Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Jones v. Perkins

245 U.S. 390

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1918-01-07
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • stating that it “is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial”
  • stating that “[i]t is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of a trial”
  • stating that it “is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be followed, and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of a trial”
  • "It is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of a trial."
  • “It is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be followed and habeas corpu

Citator

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Cited by
166 opinions
JONESv. PERKINS,245 U.S. 390(1918)
38 S.Ct. 166
JONESv. PERKINS, DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL, ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA.
No. 738.
Argued December 13, 14, 1917.
Decided January 7, 1918.
Petitioner soughthabeas corpusupon the ground that the Selective Draft Law, for disobedience of which he was arrested, was unconstitutional. The constitutional questions he raises having all been decided adversely to him in theSelective Draft Law Cases, ante, 366, the court affirms the trial court's order refusing the writ, without, however, departing from the general principle thathabeas corpusshould not anticipate trial in criminal cases, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, and without inquiring whether in this case such circumstances existed. 243 F. 997, affirmed.Page 391
THE case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. J. Gordon Jones, with whomMr. Thomas E. Watsonwas on the brief, for appellant.The Solicitor General, with whomMr. Robert Szoldwas on the brief, for appellees. Seeante, 368.Mr. Hannis TaylorandMr. Joseph E. Black, by leave of court, filed a brief asamici curiae.Mr. Walter Nelles, by leave of court, filed a brief asamicus curiae.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.
Jones, the appellant, was arrested under a warrant charging him with a failure to register as required by the Act of Congress of May 18, 1917, known as the Selective Draft Law, (c. 15,40 Stat. 76), and after a hearing by a United States Commissioner was committed to custody to await the ensuing term of the United States District Court. Alleging that he was illegally restrained because the statute under the assumed authority of which he was held was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, he petitioned the court below for a writ ofhabeas corpus. Following a rule to show cause and a hearing on the return thereto, the petition was denied on the ground that the statute was constitutional (243 F. 997), and to reverse the order so adjudging this direct appeal was prosecuted.

It is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedure should be followed andhabeas corpusshould not be granted in advance of a trial.Rigginsv.United States,Page 392199 U.S. 547;Glasgowv.Moyer,225 U.S. 420;Johnsonv.Hoy,227 U.S. 245. If that rule applied, therefore, our duty would be to affirm, unless this case could be treated as coming within the exceptional class. But we do not deem it necessary to enter into that consideration because, even if it were found to be embraced in such class, every constitutional question relied upon has been this day inArverv.United States, [theSelective Draft Law Cases,] ante, 366, decided to be without merit. Because of this situation, therefore, without departing from the general principle, we think it suffices in this case to apply the ruling made in theArver Caseand, for the reasons stated in the opinion therein, to affirm.And it is so ordered.