Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Keerl v. Montana

213 U.S. 135

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1909-04-05
Topic
general

*137 Me. Justice Bkewer delivered the opinion of the court. The defendant during the trial having specifically claimed that the action of the court in denying him thé benefit of the plea of once in jeopardy operated to deprive him of his liberty without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, our jurisdiction of the writ of error cannot be questioned. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.

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Headnotes

  1. Constitutional Law — Appellate Jurisdiction Where the accused during trial specifically claims that the state court's denial of his plea of once in jeopardy operated to deprive him of liberty without due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction under § 709, Rev. Stat., to review the judgment. 213 U.S. 135 (opinion of the Court)
  2. Criminal Law & Procedure — Double Jeopardy A court has the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict whenever, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated; such a discharge constitutes no bar to further proceedings and gives no right of exemption to the prisoner from being again put upon trial. 213 U.S. 135 (quoting United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580)
  3. Criminal Law & Procedure — Double Jeopardy Where a state court has the right to discharge the jury if it satisfactorily appears after a reasonable time that a disagreement is probable, and the state court so finds after the jury has been out for twenty-four hours, the discharge results in a mistrial, and the accused cannot on a subsequent trial interpose the plea of once in jeopardy by reason thereof. 213 U.S. 135 (citing Section 2125, Penal Code of Montana)
  4. Constitutional Law — Fourteenth Amendment The question whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in itself forbids a State from putting one of its citizens in second jeopardy is left undecided where the case is disposed of on other grounds. 213 U.S. 135 (opinion of the Court)
KEERLv. MONTANA,213 U.S. 135(1909)
29 S.Ct. 469
KEERLv. STATE OF MONTANA.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA.
No. 113.
Argued March 15, 1909.
Decided April 5, 1909.
Where the accused during the trial specifically claims that the action of the state court in denying his plea of once in jeopardy operated to deprive him of his liberty without due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, this court has jurisdiction under § 709, Rev. Stat., to review the judgment. Where a state court has the right to discharge the jury if it satisfactorily appear after a reasonable time that a disagreement is probable, and the state court so finds after the jury has been out for twenty-four hours, and discharges the jury, the result is a mistrial and the accused cannot on a subsequent trial interpose the plea of once in jeopardy by reason thereof,United Statesv.Perez, 9 Wheat. 579; and soheldin regard to a trial in Montana where the jury had been discharged under § 2125, Penal Code of that State.Quaere, and not decided, whether the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment in itself forbids a State from putting one of its citizens in second jeopardy.33 Mont. 501, affirmed.
ON April 24, 1902, an information was filed in the District
Page 136
Court of Lewis and Clark County, Montana, charging the defendant,
now plaintiff in error, with the crime of murder. Upon a trial he
was found guilty of murder in the second degree and sentenced to
imprisonment for life. The judgment was reversed by the Supreme
Court and a new trial ordered.29 Mont. 508. The record
recites that on the second trial the jury retired for
deliberation on July 12, 1904, and that on July 14, 1904, they
returned into court, "whereupon it satisfactorily appearing to
the court that there is a reasonable probability that the jury
cannot agree the court ordered the jury discharged from the
further consideration of this cause," and remanded the defendant
to the custody of the sheriff. On the third trial the defendant
interposed a plea of once in jeopardy, on the ground that the
jury was improperly discharged at the end of the second trial.
The Montana statute provides:
"Except as provided in the last section [a section respecting
sickness or accident] the jury cannot be discharged after the
cause is submitted to them until they have agreed upon their
verdict, and rendered it in open court, unless by consent of both
parties, entered upon the minutes, or unless at the expiration of
such time as the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears
that there is reasonable probability that the jury cannot agree."
Section 2125, Penal Code; vol. 2, Montana Codes, p. 1061.
The court overruled the plea, and, as a result of the trial,
the defendant was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to
imprisonment for the term of ten years. This judgment was
sustained by the Supreme Court.33 Mont. 501. Thereupon the
case was brought here on writ of error.
Mr. Thomas J. Walsh, with whomMr. Cornelius B. Nolanwas on the brief, for plaintiff in error.Mr. W.H. Poorman, with whomMr. Albert J. Galen, Attorney General of the State of Montana, andMr. E.M. Hallwere on the brief, for defendant in error.Page 137
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court.
The defendant during the trial having specifically claimed that the action of the court in denying him the benefit of the plea of once in jeopardy operated to deprive him of his liberty without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, our jurisdiction of the writ of error cannot be questioned.Beer Co. v.Massachusetts,97 U.S. 25-30;Bohananv.Nebraska,118 U.S. 231;Boydv.Thayer,143 U.S. 135-161.

On the merits, there is little room for controversy. InUnited Statesv.Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580, this court passed upon the question arising under the Fifth Amendment, whose language is in this respect more specific than that in the Fourteenth Amendment, the former applying to the courts of the United States, the latter to the action of the State, and it was held:

"We think that in all cases of this nature the law has invested courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and, in capital cases especially, courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances of life, in favor of the prisoner. But, after all, they have the right to order the discharge; and the security which the public have for the faithful, sound and conscientious exercise of this discretion rests, in this as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the judges, under their oaths of office. We are aware that there is some diversity of opinion and practice on this subject in the American courts; but after weighing the question with due deliberation, we are of opinion that such a discharge constitutes no bar to furtherPage 138proceedings, and gives no right of exemption to the prisoner from being again put upon trial."

This has been the settled law of the Federal courts ever since that time.Loganv.United States,144 U.S. 263,297;Thompsonv.United States,155 U.S. 271,274;Dreyerv.Illinois,187 U.S. 71,85.

Those decisions dispose of the question here presented, without considering whether the Fourteenth Amendment in itself forbids a State from putting one of its citizens in second jeopardy, a question which, as it is unnecessary, we do not decide. The record shows that the jury were kept out at least twenty-four hours, and probably more, and the trial court found that there was a reasonable probability that the jury could not agree. This is the only Federal question, and, finding no error therein, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana isAffirmed.