Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States
Emsheimer v. New Orleans
Emsheimer v. New Orleans, 186 U.S. 33 (1902)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of the United States
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
- Date
- 1902-05-19
- Topic
- general
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court. ,This is a certificate under section six of the Judiciary Act of March 3,1891, 26 Stat. 826, q. 517, and it is settled as to such certification that each question propounded must be a definite point'or proposition of law clearly stated, so that it can be definitely answered without regard to other issues of law in the case; that each question must be a question of law only and not of fact, or of mixed law and.fact; and that the certificate cannot embrace the whole case, even where its decision turns on matter of law only and even though it be split up in the form of questions. Graver v. Faurot, 162 U. S. 435 ; McKeen v.
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Headnotes
- Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Certification of Questions from Court of Appeals A certificate under section six of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, must propound each question as a definite point or proposition of law clearly stated, capable of being answered without regard to other issues of law in the case; each question must be one of law only, not of fact or of mixed law and fact; and the certificate may not embrace the whole case, even where its decision turns on matter of law only, and even though the case be split up in the form of questions. The certificate must contain a proper statement of the facts on which the question or proposition of law arises, and the transmission of the entire record with questions contemplating examination of the whole case does not comply with this requirement. 186 U.S. 33 (citing Graver v. Faurot, 162 U.S. 435; McKeen v. Railroad Company, 149 U.S. 249)
- Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Jurisdiction over Suits by Assignees of Choses in Action Under the provision denying the Circuit and District Courts cognizance of suits to recover the contents of a promissory note or other chose in action in favor of an assignee, unless the suit might have been prosecuted in such court if no assignment had been made, the inquiry whether the assignor could have sued in the circuit court is determined as of the time the suit is commenced, not the time of the assignment; jurisdiction vests at the commencement of the action and cannot be divested by subsequent events. 186 U.S. 33
- Federal Courts & Jurisdiction — Jurisdiction over Suits by Assignees of Choses in Action Where at the time suit is brought the original payees could themselves have instituted the action in the circuit court had there been no assignment or transfer, and the plaintiff and defendant are diverse, jurisdiction on the ground of diverse citizenship exists on the face of the bill; the situation or rights of temporary intermediate assignees, holders, or endorsers do not enter into the conditions of the case. 186 U.S. 33 (citing Kirkman v. Hamilton, 6 Pet. 20; Milledollar v. Bell, 2 Wall. Jr. 334; Wilson v. Fisher, Bald. 133)
EMSHEIMERv. NEW ORLEANS,186 U.S. 33(1902)
22 S.Ct. 770
EMSHEIMERv. NEW ORLEANS.
CERTIFICATE FROM THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT.
No. 347.
Argued March 19, 20, 1902.
Decided May 19, 1902.
THE certificate in this case is as follows:
"This suit was commenced by filing in the Circuit Court the
following bill and exhibit, filed November 13, 1899:
"`To the honorable the Judges of the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Fifth Circuit and Eastern District of
Louisiana, New Orleans division:
"`Alphonse Emsheimer, of New Orleans, an alien and a subject
of the Empire of Germany, brings this his bill against the city
of New Orleans, a municipal corporation created by the laws of
Louisiana, and a citizen of said State. And thereupon your orator
complains and says:
"`1st. That by an act of the legislature of Louisiana (No.
74), approved September 14th, 1868, the parishes of Orleans,
Jefferson and St. Bernard were territorially united in one
district for the purpose of police government therein, called the
`Metropolitan police district of New Orleans, State of
Louisiana;' that the government of said district for police
purposes was vested in a board of commissioners, styled `the
board of Metropolitan police.'
"`2d. That said board was required to appoint all the officers
Page 34
and employes of the police force required in said district, and
`their salaries (which were prescribed by the act) were required
to be paid monthly; that by said act and acts of said
legislature, supplementary to and amendatory thereof, said board
was required to make annually an estimate of the expenses of
maintaining a police force in said district, and to apportion the
same to the several cities and parishes within said district, and
said cities and parishes were required by said acts to promptly
pay, and to provide the means for promptly paying, the amounts
thus apportioned to them.
"`3d. That said city of New Orleans was a municipal
corporation created by the laws of said State of Louisiana, and
was within said Metropolitan police district; that said board
from and after its creation, as aforesaid, annually made the
estimate of expenses of maintaining said Metropolitan police and
apportioned the same to said several cities and parishes as
required by said acts.
"`4th. That the apportionments made by said board aforesaid to
the city of New Orleans for all the years from 1869 to 1876,
inclusively, amounted to the sum of $6,033,030.51, and when said
apportionments were made and notified, as they were to said city,
she became liable to said board of Metropolitan police for the
amount thereof.
"`5th. That like apportionments of police expenses were made
by said board to the cities of Jefferson and Carrollton, which
were within said police district, for which apportionments they
each became liable to said board, but afterwards by acts of said
legislature, said cities were consolidated with said city of New
Orleans, which by said acts of consolidation was made liable for
their debts, including those created for their apportionment of
police expenses aforesaid.
"`Your orator has not sufficient information to state the
amount of the liabilities thus created and imposed upon said city
of New Orleans, but avers upon information and belief, that it
was sufficient to pay and discharge the proportion of police
expenses due by each of said cities.
"`6th. That like apportionments were made by said board of
police expenses to be paid by said parishes of Jefferson and
Page 35
St. Bernard and the city of Kenner, all within said police
district, and notice given to each of said corporations thereof,
as required by law, and thereupon they became and were absolutely
liable to said board for the amount of their respective
apportionments; but what the amounts of said apportionments were
complainant is unable to state, but avers that they were
sufficient to meet the annual police expenses within their
respective jurisdictions.
"`7th. That while said cities and parishes within the police
district were required to promptly pay and to provide the means
for promptly paying their respective apportionments, the councils
of said cities and the police juries of said parishes were
authorized to raise the amount required for that purpose by
levying taxes upon the persons and things subject to taxation
within their respective jurisdictions, and for that purpose did
severally make such levies, and your orator avers that said city
of New Orleans annually, during the whole period of the existence
of said board, included in her budget of expenditures the amount
thus apportioned to her, and in pursuance of said authority
levied and collected taxes for the purpose of paying the same,
and paid upon account thereof large sums of money, but not enough
to discharge her liability in the premises, there still being due
upon account thereof, including Carrollton, the sum of two
hundred and forty-one thousand, one hundred and six and 54/100
dollars ($241,106.54,) and the defendant, the present city of New
Orleans, successor of said city, as existing at the time said
apportionments were made, is liable therefor.
"`8th. And your orator avers that said city of New Orleans was
and is a statutory trustee of the money derived from such
taxation, and collected by her for the purpose of paying said
apportionments of police expenses; that ever since said several
levies of such taxes said city has been, and still is making
collections thereof, and has collected large sums of money on
account thereof, for which she has failed to account and still
holds subject to said trust, the amount thereof being to your
orator unknown; that for a portion of such collections a receiver
was appointed by the civil district court for the parish of
Orleans with the consent of said city, to whom said city on July
25th,
Page 36
1888, paid the sum of thirty thousand nine hundred and forty-four
94/100 dollars ($30,944.94) part and parcel of the moneys derived
from the collection of such taxes as well as other small sums
thereafter, the amount and date of payment of which is to your
orator unknown.
"`And your orator avers that afterwards, to wit, on the 27th
of December, 1890, said receiver died, and that said board has
been since then, and is now without any successor or
representative, and its affairs are under no administration
whatsoever; that said city of New Orleans has since the death of
said receiver continued to collect said police taxes, and is
still collecting the same, the amount of such collections being
to your orator unknown, but he avers that it is a large amount,
no part of which she has applied to the payment of any of her
indebtedness on account of said apportionments; and that she
holds the same subject to said trust as above averred.
"`And your orator avers that large amounts of said police
taxes levied, as aforesaid, became delinquent, and thereafter
interest accrued thereon at the rate of ten per cent per annum;
that said city of New Orleans collected large amounts of such
interest, which as accessory to said taxes should have been paid
to said police board, but which she neglected and refused in
violation of her duty as trustee, to apply to the payment of said
apportionments, and she should be required to account for the
same with interest thereon; that the amount of police taxes as
well as the interest thereon, so as aforesaid collected, is
unknown to your orator, and he is entitled to an account thereof
from said city before one of the masters of this honorable court,
or otherwise, as your honors may direct.
"`9th. That said board of Metropolitan police, in obedience to
the laws creating and governing the same, organized a
Metropolitan police force in said district and maintained the
same until March 31st, 1877, when said act No. 74 of September
14th, 1868, establishing said Metropolitan police district, as
well as all other acts amendatory thereof and upon the same
subject-matter, were repealed, and said board of Metropolitan
police was abolished without any provision being made for the
liquidation of its affairs, or the payment of its debts.
Page 37
"`10th. That said board of Metropolitan police was a body
corporate under the laws of its creation, and by the repeal of
said law, ceased to be and had and has no representative or
successor against whom suit might have been or may now be brought
for the establishment of the demands of the complainant herein,
and he is remediless, except in this honorable court, where
matters of this nature are cognizable and relievable, wherefore
he brings this his bill, in behalf of himself and all other
creditors of said board, similarly situated, who may come in and
contribute to the expense of this suit.
"`11th. That one Lew Goldstein, as holder of a large amount of
Metropolitan police warrants, issued to officers and members of
the Metropolitan police, and assignee of sundry creditors of said
board of Metropolitan police, on the 21st of October, 1886,
brought suit in the 26th judicial district court in and for the
parish of Jefferson, Louisiana, against said city of New Orleans,
said city of Kenner and said parishes of Jefferson and St.
Bernard, in behalf of himself and all other creditors of said
board, similarly situated, praying the appointment of a receiver
and enforcement of the liabilities of said several defendants,
for the purpose of paying and discharging the obligations of said
board; that citation was served on the 26th of October, 1886,
upon each of said defendants to appear and answer in said suit,
and afterwards said suit was removed into this honorable court,
where holders of warrants and claims against said board,
amounting to a much larger sum, appeared before the master
appointed by the order of the court, and proved their demand, the
claims now held by your orator being among those so presented and
proved, as will appear by said master's report now on file, which
is here referred to for greater certainty; that the case as
against the city of New Orleans was afterwards dismissed upon the
ground that this court had not acquired jurisdiction thereof; but
as to all other defendants the same still remains pending and
undisposed of.
"`That afterwards, to wit: February 9th, 1891, Henry W.
Benjamin exhibited and filed his bill of complaint in this
honorable court against said city of New Orleans and others for
an account of the sums due by said defendants, applicable to the
Page 38
payment of the certificates and claims against said police board
held by him, being the same claims upon which said Goldstein
brought suit as aforesaid, and which said Benjamin had acquired;
that various persons having like claims against said police board
intervened in said suit and proved the same before the master
therein; that among said claims sued upon by said Benjamin and
said intervenors, were included the obligations and claims since
acquired and now held and owned by your orator, hereinafter
enumerated and described; that process of subpoena in said case
was duly served upon said city of New Orleans February 9th, 1891,
that she afterwards appeared and answered and a final decree was
made against her in favor of said complainant, and the
intervenors therein establishing their claims and decreeing the
said city to pay the same, which suit was afterwards dismissed
for want of jurisdiction in this honorable court, but without
prejudice to a new bill, which decree became final January 31st,
1898.
"`12th. That your orator is the holder and owner of
certificates issued by said board of Metropolitan police in
acknowledgment of its indebtedness for services rendered to it by
the persons therein named and of transfers of debts due by said
police board, amounting to three thousand, thirty and
forty-eight/100 dollars ($3030.48), a list whereof is hereto
annexed as Exhibit `A,' and made a part of this bill; that said
claims have been duly assigned and transferred to your orator for
a valuable consideration, and he is now the holder and owner
thereof.
"`And your orator avers that each of said persons in whose
favor said claims accrued, and to whom said certificates were
issued, or their heirs or legal representatives, are citizens
respectively of States other than Louisiana, and competent as
such citizens to maintain suit in this honorable court against
said defendant for the enforcement of said indebtedness,
represented by said certificates and transfers, if no assignment
or transfer thereof had been made, the citizenship of said
persons being as follows, viz.:
"`Said D.M. Moore is a citizen of the State of New York.
" Eli Jones is a citizen of the State of Texas.
Page 39
"`Said Peter Joseph is a citizen of the State of Colorado.
" Robert Crofton is a citizen of the State of Mississippi.
" W.C. Bodechtel is a citizen of the State of California.
" J.H. Moore is a citizen of the State of Colorado.
" Edward Masterson is a citizen of the State of Ohio.
" John Dinan is a citizen of the State of Ohio.
" F. Coleman is a citizen of the State of Ohio.
" R.H. Taylor is a citizen of the State of Illinois.
" W.H. Murphy is a citizen of the State of Michigan.
"`Said G.H. Hamersley resided in and was a citizen of the
State of California, until he died recently, leaving two sons,
G.H. Hamersley and ____ Hamersley, as his sole heirs, who are
also citizens of the State of California.
"`Said Dr. J.B. Cooper resided in and was also a citizen of
the State of California, where he died leaving Mrs. Catherine E.
Cooper, his widow in community, as sole heir under the laws of
said State of which she is a citizen.
"`15th. And your orator further shows and avers that there are
now outstanding, due and unpaid, other warrants and certificates
issued by said board of Metropolitan police, and sums due and
owing by it, for services rendered and supplies furnished
thereto, amounting to a large sum, the exact amount thereof being
unknown to your orator, but he avers upon information and belief,
that including interest thereof, the amount exceeds two hundred
thousand dollars ($200,000); that the only assets of said board
of Metropolitan police, at the time it was abolished, were the
amounts due to it by the said city of New Orleans, and by other
municipal corporations within said police district; that the
amount due by said city as aforesaid, is applicable to the
payment of the claims held and owned by your orator as aforesaid,
the same being for services rendered within said city, and that
he is entitled to an accounting by said city, in order that the
amount due by her may be ascertained and fixed and decreed to be
paid, and applied to the payment of your orator's claims, and of
such others as shall join herein and contribute to the expense of
this suit.
"`In consideration whereof and inasmuch as your orator has not
a complete and adequate remedy at law to the end therefore
Page 40
that the said defendant may, if she can, show why your orator
should not have the relief hereby prayed, and that she may full,
true and perfect answer make to all and singular the premises,
(but not under oath, the oath thereto being expressly waived);
that an account be taken before a master to be appointed by the
court, of the amount of taxes collected by the defendant on
account of the assessments and levies of taxes for police
purposes, as set forth in the bill, and of the amounts due by the
defendant on account of the apportionments aforesaid due by her,
and that the defendant may be decreed to pay into the hands of a
receiver, the amount of said taxes collected, with interest
thereon, since the same have come into the hands of the
defendant, and a sufficient amount of the said apportionments as
trust funds, to meet the demands of the complainant and other
creditors similarly situated who may come into this cause and
take the benefit of these proceedings, and all expenses and
costs; and that the same be applied to their payment.'"
[Then followed prayer for process and for general relief and
signatures of counsel; also Exhibit "A," "List of certificates of
indebtedness of Board of Metropolitan Police and claims against
it held and owned by said complainant." These were in small
amounts, some of them dated in October, November and December,
1874, some in December, 1875, and some in November and December,
1876. The original payees were D.M. Moore, Eli Jones, Peter
Joseph, Robert Crofton, W.C. Bodechtel, Edward Masterson, R.H.
Taylor, John Dinan, G.H. Hamersley, W.H. Murphy, F. Coleman and
Dr. J.B. Cooper.
The city demurred to the bill on the ground that the Circuit
Court had no jurisdiction as such for want of proper averments of
diverse citizenship; that necessary parties were lacking; that
plaintiff had not stated a case entitling him to the relief
prayed; and that the remedy was at law and not in equity. On
hearing the Circuit Court entered the following decree:]
"`This cause came on to be heard at a former day upon the
demurrer to the bill, filed by defendant, and after arguments
from counsel, was submitted.
Page 41
"`On consideration thereof for the reasons on file:
"`It is ordered that the defendant's first ground of demurrer
be and the same is hereby overruled, the court finding and
decreeing that the allegations of the citizenship of the
complainant, of the original payees and of the city of New
Orleans, are fully sufficient.
"`It is further ordered that defendant's third and fourth
grounds of demurrer are hereby sustained, the court finding and
decreeing that there is no equity in the bill of complaint herein
and said bill is therefore dismissed for want of equity with full
reservation of complainant's right to sue and proceed at law.'
"The complainant below prosecuted an appeal to this court and
assigns herein errors as follows:
"`1st. Said Circuit Court erred in sustaining the demurrer to
the complainant's bill, and in dismissing the same.
"`2d. Said court erred in holding that complainant's bill does
not state a case within the jurisdiction of a court of equity.
"`Wherefore, for the errors assigned, and others manifest in
the record, said complainant prays that said decree be reversed
and said cause reinstated to be proceeded with according to law.'
"And now at this term this cause came on to be heard on the
transcript and was argued, —
"Whereupon, for the proper decision of the case, this court,
desiring the instruction of the honorable, the Supreme Court of
the United States, certifies to that court the following
questions and propositions of law arising on the record, to wit:
1. This being a suit brought by an assignee to recover the
contents of choses in action, does the bill state sufficient
facts to give the court jurisdiction on the ground of diverse
citizenship? 2. Under the facts stated in the bill and under the
proper construction of Act No. 35 of the Laws of Louisiana,
approved March 31, 1877, can the city of New Orleans, as a legal
successor of the defunct Metropolitan Police Board, be held
liable to the complainant as the holder of valid outstanding
certificates of indebtedness issued by the late board of
Page 42
Metropolitan police for the amounts due on said certificates? 3.
Under the facts stated in the bill, can the complainant maintain
a suit in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Eastern District of Louisiana against the city of New Orleans
for the establishment of a fund out of which he in common with
other creditors of the late Metropolitan Police Board may be paid
pro rataupon their claims?"
Rule 37 provides: "Where, under section six of the said act, a Circuit Court of Appeals shall certify to this court a question or proposition of law, concerning which it desires the instruction of this court for its proper decision, the certificate shall contain a proper statement of the facts on which such question or proposition of law arises." In this case there is no such statement, but the entire record is certified, and the questions contemplate an examination of the whole case and in large part its decision on the merits.
We cannot regard this certificate as in compliance with the rule, and are constrained to decline to answer the second andPage 43third questions, but we think we may properly answer the first question in view of the narrow limits by which it was apparently intended to be circumscribed.
The judicial power extends to controversies between citizens of different States; and between citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of foreign States; but the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, provided that the District and Circuit Courts of the United States should not "have cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action in favor of an assignee, unless the suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange,"1 Stat. 78, c. 20, § 11; and the same provision of the act of March 3, 1887, as corrected by that of August 13, 1888, is in these words: "Nor shall any Circuit or District Court have cognizance of any suit, except upon foreign bills of exchange, to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action in favor of any assignee, or of any subsequent holder if such instrument be payable to bearer and be not made by any corporation, unless such suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment or transfer had been made."25 Stat. 433-4, c. 866, § 1.
To prevent abuse of the constitutional right to resort to the Federal courts, jurisdiction in respect of assignees or transferees was thereby denied except as to suits upon foreign bills of exchange; suits upon choses in action payable to bearer and made by a corporation; and suits that might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment or transfer had been made.New Orleansv.Quinlan,173 U.S. 191.
The bill shows that at the time this suit was brought the Circuit Court had jurisdiction as between plaintiff and defendant, and also that the payees of these warrants might themselves then have instituted it, if there had been no assignment or transfer. We lay out of view as inapplicable the limitation on amount prescribed as to parties plaintiff by another clause with a different purpose.
But it is objected that the restriction relates to the time whenPage 44the paper was assigned, and not to the time of the commencement of the suit; and that if there were intermediate assignees jurisdiction in respect of them must appear, and does not appear on the face of this bill.
We are of opinion that the inquiry is to be determined as of the date when the suit is commenced. Jurisdiction vests then and cannot be divested by subsequent change of residence; but jurisdiction cannot be held to have vested prior to action brought. There have been many decisions to this effect, the same question being presented under all the acts from 1789.
InChamberlainv.Eckert, 2 Biss. 126, Judge Drummond held that the time of the commencement of the suit determined the question; and, among other things, said: "But if the rule contended for by the defendant is the true rule, then no change in the status of the payee, after the assignment, could ever enable a party to bring a suit, and it might happen, where the note was executed by the maker to the payee of another State, and at the time of the commencement of the suit in the Federal court, he was of the same State with the maker, the suit could be maintained by the assignee, a citizen of another State, because you have to look according to the view of the defence, to the status of the parties at the time that the assignor held the note. And if he ever could have prosecuted the suit, the assignee could prosecute it, although at the time when the suit is brought the payee and maker are citizens of the same State. That would be the necessary consequence, and the question recurs, what does the language of the statute mean, `unless the suit might have been prosecuted in said court, if no assignment had been made?' I think it means at the time the suit was prosecuted, so that if it appears then that the assignor could have maintained the suit if no assignment had been made, the assignee being a citizen of another State, can maintain the suit." And seeThaxterv.Hatch, 6 McLean, 68.
InWhitev.Leahy, 3 Dillon, 378, the same conclusion was announced by Judge Dillon. The suit was a bill to foreclose brought in the Circuit Court for the District of Kansas by plaintiff, a citizen of Missouri, as the assignee of a note and mortgage. The maker and payee of the note were citizens of Kansas,Page 45and were such at the time the note and mortgage were made and the payee endorsed the note and assigned the mortgage, and delivered the same to plaintiff in Missouri. But at the time the suit was brought the payee was a citizen of Texas. Judge Dillon said: "If no assignment of this note had been made, the assignor might, being at the time when suit was brought a citizen of Texas, have then commenced it; and under the statute his assignee has the same right. If the restriction on the assignee does not exist at the time suit is commenced, the court has jurisdiction if the case involves the requisite amount and is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State."
The same ruling was made by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit inJonesv.Shapera, 57 F. 457, and the foregoing and other cases were cited. See alsoPortage WaterCompanyv.Portage, 102 F. 769.
InMilledollarv.Bell, 2 Wall. Jr. 334, which was a bill to foreclose, complainant, the mortgagee, was a citizen of New York, and defendant was a citizen of New Jersey, but there had been intermediate assignments. Mr. Justice Grier said: "The complainant's case is therefore within the strict letter of the law — nor can we discover anything in the spirit, equity or policy of the act, or in adjudged cases, which would compel us to give it a construction such as the defendant asks. The statute does not take from the assignee of a chose in action his right to sue in the courts of the United States,unless his immediateassignorcould have sustained such action; but only in case the court could have had no jurisdiction as between the original parties to the instrument,if no assignment had been made. The situation or rights of temporary intermediate assignees, holders, or endorsers enters not into the conditions of the case."Wilsonv.Fisher, Bald. 133, was approved. There a citizen of New York had obtained a judgment against a citizen of Pennsylvania in the Supreme Court of that State. The judgment was assigned to citizens of Pennsylvania, and subsequently to complainant, who was an alien, and jurisdiction was sustained; Hopkinson, J., saying: "The suit cannot be maintainedPage 46here unless it might have been prosecuted here, if no assignment had been made; that is, as we understand it, if it had remained with the original parties to the transaction, contract or cause of action. The law does not declare that no assignee shall prosecute his suit in this court unless his assignor might have done so; but, unless a recovery of the right claimed might have been had in this court if no assignment of it had been made; and of course in every case in which a recovery might have been prosecuted in the courts of the United States if no assignment had been made, it may be so prosecuted after such assignment to a party competent to sue here."
InKirkmanv.Hamilton, 6 Pet. 20, where the payees of a note and the makers thereof were citizens of Tennessee, and before the note became due the payees became citizens of Alabama and endorsed it to a citizen of Alabama, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court for the Western District of Tennessee of a suit brought by the holder of the note was upheld because the payees could have prosecuted a suit to recover the contents of the note in that court if no assignment had been made. But it is to be observed that the payees were not only citizens of Alabama when the suit was commenced, but when the note was assigned.
InMollan et al. v.Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537, the declaration contained two counts. The first was against the defendant, Torrance, as endorser of a promissory note made by Spencer and Dunn, payable to Sylvester Dunn, and endorsed by him to Torrance, by whom it was endorsed to Lowrie, and by him to plaintiffs. The other count was for money had and received by Torrance to plaintiffs' use. The declaration stated plaintiffs to be citizens of New York, and defendant to be a citizen of Mississippi, but was silent "respecting the citizenship or residence of Lowrie, the immediate endorsee of Torrance, through whom the plaintiffs trace their title to the money for which the suit is instituted."
The ruling inYoungv.Bryan, 6 Wheat. 146, "that an endorsee who resides in a different State, may sue his immediate endorser, residing in the State in which the suit is brought, although that endorser be a resident of the same State with thePage 47maker of the note," was affirmed, but it was pointed out that: ""In this case the suit is brought against a remote endorser, and the plaintiffs, in their declaration, trace their title through an intermediate endorser, without showing that this intermediate endorser could have sustained his action against the defendant in the courts of the United States. The case ofTurnerv.Bank ofNorth America, 4 Dallas, 8, has decided that this count does not give the court jurisdiction. But the count for money had and received to the use of the plaintiffs being free from objection, it becomes necessary to look farther into the case." The record showed that defendant Torrance had filed a plea to the jurisdiction, in which he stated that the promises laid in the declaration were made to Lowrie, and not to plaintiffs, and that Lowrie and defendant were both citizens of the State of Mississippi. Plaintiffs demurred to this plea, the demurrer was sustained, and judgment rendered for defendant. The court overruled the plea because it averred that Lowrie and defendant were citizens of Mississippi at the time of the plea pleaded, not that they were citizens of the said State at the time the action was brought; and Chief Justice Marshall said: "It is quite clear that the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought, and that after vesting it cannot be ousted by subsequent events. Since, then, one of the counts shows jurisdiction, and the plea does not contain sufficient matter to deny that jurisdiction, we think that the judgment ought not to have been rendered on the demurrer in favor of the defendant." The judgment was reversed and the cause remanded.
That was a suit on the distinct contract between endorsee and endorser, but as plaintiff was not the immediate endorsee, and made title through Lowrie, who was, the court held that the first count should have shown the competency of the latter to invoke the jurisdiction at the time the suit was brought.
The general rule is that when a note or bill is endorsed in blank thebona fideholder of it may write an endorsement to himself or to another over the endorser's name, and where there are several endorsements in blank he may fill up the first one to himself or may deduce his title through all of them.Page 48Evansv.Gee, 11 Pet. 80; 1 Daniel Neg. Inst. (4th ed.) §§ 693, 694, 694a.
However, this bill does not trace title through any intermediate assignee, and on the contrary does so directly from the original payees. It is true that there are averments that in a proceeding by one Goldstein, still pending and undisposed of in the Circuit Court, against other parties than the city of New Orleans, these claims, "now held" by complainant, were presented and proved, the master's report thereon being referred to but not set out; and also that in a suit by one Benjamin and certain intervenors brought against the city of New Orleans in the Circuit Court, and subsequently dismissed without prejudice, these claims, "since acquired and now held and owned by" complainant, were included; and while this shows that these warrants must have passed through the hands of others than complainant, it does not appear that there was any endorsement of them other than in blank, and on the bill as framed complainant distinctly appears to be assignee of the payees. What complications may emerge hereafter in respect of the prior cases, or either of them, need not be considered.
We answer the first question by saying that on the face of the bill the Circuit Court had jurisdiction on the ground of diverse citizenship.It will be so certified.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY did not hear the argument and took no part in the decision.Page 49