Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Alabama v. Texas
Ala. v. Tex., 347 U.S. 272 (1954)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1954-04-26
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- congressional power to dispose of any kind of property belonging to United States is without limitation
- "[T]he Property Clause gives the federal government plenary power, including legislative and police power, over federal property.”
- “The responsibility of Congress is to utilize the assets that come into its hands as sovereign in the way that it decides is best for the future of Nation.”
- Congress can cede resources under the marginal sea to the States
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Alabama v. Texas. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 84 opinions
Headnotes
- Constitutional Law — Property Clause — Disposition of Federal Property Congress's power under Article IV, § 3, cl. 2 to dispose of property belonging to the United States is vested in Congress without limitation, and it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered; that determination is for Congress. 347 U.S. at 273-274
- Constitutional Law — Equal Footing Doctrine The equal footing requirement does not demand that courts eliminate diversities in the economic aspects of the several states, but calls for parity as respects political standing and sovereignty; accordingly, it does not restrict Congress's power to cede federal property to one state without a corresponding cession to all states. 347 U.S. at 275-276 (Reed, J., concurring)
- Constitutional Law — Federal Paramount Rights in Marginal Sea The prior decisions establishing that the Federal Government rather than the states has paramount rights in and power over the marginal sea, an incident of which is full dominion over the resources of the soil beneath that water, recognized a property right in the United States of which Congress had unlimited power to dispose. 347 U.S. at 276 (Reed, J., concurring)
- Constitutional Law — Submerged Lands Act — Title to Marginal Lands Whether the marginal lands were declared by the earlier cases to belong to the United States or remained in the respective states, under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 the lands and their natural resources are now the property of the respective states—either by original ownership or by congressional cession—and the use or control of that undersea area cannot be challenged by another state on the ground of lack of sovereignty in the challenged state. 347 U.S. at 276-277 (Reed, J., concurring)
- Constitutional Law — Navigational Servitude The Submerged Lands Act conveys only the lands beneath navigable waters and the natural resources within them, while expressly retaining in the United States all its navigational servitude and rights and powers of regulation and control for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs, paramount to the proprietary rights vested in the states; this reservation forecloses any contention that the Act empowers individual states to alter the historic relationship of the states respecting navigation of the ocean. 347 U.S. at 277 (Reed, J., concurring)
- Constitutional Law — Judicial Review The United States holds resources and territory in trust for its citizens, but not in the sense that a private trustee holds for a cestui que trust; Congress's responsibility is to utilize the assets that come into its hands as sovereign in the way it decides is best for the future of the Nation, and such a congressional determination is not subject to judicial review. 347 U.S. at 277 (Reed, J., concurring)
ALABAMAv. TEXAS,347 U.S. 272(1954)
74 S.Ct. 481
ALABAMAv. TEXAS ET AL.
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BILL OF COMPLAINT.fn*
No. ___, ORIGINAL.
Argued February 3-4, 1954.
Decided March 15, 1954.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Those states, however, do not accept the applicability of the quoted clause. It is their position that the resources under the marginal sea do not, underUnitedStatesv.Texas,339 U.S. 707,United Statesv.Louisiana,339 U.S. 699, andUnited Statesv.California,332 U.S. 19, constitute property either of the United States or of any state. The complainant states assert those cases held that the "paramount rights" in the United States decreed by this Court arose from the sovereignty of the United States and the duty to provide for the common defense. Further, they urge that the rights are held in trust for all the states as a federal responsibility and to cede them to individual states would take away the "equal footing" among states by extending state power into the domain of national responsibility. SeeUnited Statesv.Texas,supra, at 719, andCoylev.Oklahoma,221 U.S. 559.
This Court is the only court for the trial and discussion of the points upon which Alabama and Rhode IslandPage 275rely. We have heard complainants on all these points and I desire to state why I think the arguments extracted by the states from this Court's ruling authorities on these same rights do not justify a hearing.
The fact that Alabama and the defendant states were admitted into the Union "upon the same footing with the original states, in all respects whatever,"2 Stat. 701,3 Stat. 489,5 Stat. 742, 797,9 Stat. 452, does not affect Congress' power to dispose of federal property. The requirement of equal footing does not demand that courts wipe out diversities "in the economic aspects of the several States," but calls for "parity as respects political standing and sovereignty."United Statesv.Texas,supra, at 716. The power of Congress to cede property to one state without corresponding cession to all states has been consistently recognized. See,e. g.,United Statesv.Wyoming,335 U.S. 895, and cases cited by the Court.
While this Court did not hold in express terms in theTexas, LouisianaandCaliforniacases that the area in question belonged to the United States as proprietor, it did hold that "the Federal Government rather than the state has paramount rights in and power over that belt, an incident to which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water area, including oil."332 U.S., at 38-39. This incident is a property right and Congress had unlimited power to dispose of it.
If the marginal lands were thus declared by theCaliforniaand following cases to belong to the United States, they were ceded to the states through the subsequent Submerged Lands Act of 1953 by the clause: "[T]itle to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and the natural resources within such lands and waters . . . are hereby . . . recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to the respective States. . . ."Page 276§ 3(a). If, on the other hand, the marginal lands were not declared by those cases to belong to the United States, title to them remained in the respective states. Either by original ownership or by the cession of the Act, the lands are now the property of the respective states. The use or control of the undersea area and its resources by the respective states cannot, therefore, now be challenged by any other state on the ground of lack of sovereignty in the challenged state.
The cession challenged here does not affect the power and responsibility of the United States as sovereign to foster and protect against foreign and domestic enemies that area or resources ceded to the proprietorship of the respective states. The Federal Government, of course, owes the same duty to the undersea area that it does to the uplands, the tidelands or the beds of the inland waters. Moreover, the Submerged Lands Act purports to convey to the states only "the lands beneath navigable waters" and "the natural resources within such lands and waters" and expressly provides that "[t]he United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights in and powers of regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs, all of which shall be paramount to, but shall not be deemed to include, proprietary rights of ownership, or the rights of management, administration, leasing, use, and development of the lands and natural resources which are specifically recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to the respective States and others by section 3 of this Act." § 6(a). Surely this provision negatives any contention that the Act empowers individual states to alter the historic relationship of the states respecting navigation of the ocean. SeeKellyv.Washington,302 U.S. 1; cf.Toomerv.Witsell,334 U.S. 385.Page 277
The United States holds resources and territory in trust for its citizens in one sense, but not in the sense that a private trustee holds for acestui que trust. The responsibility of Congress is to utilize the assets that come into its hands as sovereign in the way that it decides is best for the future of the Nation. That is what it has done here. Such congressional determination as the legislation here in question is not subject to judicial review.
Alabama and Rhode Island deny that Congress has any power to dispose of the national interest in the Ocean or its uncaptured resources. These States assert that whatever power the United States has over the Ocean is an inseparable part of national sovereignty which cannot be irrevocably parcelled out or delegated to states, individuals or private business groups. Admitting the power of Congress to control and regulate the use of the Ocean and the capturing of its assets, Alabama and Rhode Island deny that any part of this sovereignPage 278national control can be vested in any state. Such an unauthorized abdication of essential national sovereignty, so the two States urge, is precisely the effect of the challenged Act. If true, this subjection of Alabama and Rhode Island to regulation by other states deprives them of that "equal footing" as States which is theirs by right.United Statesv.Texas,339 U.S. 707,719. The Court, however, summarily denies Alabama and Rhode Island a right even to file their complaint. This I assume must be done on the ground that the claims they present are so clearly without merit as to be frivolous. I am unable to agree to this and would grant leave to file in order that the case might be considered in the usual manner. My reasons can be briefly stated.
Ocean waters are the highways of the world. They are no less such because they happen to lap the shores of different nations that border them. Freedom of the seas everywhere is essential to trade, commerce, travel and communication among the nations. These far-flung international activities have frequently led to conflict and war. The War of 1812 bears witness to this. In ocean waters bordering our country, if nowhere else, day-to-day national power — complete, undivided, flexible, and immediately available — is an essential attribute of federal sovereignty. The present Act might be construed in such way that this power would not be substantially impaired, weakened or made less easily available at all times. But the Court is not construing it that way.
The Act's language purports to convey "all right, title, and interest of the United States" to immense ocean areas as though the Ocean could be divided up and sold like town lots. If valid, the Act grants to states all "proprietary rights of ownership, or the rights of management, administration, leasing, use, and development of the lands and natural resources" of the Ocean. The result is that some favored states can say how, when, for what purposesPage 279and to what extent other states and their citizens may use the Ocean or its resources. This raises serious and difficult questions with respect to the authority of Congress to relinquish elements of national sovereignty over the Ocean.
Once private property rights in ocean waters are recognized, I am uncertain where lines can be drawn. The Court's decision today inFederal Power Commissionv.Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., ante, p. 239, goes a long way toward partitioning up the running rivers of America into conceptualistic segments.1Under that case the Government is likely to have to pay large sums if it wishes to use its rivers. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS' dissent in theNiagara Mohawkcase should warn us to beware of extending the concept of state ownership of land under inland streams to the vast ocean areas of the world.2The results in that case are in my view bad enough. But it could be far worse to permit agencies other than the United States to clutter up the Ocean with multitudinous wells and derricks and deeds and leases and time-consuming lawsuits. All of these things suggest some of the dangers of depriving the United States of complete, unhampered control of the Ocean bordering our Nation. We should not forget that the Ocean "belongs to no one nation, but is the common property of all."Lordv.Steamship Co.,102 U.S. 541,544.3Page 280
The Constitution does give Congress power to dispose of and regulate "Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." This power, where it applies, has been declared to be unlimited. Congress, the Court has said, "may deal with such lands precisely as a private individual may deal with his farming property."Camfieldv.United States,167 U.S. 518,524. Of course, this authorizes Congress at will to sell or dispose of property it owns as property. It could produce oil from the Ocean and sell that property. It could have that oil produced by its agents. But I have difficulty in believing that any state can be granted power under our Constitution to exact tribute from any other state that wants to take oil or fish from the Ocean which is the common "property" of all. And I have trouble also in thinking Congress could sell or give away the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean. If it can treat those Oceans as "Territory" within the Constitution's meaning, why could it not deed away thousands of miles of the Atlantic or Pacific at will? I suppose no one would say that the Constitution permits Congress to create new states at least in part out of submerged lands with state power to govern and rule over the "Territory" so disposed of. Would this Court sustain the power of Congress to sell the Mississippi or any of the other great navigable rivers of this country? The Court's decisions here and in theNiagara Mohawkcase leave me in doubt.
The issues presented are too grave and too doubtful for me to assent to closing the doors of this Court to these States without a more careful consideration of the question than the Court has afforded. For there is a greatPage 281deal more involved than who gets what oil. Congress has here transferred to the states substantial power over the Ocean. This necessarily makes less readily available the Nation's power to protect the freedom of the seas — a power essential to keep peace and friendship among the nations of the world. I cannot agree to deny these States a full opportunity to challenge the Act.
If the issue before us were only the power of Congress to dispose of public lands, the claims of Alabama and Rhode Island would be foreclosed by Art. IV, § 3 of the Constitution. But the entire point of the earlier litigation in theCaliforniaandTexascases was that more than property rights was involved. As we said inUnitedStatesv.Texas, supra, p. 719, "once low-water mark is passed the international domain is reached. Property rights must then be so subordinated to political rights as in substance to coalesce and unite in the national sovereign." Any "property interests" which the States mayearlierhave held in the bed of the marginal seaPage 282were "so subordinated to the rights of sovereignty as to follow sovereignty."Id.
Thus we are dealing here with incidents of national sovereignty. The marginal sea is not an oil well; it is more than a mass of water; it is a protective belt for the entire Nation over which the United States must exercise exclusive and paramount authority. The authority over it can no more be abdicated than any of the other great powers of the Federal Government. It is to be exercised for the benefit of the whole. As MR. JUSTICE BLACK aptly states in his dissent in these cases, "In ocean waters bordering our country, if nowhere else, day-to-day national power — complete, undivided, flexible, and immediately available — is an essential attribute of federal sovereignty."
Could Congress cede the great Columbia River or the mighty Mississippi to a State or a power company? I should think not. For they are arteries of commerce that attach to the national sovereignty and remain there until and unless the Constitution is changed. What is true of a great river would seem to be even more obviously true of the marginal sea. For it is not only an artery of commerce among the States but the vast buffer standing between us and the world. It therefore would seem that unless we are to change our form of government, that domain must by its very nature attach to the National Government and the authority over it remain nondelegable.
It is said, however, that the interests in the marginal sea may be chopped up, the States being granted the economic ones and the Federal Government keeping the political ones. We rejected, however, that precise claim in the earlier cases. We said, for example, that the "equal footing" clause in the Joint Resolution admitting Texas to the Union precluded the argument that Texas surrendered only political rights over the marginal seaPage 283and retained all property rights in it.339 U.S., at 716-720.
If it were necessary for Texas to surrender all her property and political rights in the marginal sea in order to enter the Union on an "equal footing" with the other States, pray how can she get back some of those rights and still remain on an "equal footing" with the other States? That is the unresolved question in these cases. That is the question which points up the grievances of Alabama and Rhode Island. For what Texas (and a few other States) obtain by the present Act of Congress is what we held the "equal footing" clause forbade them to retain. The "equal footing" clause, in other words, prevents one State from laying claim to a part of the national domain from which the other States are excluded.339 U.S., at 719-720. Today we permit that precise "inequality among the States" which we earlier said was precluded by the "equal footing" clause.
Alabama and Rhode Island can justly complain. So can the other States. Our Union is one of equal sovereigns, none entitled to preferment denied the others. That is what the "equal footing" standard means or it means nothing. Today powerful political forces are marshalled to wipe out our prior decisions for the benefit of a favored few. But those decisions were sound in constitutional theory and they should stand. If they presented a question suitable for judicial review, so does the present controversy.Page 284
- Page 272 Together with No. ___, Original,Rhode Islandv.Louisiana et al.,also on motion for leave to file bill of complaint. ↩
- Page 279 This Court has referred to ownership of submerged lands under navigable streams as "theoretical ownership and dominion," "a qualified title," and "a bare technical title."Scrantonv.Wheeler,179 U.S. 141,160,163. See alsoUnited Statesv.Commodore Park, Inc.,324 U.S. 386,390. ↩
- Page 279 SeeUnited Statesv.California,332 U.S. 19,36. ↩
- Page 279 It is true that the Act does purport to reserve for the United States "all its navigational servitude and rights in and powers of regulation and control . . . for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs. . . ." But surely this reserves nothing that Congress could give away. Any Page 280 attempt to relinquish the National Government's power over the Ocean to that extent would ignore the fact that "Navigation on the high seas is necessarily national in its character. Such navigation is clearly a matter of `external concern,' affecting the nation as a nation in its external affairs. It must, therefore, be subject to the national government."Lordv.Steamship Co.,102 U.S. 541,544. ↩