Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Ann Arbor Railroad
W. Union Tel. Co. v. Ann Arbor R.R., 178 U.S. 239 (1900)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1900-05-21
- Topic
- general
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. The Western Union Telegraph Company might have instituted its suit in the Circuit Court, but it sought the state tribunals as it had the right to do, and the defendant could not remove the case on the ground of diverse citizenship, although that fact existed, because it was itself a resident of the State. Defendant’s application to remove, therefore, was based on the averment that the suit arose “ under the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Whether it did so arise depended on complainant’s statement of its own case. Tennessee v.
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Headnotes
- Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Removal A suit does not arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States, so as to support federal jurisdiction, unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy as to the effect or construction of the Constitution or laws of the United States upon the determination of which the result depends; and it must appear on the record, by a statement in legal and logical form such as is required in good pleading, that the suit is one which does really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy as to a right depending on the construction of the Constitution, or some law or treaty of the United States. 178 U.S. at 244
- Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Removal A defendant may not remove a case on the ground of diverse citizenship where the defendant is itself a resident of the forum state, even though the requisite diversity of citizenship otherwise exists. 178 U.S. at 243
- Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Removal Whether a suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, for purposes of removal, depends upon the plaintiff's statement of its own case as set forth in the complaint. 178 U.S. at 244
- General — Telegraphs — Federal Statute — Right to Occupy Railroad Property The Act of Congress of July 24, 1866, does not confer on telegraph companies the right to enter upon private property without the consent of the owner and there erect the structures necessary for their business; the statute provides only that, whenever the owner's consent is obtained, no state legislation shall prevent the occupation of post roads for telegraph purposes by corporations willing to avail themselves of its privileges. 178 U.S. at 245
- Remedies — Pleading — Relief Under General Prayer Relief cannot be awarded under a general prayer for relief unless it is such relief as is agreeable to the case made by the bill. 178 U.S. at 246
WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.v. ANN ARBOR R'D CO.,178 U.S. 239(1900)
20 S.Ct. 867
WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANYv. ANN ARBOR RAILROAD COMPANY.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
No. 202.
Argued and submitted March 19, 20, 1900.
Decided May 21, 1900.
THIS was a bill filed in the Circuit Court of Benzie County,
Michigan, by the Western Union Telegraph Company against the Ann
Arbor Railroad Company, to restrain defendant from interfering
with the rights of complainant in a certain telegraph line along
defendant's railroad. The bill stated the Western Union Telegraph
Company to be "a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the State of New York, and a citizen of the said State of
New York," and the Ann Arbor Railroad Company to be "a
corporation organized and existing under
Page 240
the laws of the State of Michigan and a citizen of said State of
Michigan." The bill alleged that on the 25th day of September,
1890, the Frankfort and South Eastern Railroad Company, a
corporation of the State of Michigan, owned and operated a
railroad from Frankfort to near Copemish, Michigan; that on that
day complainant entered into a contract with the Frankfort and
South Eastern Railroad Company for the construction and
maintenance of a telegraph line along the entire length of its
road; that in pursuance of the contract and in May, June and
July, 1891, complainant built the telegraph lines provided for
therein; that one wire was erected for the joint use of the
railroad company and complainant, and a loop to Frankfort and
back was put on the poles for the exclusive use of complainant.
It was further alleged that the railroad of the Frankfort and
South Eastern Railroad Company was sold some time in May, 1892,
and transferred to the Toledo, Ann Arbor and North Michigan
Railroad Company, a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the State of Michigan; that afterwards said
last-mentioned company mortgaged their entire railroad to the
Farmers' Loan and Trust Company as trustee, and said mortgage
being in default a bill was filed to foreclose it in September,
1893, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern
District of Michigan, to which foreclosure suit complainant was
not a party; that the whole road was sold under order of court
and conveyed to the Ann Arbor Railroad Company, and the sale and
conveyance were confirmed; that the last-mentioned company now
claimed to be in possession and operating the road formerly known
as the Frankfort and South Eastern Railroad. And further, that
the Ann Arbor Railroad Company purchased the road with full
knowledge of complainant's rights, but that it insisted that it
was not bound by the contract made with the Frankfort and South
Eastern Railroad Company, and had given complainant written
notice to that effect.
The sixth and seventh paragraphs of the bill were as follows:
"6th. Your orator is now and long has been doing an extensive
telegraph business in many parts of the United States. On January
7, 1867, it filed with the Postmaster General its acceptance
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of the provisions of the act of the United States, passed July
24, 1866.
"7th. It avers that the provisions of the contract with said
Frankfort and South Eastern Railroad Company are binding on said
Ann Arbor Company, and that independent of said contract it has a
right to maintain its telegraph line on what was formerly said
Frankfort and South Eastern Railroad under the provisions of the
statute of the United States."
It was further averred that about October 1, 1895, the Ann
Arbor Railroad Company took possession of complainant's wires
between Thompsonville, near Copemish, and Frankfort, and cut off
their connection with its other wires, and deprived complainant
of telegraphic connection with Frankfort; that the value of the
telegraph lines was at least the sum of $3000, and the damages
arising through loss of business large but incapable of accurate
calculation; that October 14, 1895, complainant reconnected the
telegraph lines running from Thompsonville to Frankfort, and so
again opened telegraphic communication with the latter place, and
was now in full possession and use of said lines; but that
complainant was justly apprehensive that, unless restrained by
injunction, defendant would again seize said telegraph lines and
deprive complainant of their use.
The prayer was for process and answer, "and that an injunction
both preliminary and final may be issued out of and under the
seal of this court, commanding the said Ann Arbor Railroad
Company and all its officers and agents to absolutely desist and
refrain from in any way interfering with the rights of
complainant, as alleged in this bill, in the telegraph wires and
poles running from Thompsonville to Frankfort, or its possession
of the same, and that said defendant allow said complainant to
reconnect said wires to its main line on the Chicago and West
Michigan Railroad, and to use said wires for its telegraph
business in the same way as it was accustomed to use them before
its rights were disturbed by said defendant, and that defendant
be required to carry out said contract in good faith and for such
other and further or different relief, or both, as may be
agreeable to equity and good conscience."
Defendant filed its petition and bond for the removal of the
Page 242
cause into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Michigan, alleging that it was a citizen of the State
of Michigan, and that complainant was a citizen of New York, and
then stating: "Your petitioner further shows to the court that
the matter and amount in dispute in the above entitled cause
exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum and value of
two thousand dollars ($2000); that this suit is one arising under
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and especially
under the act of Congress of July 24, 1866, now contained in
section 5263 of the Revised Statutes of the United States and the
amendments thereto." The cause having been removed, defendant
filed an answer and cross-bill, setting up the existence of a
mortgage prior to the alleged contract and its foreclosure, and
other matters. Certain facts were stipulated, and the cause
submitted. The Circuit Court decreed a dismissal of the bill.
From this decree an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of
Appeals, and that court affirmed the decree. 61 U.S. App. 741.
From the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals the Western Union
Telegraph Company appealed to this court.
No appearance for appellee.
The bill was in legal effect a bill for the specific performance of the contract set up in the pleadings, and the prayer was for injunction against interference with complainant's alleged rights, and that defendant allow complainant to reconnect its said wires, and use them in the same way as before they were disturbed by defendant, "and that defendant be required to carry out said contract in good faith," and for general relief.
It was not argued by counsel for the telegraph company that the telegraph company had any right under the statute, and independently of the contract, to maintain and operate this telegraph line over the railroad company's property; and it has been long settled that that statute did not confer on telegraph companies the right to enter on private property without the consent of the owner, and erect the necessary structures for their business; "but it does provide, that, whenever the consent of the owner is obtained, no state legislation shall prevent the occupation of post roads for telegraph purposes by such corporations as are willing to avail themselves of its privileges."Pensacola Telegraph Companyv.Western UnionTelegraph Company,96 U.S. 1. In that case Mr. Chief Justice Waite further said: "No question arises as to the authority of Congress to provide for the appropriation of private property to the uses of the telegraph, for no such attempt has been made. The use of public property alone is granted. If private property is required, it must, so far as the present legislation is concerned, be obtained by private arrangement with its owner. No compulsory proceedings are authorized."
When a suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy as to the effect or construction of the Constitution or laws of the United States, upon the determinationPage 244of which the result depends, it is not a suit arising under the Constitution or laws. And it must appear on the record, by a statement in legal and logical form, such as is required in good pleading, that the suit is one which does really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy as to a right which depends on the construction of the Constitution or some law or treaty of the United States, before jurisdiction can be maintained on this ground.Gold Washing Water Co. v.Keyes,96 U.S. 199;Blackburnv.Portland Gold Mining Co.,175 U.S. 571.
We are unable to perceive that paragraphs sixth and seventh met this requirement, and it does not appear to us that they were intended to do so by the pleader. As we have said, it was not asserted in argument that the telegraph company had the right independently of the contract to maintain its line on the railroad company's property, and in view of the settled construction of the statute, we could not permit such a contention to be recognized as the basis of jurisdiction. But it was argued that by virtue of the statute the telegraph company was possessed of a public character and was discharging public duties, and that although the interest it acquired by its contract was subject to the prior mortgage, it could not be absolutely deprived thereof by foreclosure, but that the Circuit Court should have so framed its decree as to preserve the occupancy of the telegraph company, subject to making compensation to the railroad company, the value of the alleged easement to be ascertained by the court. It is sufficient to say that the bill was not framed in that aspect, and though there was a prayer for general relief, relief cannot be awarded under that prayer unless it is such relief as is agreeable to the case made by the bill. And it is entirely clear that there were no averments in the bill in respect of this contention which would bring the case within the category of cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States so that jurisdiction could be held to have rested on that ground.The result is that the decrees of the Circuit Court of Appealsand of the Circuit Court must be reversed, and the cause beremanded to the latter court with a direction to remand it to thestate court, and it is so ordered.Page 245