Opinion · Texas Supreme Court

Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co.

Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 423 (Tex. 1985)

Type
Opinion
Court
Texas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction
Texas
Date
1985-05-22
Topic
litigation

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that where return showed Henry Bunting was served and petition alleged Henry Bunting, Jr. was proper registered agent of defendant, record did not show that correct person was served
  • holding that citation to and service on "Henry Bunting," not "Henry Bunting, Jr .," were defective
  • holding that service was ineffective when the person served was “Henry Bunting,” but the registered agent was “Henry Bunting, Jr.”
  • holding that citation was invalid because it named “Henry Bunting,” and not Henry Bunting Jr., as defendant
  • holding that record did not show that person named in return of service, Henry Bunting, was authorized to receive service for, or was connected with, defendant named in petition, when registered agent for defendant named in petition was Henry Bunting, Jr.
  • holding service invalid where registered agent named “Henry Bunting, Jr.” but service delivered to “Henry Bunting”
  • stating that "failure to affirmatively show strict compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure renders the attempted service of process invalid and of no effect."
  • holding failure to affirmatively show strict compliance with rules of service renders attempted service of process invalid and of no effect

Citator

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Cited by
412 opinions
PER CURIAM.

The question here is whether service of citation was proper in the face of a writ of error attack on a default judgment. The plaintiff’s original petition alleged that the defendant, Uvalde Country Club, could be served by serving its registered agent, Henry Bunting, Jr., 137 West Nopal Street, in Uvalde, Uvalde County, Texas. The citation was directed to Uvalde Country Club, by serving its registered agent, “Henry Bunting.” The sheriff’s return on this citation showed delivery to “Henry Bunting.” Uvalde Country Club failed to answer, and the trial court rendered a default judgment in favor of Martin Linen Supply Company, Inc. Uvalde Country Club brought writ of error to the court of appeals within six months of the default judgment. In affirming the trial court judgment, the court of appeals held that the lack of “Jr.” was immaterial because it did not constitute any part of the name of the registered agent. 685 S.W.2d 375. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court.

The court of appeals holding conflicts with our holdings in Hendon v. Pugh, 46 Tex. 211, 212 (1876) and Faver v. Robinson, 46 Tex. 204 (1876). In Hendon, we remanded a default judgment because the return reflected that it was served on J.N. Hendon, not the named defendant, J.W. *885 Hendon. In Faver, we remanded a default judgment against John R. Faver because the citation was addressed and served on John R. Favers. There are no presumptions in favor of valid issuance, service, and return of citation in the face of a writ of error attack on a default judgment. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex.1965). Moreover, failure to affirmatively show strict compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure renders the attempted service of process invalid and of no effect. McKanna, 388 S.W.2d at 929.

The record does not show that the person served with citation, “Henry Bunting,” was authorized to receive service or that he was connected with the appellant. Rather, the petition alleges that the registered agent is “Henry Bunting, Jr.” Thus, the record in this case does not reflect strict compliance with the rules of civil procedure relating to the issuance, service, and return of citation. See, e.g., Tex. R.Civ.P. 101, 106, and 107. In view of our holding we need not discuss the other points of error.

Pursuant to Tex.R.Civ.P. 483, without hearing oral argument, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court.