Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
United States v. Perkins
United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1886-01-25
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- holding naval service officers to be inferior officers and upholding a statute prohibiting their dismissal in time of peace "except upon and in pursuance of the sentence of a court-martial to that effect, or in commutation thereof"
- “ ‘The constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment [of inferior officers in the heads of departments] implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed’”
- power of Congress to vest appointment of inferior officers in heads of departments implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the power of removal, and such authority does not infringe upon constitutional prerogatives of the Executive
- “The constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed.”
- “The constitutional authority in [C]ongress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as [C]ongress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed.”
- itself quoting Perkins v. United States, 20 Ct. Cl. 438, 444 (1885)
- Cadet engineer at the Naval A cademy was an officer because “ Congress has by express enactment vested the appointment o f cadet-engineers in the Secretary o f the Navy and when thus appointed they become officers and not employees."
- upholding tenure protections for a naval cadet-engineer
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed United States v. Perkins. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Authority status
- pending
- Cited by
- 95 opinions
Headnotes
- Administrative Law — Appointment and Removal of Inferior Officers When Congress by law vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments, Congress may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the public interest; the constitutional authority to vest such appointments carries with it authority to limit, restrict, and regulate removal by such laws as Congress may enact, and the head of a department has no constitutional prerogative of appointment independent of congressional legislation and must be governed by that legislation in making appointments and in all matters incident thereto. 116 U.S. 483 (adopting the opinion of the Court of Claims)
- Military & Military Justice — Discharge A cadet-engineer who was not found deficient at examination and was not dismissed for misconduct under Rev. Stat. § 1525 or upon and in pursuance of a court-martial sentence under Rev. Stat. § 1229, but was honorably discharged by the Secretary of the Navy against his will without lawful authority, remains in the service notwithstanding the discharge and is entitled to recover in the Court of Claims the pay attached to the position. 116 U.S. 483
UNITED STATES v. PERKINS,116 U.S. 483(1886)
6 S.Ct. 449
UNITED STATESv. PERKINS.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.
Submitted January 6, 1886.
Decided January 25, 1886.
The plaintiff entered the Naval Academy as a cadet-engineer in 1877, and graduated therefrom on June 10, 1881. On June 26, 1883, he received a letter from the Secretary of the Navy giving him notice that, as he was not required to fill any vacancy in the naval service happening during the preceding year, he was thereby honorably discharged from the 30th of June, 1883, with one year's sea-pay, as prescribed by law for cadet-midshipmen, in accordance with the provisions of the act of Congress approved August 5, 1882.
He protested against this order as illegal and refused the pay, and, regarding himself as continuing in the service, he sued for his pay subsequently accruing.Page 484
The case differs from that of Redgrave, just decided, in one particular only, that the claim is for pay after the alleged discharge.
The single question now raised as to that point is, that, although the discharge may not be justified by the act of August 5, 1882, the Secretary of the Navy, irrespective of that act, had lawful power to discharge him from the service at will. This authority is claimed on the ground that the plaintiff was not an officer in the naval service within the meaning of Rev. Stat. § 1229, which provides that "No officer in the military or naval service shall in time of peace be dismissed from service except upon and in pursuance of the sentence of a court-martial to that effect or in commutation thereof;" and that consequently the right to remove and discharge him from the public service is implied in the power of appointment.
In reply to this position, the Court of Claims, in its opinion in this case, said:
"In this view we cannot concur. That a cadet-engineer like the claimant was a graduate and in the naval service we have already decided; that he was an officer is made manifest by the terms of the Constitution, which provides that "Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of Departments." Congress has by express enactment vested the appointment of cadet-engineers in the Secretary of the Navy, and when thus appointed they become officers and not employés.United Statesv.Germaine,99 U.S. 508;Moorev.UnitedStates,95 U.S. 760:United Statesv.Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385.
"It is further urged that this restriction of the power of removal is an infringement upon the constitutional prerogative of the Executive, and so of no force, but absolutely void. Whether or not Congress can restrict the power of removal incident to the power of appointment of those officers who are appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate under the authority of the Constitution (article 2, section 2) does not arise in this case and need not be considered.Page 485
"We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of Departments it may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the public interest. The constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed.
"The head of a Department has no constitutional prerogative of appointment to offices independently of the legislation of Congress, and by such legislation he must be governed, not only in making appointments but in all that is incident thereto.
"It follows that as the claimant was not found deficient at any examination, and was not dismissed for misconduct under the provisions of Revised Statutes, section 1525, nor upon and in pursuance of the sentence of a court-martial to that effect or in commutation thereof, according to Revised Statutes, section 1229, he is still in office and is entitled to the pay attached to the same."
We adopt these views, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims.Affirmed.