Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

In Re Bradley

In Re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1943-02-01
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • holding that when a fíne is paid, there is “a full satisfaction of one of the alternative penalties of the law” and that the fine cannot be reimbursed in order to punish the defendant instead with imprisonment
  • holding that when a fine is paid, there is “a full satisfaction of one of the alternative penalties of the law” No. 03-1368 11 and that the fine cannot be reimbursed in order to punish the defendant instead with imprisonment
  • construing similarly worded predecessor to section 401

Citator

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Cited by
134 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Criminal Law & Procedure — Sentencing Under Section 268 of the Judicial Code, a federal court may punish a contempt only by fine or by imprisonment, not by both; a sentence imposing both a fine and imprisonment for contempt is erroneous. 318 U.S. at 52
  2. Criminal Law & Procedure — Contempt — Execution and Satisfaction of Sentence Where a sentence lawfully could have been either a fine or imprisonment and the defendant pays the fine to the clerk of the court, completing one of the alternative penalties, the judgment is satisfied and the power of the court over the sentence is at an end; the court may not thereafter amend the sentence to retain only imprisonment, and the defendant must be discharged. 318 U.S. at 52
  3. Criminal Law & Procedure — Contempt — Satisfaction of Sentence — Effect of Payment to Clerk The satisfaction of a sentence by payment of a fine does not depend on whether the money has been covered into the Treasury; payment to the clerk of the court, the officer authorized to receive it, is sufficient, and a subsequent attempt to amend the sentence is a nullity. 318 U.S. at 52
IN RE BRADLEY,318 U.S. 50(1943)
63 S.Ct. 470
IN RE WILLIAM V. BRADLEY.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.
No. 473.
Argued January 8, 1943.
Decided February 1, 1943.
A federal court having erroneously imposed upon the petitioner a sentence of fineandimprisonment for contempt (Jud. Code § 268, 28 U.S.C. § 385), and the fine having been paid to the clerk of the court, who gave a receipt therefor, the court is without power thereafter — although the money had not been covered into the Treasury — to modify the sentence to one of imprisonment only, and the petitioner must be discharged. P. 52. Reversed.Page 51
CERTIORARI,317 U.S. 616, to review a judgment sentencing the
petitioner for contempt.
Mr. Thomas D. McBridefor petitioner.Mr. W. Marvin Smith, with whomSolicitor General Fahy,Assistant Attorney General Berge, andMessrs. Oscar A. ProvostandJohn Ford Baecherwere on the brief, for the United States.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
A proceeding, instituted by the National Labor Relations Board against Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Company for enforcement of an order of the Board, was pending in the Circuit Court of Appeals. A hearing was set at which witnesses were to be heard. The petitioner was to be a witness for the Board. During the course of the trial the petitioner was summoned and, after hearing, was adjudged guilty of contempt because of his intimidation of a witness for the Ferry Company in the corridor adjoining the court room.

The court sentenced the petitioner to six months' imprisonment, to pay a fine of $500, and to stand committed until he complied with the sentence. The sentence was erroneous.Exparte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 176. Under § 268 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 385, the sentence could only be a fineorimprisonment.Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 512;Clarkv.United States,61 F.2d 695,709; affirmed289 U.S. 1.

The marshal was directed forthwith to execute the judgment. On September 28, 1942, the petitioner was taken into custody and committed to prison. On October 1 his attorney paid the fine in cash to the clerk of the court. Later on that day the court, realizing that the sentence was erroneous, delivered to the clerk an order amending it by omitting any fine and retaining only thePage 52six months' imprisonment. The court instructed the clerk, who still held the money, to return it to the petitioner's attorney. The latter refused to receive it, and the clerk has it.

The petitioner, being in jail, petitioned this Court to grant certiorari, alleging as errors the adjudication that he was guilty of contempt and the manner of sentencing him. We granted the writ and admitted him to bail pending decision.

We do not review the finding that the petitioner's conduct was a contempt summarily punishable by the court, for we are of opinion that the errors involved in the sentence require that he shall be freed from further imprisonment.

When, on October 1, the fine was paid to the clerk and receipted for by him, the petitioner had complied with a portion of the sentence which could lawfully have been imposed. As the judgment of the court was thus executed so as to be a full satisfaction of one of the alternative penalties of the law, the power of the court was at an end.1It is unimportant that the fine had not been covered into the treasury; it had been paid to the clerk, the officer of the United States authorized to receive it,2and petitioner's rights did not depend upon what that officer subsequently did with the money.3

It follows that the subsequent amendment of the sentence could not avoid the satisfaction of the judgment, and the attempt to accomplish that end was a nullity. Since one valid alternative provision of the original sentence has been satisfied, the petitioner is entitled to be freed of further restraint.Page 53

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions that the petitioner be discharged from custody.Reversed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE, dissenting:
InEx parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, the trial court did not remit or offer to remit the fine which the offender had paid. The opinion was careful to point out (p. 175) that the fine paid had been covered into the treasury and that the courts were powerless to direct its return. That decision thus lends no support to that now rendered that the choice rests with the offender rather than with the court whether he shall be punished by fine or by imprisonment, either of which alone the court could have lawfully imposed; and that by payment of the fine, imposed and accepted under mistake of law and immediately remitted, he may irrevocably escape punishment by imprisonment.

So far asEx parte Langeis regarded here as resting on the ground that it would be double jeopardy to compel the offender to serve the prison sentence after remission of the fine on the same day on which it was paid, I think its authority should be reexamined and rejected. The substance of the punishment imposed on the offender by a fine is in depriving him of the money he has paid. Here he has not been deprived of the money paid to the clerk of the court, for the fine was remitted on the same day on which it was paid, and he was then free to reclaim it. Since he is shown to have suffered no more from the imposition of the fine than if the clerk had refused to receive it when tendered, there is I think no substance in the contention that he will suffer double punishment if compelled to serve out his prison sentence.

The Constitution is concerned with matters of substance not of form. Nothing in its words or history forbids a common sense application of its provisions, or excludesPage 54them from the operation of the principlede minimis. I can hardly suppose that we would hold unconstitutional an Act of Congress commanding prompt return of a fine mistakenly imposed under these circumstances, and requiring the prison sentence originally imposed to be served. YetEx parte Langeas interpreted and applied here rests on constitutional grounds which are equally applicable to an Act of Congress.

I agree with the suggestion of the Government that the court's second order resentencing petitioner could not rightly be entered without affording petitioner or his counsel an opportunity to be present, and that the cause should, on that account, be remanded for further proceedings.
  1. Page 52Ex parte Lange, supra, 176. ↩
  2. Page 52In re Fletcher,71 App.D.C. 108,107 F.2d 666,668. ↩
  3. Page 52Ex parte Lange, supra, p. 176; and compare the dissenting opinion, pp. 180, 190, 199-200;Yavorskyv.United States,1 F.2d 169,171;Mossv.United States,23 App.D.C. 475,485. ↩