Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Brooks v. Railroad Co.
102 U.S. 107
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1880-11-18
- Topic
- general
Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court. A petition for rehearing after judgment, under the rule promulgated in Public Schools v. Walker (9 Wall. 603), cannot be filed except at the term in which the judgment was rendered; In Hudson & Smith v. Guestier.
Citator
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- Cited by
- 36 opinions
Headnotes
- Civil Procedure — Rehearing After Judgment A petition for rehearing after judgment cannot be filed except at the term in which the judgment was rendered; once the term ends, the parties are discharged from further attendance on all decided causes, and the court lacks power to bring them back, being able thereafter only to correct clerical errors appearing in the record of what it has done.
- Civil Procedure — Rehearing After Judgment An order for reargument may be made after judgment, but only if entered at the same term; that limitation has been maintained consistently in the court's practice.
- Civil Procedure — Rehearing After Judgment While the practice was relaxed to permit counsel to submit a petition for rehearing after judgment, the rule remains substantially the same as before in all other respects, including that such an order may be made only on the application of a member of the court who concurred in the judgment.
delivered the opinion of the court.
A petition for rehearing after judgment, under the rule promulgated in Public Schools v. Walker (9 Wall. 603), cannot be filed except at the term in which the judgment was rendered; In Hudson & Smith v. Guestier. (7 Cranch, 1), a motion was made at the February Term, 1812, for a rehearing in a case decided two years before; but the court said “ the case could not be reheard after the term In which it was decided.” At thé end of the term, the parties. are discharged from further attendance on all causes decided, and.we have no power to brihg them back. . After that, we can do no more than correct *108 any clerical errors that may be found in the record of what we have done.
In Brown v. Aspden (14 How. 25), where the practice in respect to orders for rearguments was first formally announced, the rule in this particular was not extended, for Mr. Chief Justice Taney was careful to say that the order for reargument might be made after judgment, provided it was entered at the saíne term; and the same limitation is maintained in United States v. Knight’s Administrator, 1 Black, 488. Down to that time such an order could be made only on the application of some member of the court who concurred in the judgment, and this continued until Public Schools v. Walker (supra), when leave was given counsel to submit a petition to the same effect. In all other respects the rule is now substantially the same as it was before this relaxation.
Motion denied.