Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Clements

Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Clements, 140 U.S. 226 (1891)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1891-05-11
Topic
general

Mr. Justice Gray, after stating the case as above, delivered' the opinion of the court. Upon the question whether the contract sued on was made in New York or in Missouri, there is nothing in the record, except the policy and application, the petition and answer, by which the facts appear to have been as follows : The assured was a resident of Missouri, and the application for the policy was signed in Missouri. The policy, executed at the defendant’s office in New York, provides that “ the contract between the parties hereto is completely set' forth in this policy and *232 the application therefor, taken. together.” The application declares that the contract “ shall not take effect until the first premium shall have been actually paid during the life of the person herein proposed for assurance.” The petition alleges that, that premium and two annual premiums were paid in Missouri. The answer expressly admits the payment of the three premiums, and, by not controverting that they were páid in Missouri, admits that fact also, if material.

Citator

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Cited by
150 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Insurance Law — Choice of Law — Formation of Contract A policy of life insurance executed by a New York corporation in New York upon an application signed in Missouri by a Missouri resident, and delivered, with the first premium paid, in Missouri, is a Missouri contract governed by Missouri law, where there is no evidence that the company accepted the application in New York; the contract does not take effect until delivery of the policy and payment of the first premium, and that delivery and payment occurred in Missouri. 140 U.S. at 232-233
  2. Insurance Law — Statutory Regulation of Policy Terms — Mandatory Nature of Statute A statute prescribing rules of commutation upon default in payment of premium after two full annual premiums have been paid on a life insurance policy is mandatory, not directory, and controls the nature and terms of the contract into which the insurer may induce the assured to enter; it is not subject to be set aside by the company with the consent of the assured. 140 U.S. at 233-234
  3. Insurance Law — Statutory Commutation — Excepted Cases Where a statute by its terms renders nonforfeiture and commutation provisions inapplicable only in specified cases, those sections control all cases not so specified, whatever the form of the policy, and the statute's specification of particular exceptions necessarily implies that the prescribed rules govern all other cases. 140 U.S. at 234-235
  4. Insurance Law — Waiver of Statutory Surrender Value — Effect of Contractual Provision A provision inserted in a life insurance policy prescribing a rule of commutation different from that fixed by statute upon default in payment of premium, and a clause in the application by which the beneficiary purports to waive all right to any surrender value other than that provided, whether required by statute or not, constitute an ineffectual attempt to evade and nullify the clear words of the statute. 140 U.S. at 235-236