such bond may examine any person offered as security upon
any such bond, under oath, and require him to subscribe and swear
to his statement in regard to his pecuniary ability to become
such security. Any bond taken pursuant to this section may be
sued upon for the use of any person, or his legal
representatives, who may be injured by reason of the selling or
giving away any intoxicating liquor by the person so licensed, or
by his agent or servant." 2 Starr Curtis, Anno. Stat. Ill. (2d
ed.) 1586, c. 43.
Page 5
By article five, chapter 24, of the statutes of Illinois
concerning cities, it was provided:
"§ 1. The city council in cities, and president and the board
of trustees in villages, shall have the following powers . . .
"Fourth. To fix the amount, terms and manner of issuing and
revoking licenses. . . .
"Forty-sixth. To license, regulate and prohibit the selling
or giving away of any intoxicating, malt, vinous, mixed or
fermented liquor, the license not to extend beyond the municipal
year in which it shall be granted, and to determine the amount to
be paid for such license: . . .Provided, further, That in
granting licenses, such corporate authorities shall comply with
whatever general law of the State may be in force relative to the
granting of licenses."
". . .Ninety-sixth. To pass all ordinances, rules, and make
all regulations proper or necessary to carry into effect the
powers granted to cities or villages, with such fines or
penalties as the city council or board of trustees shall deem
proper: . . ." 1 Starr Curtis (2d ed.), 689, c. 24.
The Revised Code of Chicago of 1897, provided: "The mayor of
the city of Chicago shall, from time to time, grant licenses for
the keeping of dram shops within the city of Chicago to persons
who shall apply to him in writing therefor, and shall furnish
evidence satisfying him of their good character. Each applicant
shall execute to the city of Chicago a bond, with at least two
sureties, to be approved by the city clerk or city collector, in
the sum of five hundred dollars, conditioned that the applicant
shall faithfully observe and keep all ordinances in force at the
time of the application or thereafter to be passed during the
period of the license applied for, and will keep closed, on
Sundays, all doors opening out upon any street from the bar or
room where such dram shop is to be kept; and that all windows
opening upon any street from such bar or room shall, on Sundays,
be provided with blinds, shutters or curtains, so as to obstruct
the view from such street into such room. No application for a
license shall be considered until such bond shall have been
filed." 1 Rev. Code, 1897, p. 253, c. XXXIX, art. I.
Page 6
The ordinance contained many other specific regulations of the
traffic, and provided that licenses might be revoked by the mayor
for violation of "any provision of any ordinance of the city
council relating to intoxicating liquors, or any condition of the
bond aforesaid."
The conditions of the bond in the sum of $3000 to the People
of the State of Illinois were substantially in the words of the
statute. The conditions of the bond in the sum of $500 to the
city of Chicago were somewhat more stringent than the language of
the municipal code.
The legislation was enacted in the exercise of the police power for the safety, welfare and health of the community, and it is conceded that that power is a power reserved by the States, free from Federal restriction in any particular material here.
The act and the ordinance required these bonds to be given as prerequisites to the issue of licenses permitting the sale. The licenses could not be issued without compliance with this condition precedent. The statute expressly provided that no license should be granted unless the applicant "shall first give bond in the penal sum of $3000," and the ordinance, that "no application for a license shall be considered until such bond shall have been filed."
The bonds were obviously intended to secure the proper enforcement of the laws in respect of the sale of intoxicating liquors;Page 7the prompt payment of fines and penalties; a remedy for injuries in person, property or means of support; and the protection of the public in divers other enumerated particulars. The granting of the licenses was the exercise of a strictly governmental function, and the giving of the bonds was part of the same transaction. To tax the license would be to impair the efficiency of state and municipal action on the subject and assume the power to suppress such action. And considering license and bond together, taxation of the bond involves the same consequences. In themselves the bonds were not mere incidents of the regulation of the traffic, but essential safeguards against its evils, and governmental instrumentalities of State and of city, as authorized by the State, to insure the public welfare in the conduct of the business, although the business itself was not governmental. They were not mere individual undertakings to secure a personal privilege as suggested by the court below, but means for the preservation of the peace, the health and the safety of the community in compelling strict observance of the law, and remedying injurious results.
The general principle is that as the means and instrumentalities employed by the General Government to carry into operation the powers granted to it are exempt from taxation by the States, so are those of the States exempt from taxation by the General Government. It rests on the law of self-preservation, for any government, whose means employed in conducting its strictly governmental operations are subject to the control of another and distinct government, exists only at the mercy of the latter. Nelson, J.,Collectorv.Day, 11 Wall. 113.
Viewed in the light of that general principle, we think it clear that Congress, lest the broad language of Schedule A, "and all other bonds of any description," might literally cover bonds such as those in question, and in avoidance of controversy in that regard, exempted them by section 17, wherein it was declared that it was intended "to exempt from stamp taxes imposed by this act, such State, county, town, or other municipal corporations in the exercise only of functions strictly belonging to them in their ordinary governmental, taxing or municipal capacity." True, this language was used in a proviso, and thePage 8enacting clause exempted bonds "issued by the officers of any State, county, town, municipal corporation or other corporation exercising the taxing power;" but as the bonds were required by the State and the city and were issued for the benefit of the public and not for the benefit of the individuals who executed them, it appears to us that they came fairly within the meaning of the clause, assuming that they were covered by Schedule A. The question is whether the bonds were taken in the exercise of a function strictly belonging to the State and city in their ordinary governmental capacity, and we are of opinion that they were, and that they were exempted as no more taxable than the licenses. Either they were exempt, apart from the proviso, because, in the sense of the statute, issued by the State and city, or the proviso so far qualified the language of the enacting clause as to exempt them in exempting the State and city in respect of the exercise of strictly governmental functions.
We conclude, therefore, that they were not taxable within the statute.United Statesv.Owens, 100 F. 70;Stirnemanv.Smith, 100 F. 600;Warwickv.Bettman, 102 F. 127;S.C., 108 F. 46;Peoplev.City, 31 C.L.N. 247.Judgment reversed and cause remanded with a direction to quashthe indictment.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN did not hear the argument and took no part in the decision.