Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Rice v. Norman Williams Co.

Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654 (1982)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1982-07-01
Topic
antitrust

How later courts describe this case

  • determining that, although the purpose of federal antitrust law is to prohibit anticompetitive conduct, a “state statute is not preempted ... simply because [it] might have an anticom-petitive effect” (citations omitted)
  • concluding, under the specific facts of the case, the district court properly denied injunctive relief because the President acted within his executive powers in nullifying claims pending in the United States court against Iranian assets
  • noting that rule,of reason analysis “requires an examination of the circumstances underlying a particular economic practice, and therefore does not lend itself to a conclusion that a statute is facially inconsistent with federal antitrust laws”
  • requiring an irreconcilable conflict as a condition precedent for preemption, not just a hypothetical or potential conflict
  • finding that “hypothetical or potential conflict[s]” do not satisfy preemption arguments
  • inquiring whether New York liquor pricing law that allowed wholesalers to control retail prices was a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act
  • discussing the state action doctrine defense to a Sherman Act anti-trust claim
  • “The existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant the pre-emption of the state statute.”

Citator

Rice v. Norman Williams Co. has been questioned or limited by later authorities: relies on overruled authority: 31 S. Ct. 376 (overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Products Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007)). Read them before relying on it. 243 later decisions cite it.

Authority status
caution
Cited by
243 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Antitrust & Competition Law — Preemption of State Statutes A state statute is preempted by the federal antitrust laws only if it irreconcilably conflicts with those laws; a hypothetical or potential conflict, the mere possibility that a private party's compliance with the statute might in some situation cause a violation of the antitrust laws, or the mere fact that the state scheme might have an anticompetitive effect, is insufficient to warrant preemption. 458 U.S. at 659
  2. Antitrust & Competition Law — Preemption of State Statutes A state statute, considered in the abstract, may be condemned under the antitrust laws only if it mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of those laws in all cases, or if it places irresistible pressure on a private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with the statute; under § 1 of the Sherman Act, such condemnation follows only when the conduct contemplated by the statute is in all cases a per se violation, and where the activity must instead be analyzed under the rule of reason, the statute cannot be condemned in the abstract because rule-of-reason analysis requires examination of the circumstances underlying a particular economic practice. 458 U.S. at 661
  3. Antitrust & Competition Law — Vertical Nonprice Restraints A manufacturer's use of vertical nonprice restraints is not per se illegal, because restraints on intrabrand competition may promote interbrand competition and are therefore to be scrutinized under the rule of reason; after GTE Sylvania, it cannot be said that every attempt by a manufacturer to restrain competition in its own products is illegal under the Sherman Act. 458 U.S. at 661 (citing Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36)
  4. Antitrust & Competition Law — State Designation Statute — Preemption A state statute that merely enforces a distiller's decision to restrain intrabrand competition — permitting the distiller to designate which wholesalers may import its products into the state and preventing unauthorized wholesalers from obtaining those products outside the distiller's established distribution chain — does not mandate conduct that is in all cases a per se violation of the Sherman Act, and therefore cannot be condemned on its face; although the manner in which a distiller utilizes the statute and the arrangements it makes with its wholesalers remain subject to Sherman Act analysis under the rule of reason, there is no basis for condemning the statute itself by force of the Sherman Act. 458 U.S. at 662
  5. Antitrust & Competition Law — Preemption — State Statute with Anticompetitive Effect The fact that a state statute permits a private party's restraint to operate with the imprimatur of state law does not render the statute invalid under the antitrust laws where the statute does not itself mandate or authorize a per se violation. 458 U.S. at 662
  6. Constitutional Law — Supremacy Clause A state statute is not preempted by § 5(a) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, which prohibits a distiller or wholesaler from establishing exclusive retail outlets, where the statute in no way requires exclusive retail outlets and by its terms does not even require exclusive wholesale arrangements; the mere possibility that an arrangement enforced by the statute might be prohibited by § 5(a) is insufficient to invalidate the statute under the Supremacy Clause. 458 U.S. at 664
  7. Constitutional Law — Due Process A state statute that gives a distiller the power to designate which wholesalers may import its products does not deny due process to nondesignated wholesalers, because such wholesalers possess no constitutionally protected liberty or property interest in obtaining the distiller's permission to deal in its products, and the Due Process Clause does not authorize the judiciary to assess the wisdom of the legislature's decision to confer such power without governing criteria. 458 U.S. at 664
  8. Constitutional Law — Equal Protection A state statute that discriminates between designated and nondesignated wholesalers does not violate the Equal Protection Clause where it is rationally related to legitimate purposes, namely enabling the distiller to place restraints on intrabrand competition in order to foster interbrand competition. 458 U.S. at 665