Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Reagan v. United States
Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419 (1901)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1901-05-27
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- stating that where causes of removal are specified by the Constitution or statute, “notice and hearing are essential”
- noting “the rule . . . that where causes of removal are specified by Constitution or statute, as also where the term of office is for a fixed period, notice and hearing are essential” (emphasis added)
- “[W]here causes of removal are specified by Constitution or statute, . . . notice and hearing are essential. If there were not, 6 the appointing power could remove at pleasure or for such cause as it deemed sufficient.”
- describing Hennen 's holding as a "settled rule"
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Reagan v. United States. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 57 opinions
Headnotes
- Municipal Law — Removal Power The power of removal is incident to the power of appointment; officers appointed by a court who do not hold their offices for life or for any fixed tenure are subject to removal at the will of the appointing power, and where causes for removal are not prescribed by law, the removal is a matter of discretion and is not reviewable in an action for salary. 182 U.S. 419 (citing Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230, 258; Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324)
- Municipal Law — Statutory Construction A statutory proviso directing that present commissioners "shall hold office under their existing appointments, subject to removal by the judge of the district where said commissioners reside, for causes prescribed by law" refers to causes prescribed at the time the act was approved or when the removal was made; it does not entitle such commissioners to hold office for life or until Congress thereafter defines causes for removal. 182 U.S. 419 (quoting Act of March 1, 1895, 28 Stat. 693, c. 145, § 4)
- Municipal Law — Notice and Hearing Where causes for removal are specified by constitution or statute, or where the term of office is for a fixed period, notice and a hearing are essential before removal; but where causes for removal are not defined and removal for cause is not provided for, removal rests in the discretion of the appointing power, and the officer is not entitled to notice of charges or an opportunity to be heard. 182 U.S. 419
- Municipal Law — Removal for Cause The phrase "causes prescribed by law" means causes prescribed by legislative act, not such causes as courts might deem just; and the mere adoption of state laws extending to commissioners the powers of justices of the peace does not import the state constitutional and statutory provisions governing the tenure and removal of justices of the peace, so as to subject the commissioners to removal only for the causes specified for justices of the peace. 182 U.S. 419
REAGANv. UNITED STATES,182 U.S. 419(1901)
21 S.Ct. 842
REAGANv. UNITED STATES.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
No. 239.
Argued April 15, 1901.
Decided May 27, 1901.
APPELLANT filed his petition in the Court of Claims, October
13, 1897, and an amended petition October 27, 1899, seeking to
recover salary as United States Commissioner in the Indian
Territory, at the rate of $1500 per annum, from February 1, 1896,
to September 30, 1899, aggregating $5375.
The findings of fact and conclusion of law were as follows:
"I. The claimant was, on the 25th day of April, 1893,
appointed by the United States court for the Indian Territory
United States commissioner within said Territory, under the
provisions of section 39 of an act of Congress approved May 2,
1890, chapter 182, (1st Suppl. Rev. Stat. 737,) and upon the 1st
day of March, 1895, the claimant was one of the present
commissioners, then holding office under an existing appointment.
On April 17, 1895, the following order was entered of record in
the United States court in the Indian Territory, Southern
District:
"`It appearing from the records of this court that the said
William R. Reagan was a duly appointed, qualified and acting
commissioner for the United States court for the Third Judicial
Division of the Indian Territory, located at Chickasha, on
Page 420
the 1st day of March, 1895, it is hereby ordered that in
accordance with the act of Congress approved March 1, 1895, the
said William R. Reagan be, and he is hereby, continued in office,
and the bond hereinbefore recited be, and the same is, in all
things approved and confirmed. C.B. KILGORE,Judge.'"
"II. He continuously performed the duties and received the
salary of said office until the 31st day of January in the year
1896, when the following letter was entered upon the records of
the United States court in the Indian Territory, in the Southern
District, by the Hon. Constantine B. Kilgore, judge of said
court:
"`IN CHAMBERS,
"`ARDMORE, INDIAN TERRITORY,January 31st, 1896.
"`HON. WILLIAM R. REAGAN, United States commissioner for the
fourth commissioner's district in and for the southern
district of the Indian Territory.
"`Sir:I feel it my duty to declare the office of
commissioner in that district vacant and to notify you that you
are no longer United States commissioner for that district, and
your successor will be named at once.
"`There are many reasons which I could assign for my action in
this behalf, but I will only suggest one now, that is, your age
and the infirmities incident thereto render you, in my judgment,
in many respects unfit for the office.
"`Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"`C.B. KILGORE,
"`Judge U.S. Dist. Court, S. Dist.'
"The letter was not sent to the claimant or served upon him.
No other statement of cause was made. The claimant was given no
notice of any charge against him. No hearing was allowed the
claimant and no opportunity to submit proof in his defence.
"III. The claimant protested that said letter was insufficient
to effect his removal, and duly served such protest upon the Hon.
Constantine B. Kilgore, judge of said court.
"IV. On February 10, 1896, one John R. Williams, who had
Page 421
been designated by said judge as United States commissioner in
the claimant's place, came to claimaint's office with two armed
deputy marshals, and, presenting his order of appointment,
demanded possession of the dockets, books, and papers belonging
to claimant's office as United States commissioner.
"V. The order of appointment of said Williams is as follows:
"`IN CHAMBERS,
"`ARDMORE, INDIAN TERRITORY,January 31st, 1896.
"`John R. Williams, a resident of Ryan, Southern District of
Indian Territory, is hereby appointed United States commissioner
in and for the Fourth District of the Southern District of the
Indian Territory.
"`Said appointment to take effect at once.
"`It is further ordered that said commissioner shall reside at
Ryan, and that he shall hold court at Ryan and at the town of
Duncan in said district until further ordered, the time to be
divided so as to dispose of the business at both points, which
time shall be determined upon hereafter.
"`C.B. KILGORE,
"`Judge U.S. Ct., So. Dist.'
"VI. The claimant protested and refused to recognize said
Williams as his successor in said office, excepting so far as he
was compelled thereto by the exercise of superior force on the
part of the deputy marshals aforesaid and said Williams.
Thereupon the claimant and said Williams joined in the following
instrument of writing:
"`DUNCAN, INDIAN TERRITORY,
Southern District.
"`This instrument of writing witnesseth:
"`That whereas C.B. Kilgore, judge of the United States court
for the Southern District of the Indian Territory, on the 31st
day of January, A.D. 1896, made, and caused to be entered upon
the docket of his court at Ardmore, Indian Territory, an order
declaring my office of United States Commissioner for the Ryan
division of said district vacant; and at the same time appointing
John R. Williams to be my successor in said office,
Page 422
and the said Reagan having appealed to the courts of the United
States from said order, on the ground that said order is contrary
to the law:
"`Now, therefore, it is agreed by and between the parties
hereto that said Reagan will turn over and surrender the dockets,
books, and papers belonging to said office under protest, and
that said Williams receives the same with the understanding that
said Reagan yields no rights by so doing that he would otherwise
have.
"Witness our hands this 10th day of February, A.D. 1896.
"`JNO. R. WILLIAMS.
"`WM. R. REAGAN.'
"VII. The claimant received a salary of $1500 per annum up to
the 3d day of February, 1896, but since that date has not been
paid said salary or any part thereof.
"VIII. Claimant took no other or further action to assert his
claim to said office or to obtain a reversal of the action of
Judge Kilgore until the institution of this proceeding.
"IX. From the 3d day of February, 1896, until the 7th day of
October, 1897, John R. Williams, who was appointed by Judge
Kilgore to said office in claimant's stead, exercised said office
and was paid the salary thereof. On said date one Horace M.
Wolverton was appointed as the successor of said John R. Williams
by Hon. Hosea Townsend, United States judge for said district,
and since that time has exercised said office and has been paid
the salary thereof.
"X. From the 3d day of February, 1896, until the commencement
of this action, the disbursing clerk of the Department of Justice
paid to the persons who succeeded claimant to said office the
salary of said office in the absence of any notice on the part of
claimant that he claimed to be lawfully entitled to said office
and the salary thereof, or any claim or demand on the part of
claimant for the payment to him of such salary for said period of
time or any part thereof.
"Conclusion of Law.
"Upon the foregoing findings of fact, the court decide, as a
conclusion of law, that the petition be dismissed."
Page 423
Judgment was thereupon rendered dismissing the petition, and
the case was brought to this court by appeal. The opinion below
is reported 35 C. Cl. 90.
"That the United States court in the Indian Territory shall have all the powers of the United States Circuit Courts or Circuit Court judges to appoint commissioners within said Indian Territory, who shall be learned in the law, and shall be known as United States commissioners; but not exceeding three commissioners shall be appointed for any one division, and such commissioners when appointed shall have, within the district to be designated in the order appointing them, all the powers of commissioners of Circuit Courts of the United States.
"They shall beex officionotaries public, and shall have power to solemnize marriages.
"The provisions of chapter ninety-one of the said laws of Arkansas, regulating the jurisdiction and procedure before justices of the peace, are hereby extended over the Indian Territory; and said commissioners shall exercise all the powers conferred by the laws of Arkansas upon justices of the peace within their districts; but they shall have no jurisdiction to try any cause where the value of the thing or the amount in controversy exceeds one hundred dollars."
The act of March 1, 1895,28 Stat. 693, c. 145, provided for additional judges of the court, and by section 4:
"That each judge of said court shall have the powers conferred by law upon the United States Circuit Courts to appoint commissioners within the district in which he presides, who, at the time of their appointment, shall be duly enrolled attorneys of some court of record of the United States or of some State,Page 424and shall be competent and of good standing, and shall be known as United States commissioners, but not exceeding six commissioners shall be appointed for any district hereinbefore constituted:"Provided, That the present commissioners shall be included in that number and shall hold office under their existing appointments, subject to removal by the judge of the district where said commissioners reside, for causes prescribed by law. The judge for each district may fix the place where, or the time when, each commissioner shall hold his regular terms of court.
"The order appointing such commissioners shall be in writing and shall be spread upon the records of one of the courts of the district for which they are appointed; and such order shall designate, by metes and bounds, the portion of the district for which they are appointed. They shall have all the powers of commissioners of the Circuit Courts of the United States.
"They shall beex officionotaries public andex officiojustices of the peace within and for the portion of the district for which they are appointed, and shall have the power as such to solemnize marriages."
Appellant was appointed a commissioner April 25, 1893, and was such on March 1, 1895. In view of the proviso he was continued in office until January 31, 1896, when he was removed by the judge of the district where he resided, and another person appointed.
He now contends that the removal was void, because the cause assigned for the action of the judge was not a "cause prescribed by law," and because he was given no notice of any charge against him, and no hearing, contrary to the statute.
The commissioners appointed by the judges of the United States Court in the Indian Territory are inferior officers, not holding their offices for life, or by any fixed tenure, and they fall within the settled rule that the power of removal is incident to the power of appointment.Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230, 258;Parsonsv.United States,167 U.S. 324. But it is assumed that because of the language of the proviso, commissioners appointed by the court prior to March 1, 1895, formed anPage 425exceptional class from commissioners appointed by the judges of that court after that date, and hold office until they are removed for causes prescribed by existing law, or until Congress passes a law defining such causes. The latter view may be rejected at once, for the words "causes prescribed by law, "manifestly relate to causes prescribed when the act was approved, or at least when the removal was made. Not only is there nothing here to give them any other meaning, but it cannot be presumed that Congress intended to forbid the exercise by the judges of their power in the matter of these appointments in the instance of these particular commissioners, or to provide that they should held office during life, or until Congress should specify causes subjecting them to removal, while all other commissioners were removable at the will of the power appointing them.
The proviso was enacted apparently out of abundant caution lest the legislation in respect of the United States Court in the Indian Territory might operate in itself to turn the then commissioner out of office, and if Congress had intended in addition that they should hold office free from the rule applicable to others, we think that the intention would have been plainly expressed.
The inquiry is therefore whether there were any causes of removal prescribed by law, March 1, 1895, or at the time of the removal. If there were, then the rule would apply that where causes of removal are specified by constitution or statute, as also where the term of office is for a fixed period, notice and hearing are essential. If there were not, the appointing power could remove at pleasure or for such cause as it deemed sufficient.
The suggestion that the proviso refers to such causes as courts might recognize as just will not do, for "prescribed by law" is prescribed by legislative act, and removal for cause, when causes are not defined nor removal for cause provided for, is a matter of discretion and not reviewable.
It does not appear that any causes for removal of these court officers were ever affirmatively specified by Congress; but it is said that Congress had prescribed such causes by the adoptionPage 426in the Indian Territory of certain laws of Arkansas. By section thirty-one of the act of May 2, 1890, some of those laws were put in force in the Indian Territory, and by section thirty-nine the commissioners were authorized to exercise all the powers conferred by the laws of Arkansas on justices of the peace within their districts, and the provisions of chapter ninety-one of those laws regulating the jurisdiction of and procedure before justices of the peace were extended to that Territory. By the act of March 1, 1895, these were reenacted, and chapters forty-five and forty-six of Mansfield's Digest, treating of criminal law and criminal procedure, were also put in force there.
The argument is that the effect of these provisions was to put the commissioners in the place of justices of the peace in Arkansas, and that consequently the causes prescribed by law for the removal of justices of the peace must be taken as prescribed by law as causes for the removal of commissioners.
In our opinion this conclusion does not follow. In order to clothe the commissioners with the powers pertaining to justices of the peace, this was conveniently accomplished by reference, but that did not convert these officers of the United States Court in the Indian Territory into justices of the peace or change the relations between them and the judges of that court. Justices of the peace in Arkansas by state constitution and laws hold office for two years, and cannot be removed except for cause, and on notice and hearing. The commissioners hold office neither for life, nor for any specified time, and are within the rule which treats the power of removal as incident to the power of appointment, unless otherwise provided. By chapters forty-five and forty-six, justices of the peace on conviction of the offences enumerated are removable from office, but these necessarily do not include all causes which might render the removal of commissioners necessary or advisable. Congress did not provide for the removal of commissioners for the causes for which justices of the peace might be removed, and if this were to be ruled otherwise by construction, the effect would be to hold the commissioners in office for life unless some of those specially enumerated causes became applicable to them.Page 427
We agree with the Court of Claims that this would be a most unreasonable construction and would restrict the power of removal in a manner which there is nothing in the case to indicate could have been contemplated by Congress.
If causes of removal had been prescribed by law before the removal of appellant that would have presented a different question, but as there were then none such, the proviso did not operate to take him out of the rule expounded inEx parteHennen, and the mere fact that in that particular this part of the proviso was inoperative as to him did not change the result.Judgment affirmed.