Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Schwed v. Smith
106 U.S. 188
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1882-11-27
- Topic
- general
Me. Chief Justice Waite, -after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. It is impossible to distinguish this case in principle from Seaver v. Bigelows, 5 Wall. 208, where an appeal by creditors who had joined in a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance by their debtor was dismissed because the amounts found due the appellants, respectively, were less than our jurisdictional limit. In delivering the opinion of the court, Mr.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Schwed v. Smith. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 17 opinions
SCHWED v. SMITH,106 U.S. 188(1882)
1 S.Ct. 221
SCHWEDv. SMITH.
OCTOBER TERM, 1882.
On the 26th of January, 1880, Schwed Newhouse confessed a judgment in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, against themselves, and in favor of Henry Heller, for $9,512.50. Execution was at once issued on this judgment, and levied by Bailey, sheriff of the county, on a stock of goods.
On the 12th of February, 1880, William Smith Co. had a suit pending in the same court, in their favor, against Schwed Newhouse for the recovery of $3,829.71, and William C. Greene Co. another suit for the recovery of $1,012.93. In both the suits attachments were issued and levied on the same goods taken under the execution in favor of Heller, and then in the hands of the sheriff. Smith Co. and Greene Co. thereupon brought suit in the same court against Schwed, Newhouse, Heller, and the sheriff, to set aside the judgment in favor of Heller on the ground that it was confessed without any consideration, and for the purpose of covering up the property of Schwed Newhouse, and hindering and delaying creditors in the collection of their debts. This suit was afterwards removed to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western Division of the Western District of Missouri. Afterwards judgments were rendered in the attachment suits; that in favor of Smith Co. being for $4,174.38, and that in favor of Greene Co. for $1,104.09. In the mean time other creditors of Schwed Newhouse sued out attachments againstPage 189them and recovered judgments; to wit, The Seth Thomas Clock Company for $1,518.49, The E.N. Welch Manufacturing Company for $455.58, and F. Quayle for $356. The attachments in these cases were also levied on the goods in the hands of the sheriff. All the later attaching creditors were admitted as parties to the original suit begun by Smith Co. and Greene Co. to set aside the judgment in favor of Heller, and in proper time a supplemental bill was filed in which all the attaching creditors appeared as complainants, setting up the recovery of their respective judgments. Pending the suit the property levied upon was sold, and the proceeds, being $7,405.55, paid into the registry of the court. At the final hearing a decree was rendered declaring the judgment confessed in favor of Heller void as against the attaching creditors. From this decree Schwed, Newhouse, Heller, and Bailey, the sheriff, took an appeal, which the appellees now move to dismiss on the ground that the value of the matter in dispute between the appellants and the several appellees is not greater than $5,000.
The appeal inSeaverv.Bigelowswas from a decree against the creditors, but, in deciding the case, the court, in express terms, adopted the analogous practice in admiralty, where, under certain circumstances, separate and distinct causes of action may be united in one suit, and in that practice it has always been held that the ship-owner cannot unite the separate decrees against him in a suit to make up the amount necessary for our jurisdiction on appeal. That question was fully considered inExparte Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, ante, p. 5. Although the effect of the decree is to deprive Heller in the aggregate of more than $5,000, it has been done at the suit of several parties on several claims, who might have sued separately, but whose suits have been joined in one for convenience and to save expense.Motion granted.Page 191