Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Southwestern Coal Co. v. McBride
185 U.S. 499
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1902-05-19
- Topic
- general
Mr. Justice White, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. The solé 'qué'stion presented for the consideration of- the courts below and necessary to be passed upon by this court was, and is, Did the act of Congress, approved June 28,1898, known as the Curtis Act, operate to deprive the lessors of coal mines in the Choctaw Nation of the royalties due and owing to them for coal mined under valid leases prior to the date named ? The question necessarily requires a construction of section 16 of the act,, which reads as follows: “ Sec. 16.-. That it shall be unlawful for any person, after the passage of this act, except as hereinafter provided, to claim, demand or receive, for his own use or for the use of any one else, any royalty on oil, coal, asphalt-or other mineral, or on any timber or lumber, or any other kind of property whatsoever, or any rents on any lands or property belonging to any one of said tribes or nations in said Territory, or for any one to pay to any individual any such royalty or rents or any consideration therefor whatsoever; and all royalties and rents hereafter payable to the tribe shall be paid, under such rules and regulations as *503 may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, into the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the tribe to which they belong: Provided, That where any citizen shall be in .possession of only such amount of agricultural or grazing lands as would be his just and reasonable share …
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Southwestern Coal Co. v. McBride. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 17 opinions
SOUTHWESTERN COAL CO.v. McBRIDE,185 U.S. 499(1902)
22 S.Ct. 763
SOUTHWESTERN COAL COMPANYv. McBRIDE.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
No. 230.
Argued April 21, 1902.
Decided May 19, 1902.
THIS litigation was begun in the United States Court for the
Indian Territory, Central Judicial District, sitting at Atoka, by
Page 500
the filing of a bill in equity on behalf of Hyram Y. McBride, a
citizen of the Choctaw Nation. The defendants named in the bill
were the National Bank of Denison, the Southwestern Coal and
Improvement Company (hereafter referred to as the Coal Company)
and J.A. Randell, as administrator of the estate of G.G. Randell,
deceased. The Coal Company is an appellant in this court, while
McBride and Randell are the appellees. It was averred in the bill
that on April 6, 1894, the complainant (McBride) was the owner of
a three twenty-seconds share in a certain coal or mining interest
situated in the town of Coalgate, Indian Territory, which coal
claim was being operated, under royalty contracts, by the Coal
Company; that, to secure an indebtedness due by the complainant
to the National Bank of Denison, complainant had executed and
delivered a mortgage upon his aforesaid share; and that, under
the assumed authority of a power of sale contained in the
mortgage and pursuant to a combination between the bank and one
G.G. Randell, a purported sale of said share of complainant was
made to said Randell, but that said pretended sale, for various
stated reasons, was illegal and void. It was further averred that
from the time of said pretended sale the Coal Company had failed
to make payments of royalties due upon said share of complainant,
and was liable to account therefor. The prayer of the bill was,
in substance, that the sale in question be declared a nullity and
that the various defendants account to complainant in respect to
the royalties received and retained.
The bank filed its answer, and therein disclaimed having any
interest in the unpaid royalties claimed by complainant and
Randell, as administrator of G.G. Randell. In its answer the Coal
Company, among other things unnecessary to be stated, admitted
that it had withheld payments from March 1, 1897, of royalties on
the coal mining share referred to in the complaint, and averred
that the amount of said unpaid royalties aggregated $2617.29. The
Coal Company also further specifically pleaded in its answer as
follows:
"Defendant Coal Company further states that on the 28th day of
June, 1898, the President of the United States approved an act
entitled `An act for the protection of the people of the
Page 501
Indian Territory, and for other purposes,' and which said act of
Congress is commonly known as the `Curtis bill,' and by section
sixteen of said act it was provided that it should be unlawful
for any person, after the passage of said act, except as
otherwise provided therein, to claim, demand or receive for his
own use, or the use of any one else, any royalty on coal, or any
rents on any lands or property belonging to any one of said
tribes or nations in said Territory, or for any one to pay to any
individual any such royalty or rents or any consideration
therefor, whatsoever.
"And that by virtue of the provisions of said act of Congress
hereinabove referred to, on and after the 28th day of June, 1898,
no royalties accrued to any person upon this said interest
claimed by the plaintiff in said mines; and that by virtue of the
provisions of said act of Congress, hereinabove referred to, the
royalty which accrued upon said interest so claimed by the
plaintiff in said mines and which said Coal Company had not paid
over to said defendant bank in accordance with plaintiff's
instructions, is no longer due and payable to the said plaintiff
or any person claiming under him, and cannot be claimed, demanded
or received by the plaintiff, or any other person; and that by
virtue of section eighteen of said act of Congress, hereinabove
referred to, any person claiming, demanding or receiving any of
the royalties which the plaintiff claims accrued upon the
interest claimed by him in said coal mines, becomes guilty of a
misdemeanor, which is punishable by a fine of not less than one
hundred dollars ($100.00,) and is liable to forfeit possession of
the property in question."
A written stipulation was thereafter entered into between the
complainant and the defendant Randell, administrator, wherein it
was agreed that the complainant was entitled to $900 of the sum
admitted by the Coal Company to be unpaid, and that the said
defendant administrator was entitled to the remainder, or the sum
of $1717.29. Upon the pleadings in the cause and the stipulation
referred to, a motion for judgment against the Coal Company for
$2617.29 was filed on behalf of the complainant and said
defendant administrator. The motion was granted, and a judgment
was entered accordingly. An
Page 502
appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals for the Indian
Territory, and that court affirmed the judgment. 54 Southwestern
Rep. 1099. The judgment of affirmance was in favor of McBride and
Randell, administrator, against the Coal Company and the sureties
on its supersedeas bond (Clarence W. Turner and Homer B.
Spaulding,) for the amount of the original judgment, with
interest and costs. An appeal was then prosecuted by the Coal
Company, and Turner and Spaulding to the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court affirmed the
judgments, (104 F. 1007,) and the cause was then appealed
to this court.
No counsel appeared for appellee.
"SEC. 16. That it shall be unlawful for any person, after the passage of this act, except as hereinafter provided, to claim, demand or receive, for his own use or for the use of any one else, any royalty on oil, coal, asphalt or other mineral, or on any timber or lumber, or any other kind of property whatsoever, or any rents on any lands or property belonging to any one of said tribes or nations in said Territory, or for any one to pay to any individual any such royalty or rents or any consideration therefor whatsoever; and all royalties and rents hereafter payable to the tribe shall be paid, under such rules and regulations asPage 503may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, into the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the tribe to which they belong:Provided, That where any citizen shall be in possession of only such amount of agricultural or grazing lands as would be his just and reasonable share of the lands of his nation or tribe and that to which his wife and minor children are entitled, he may continue to use the same or receive the rents thereon until allotment has been made to him:Provided,further, That nothing herein contained shall impair the rights of any member of a tribe to dispose of any timber contained on his, her or their allotment."
A particular consideration of section 18 of the act, referred to in the answer of the Coal Company, is not required, as the section merely provided for the punishment of any person convicted for violating any of the provisions of sections 16 and 17 of the act.
On the part of the appellants it is contended that the section in question is retrospective in its operation and inhibits the collection of royalties due and owing at the time of the approval of the Curtis Act, even though such royalties, had the statute in question not been passed, might lawfully have been collected by the lessors to whom it had been agreed the same should be paid. The Circuit Court of Appeals, however, sustained the contention that the provisions of the section in question had only a prospective operation, and in so doing we think no error was committed. We adopt the reasoning of the court below on the subject. The court said (104 F. 473):
"The function of the legislature is to prescribe rules to operate upon the actions and rights of citizens in the future. While, in the absence of a constitutional inhibition, the legislature may give to some of its acts a retrospective operation, the intention to do so must be clearly expressed, or necessarily implied from what is expressed; and, assuming the legislature to possess the power, its act will not be construed to impair or destroy a vested right under a valid contract unless it is so framed as to preclude any other interpretation. If Congress had intended to deprive lessors of the royalties due and owing to them at the date of the act it would have used appropriatePage 504language to express that intention, and would necessarily have made some provision for the disposition of such royalties. But it is clear from the language of the act that it does not deal with royalties already paid, or already due and owing to lessors under leases for coal already mined. . . . Congress, by the Curtis Act, neither attempted nor intended to interfere with the rights of lessors to royalties due them under their leases at the date of the passage of the act."
It is asserted in the brief of counsel for the appellants that the contract under which the royalties in question became due was made under authority of a tribal law of the Choctaw Nation, and we are asked to assume that the authority to make the lease in question was not either directly or indirectly conferred by Congress, and that in consequence the contract was of no validity by reason of section 2116 of the Revised Statutes, wherein, among other things, it is declared that "no purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution." We do not decide this contention, in view of the fact that it does not appear to have been raised or considered in the courts below, and it is besides entirely inconsistent with the answer of the Coal Company, wherein it is substantially conceded that the lease in question was valid in its inception, and that the unpaid royalties would have been due and owing to the lessor or his assigns, but for the effect of the alleged nullifying provisions of section 16 of the Curtis Act.Judgment affirmed.Page 505