Opinion · Orlaw Oregon
CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE GROWTH v. CITY OF SEASIDE, 116 Or. App. 275 (1993)
840 P.2d 1370
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Orlaw Oregon
- Jurisdiction
- Orlaw
- Date
- 1993-03-23
- Topic
- general
CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE GROWTH v. CITY OF SEASIDE, 116 Or. App. 275 (1993) 840 P.2d 1370 CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE GROWTH, Wayne Poole, Barbara Stephens, Bob Poole,Shirley Loutzenhiser, Teresa Taylor, Kay Duncan, Aurora Jones, Paul Jones,Kathleen Wysong, Peter Ter Har, Jeff Ter Har, Dave Langlo, Miriam Huntsman,Helen Gaston, Ralph Winsor and Olive Blumenshein, Petitioners, v. CITY OFSEASIDE, Respondent, and CENTERS WEST DEVELOPMENT CO., Intervenor— Respondent. 91-194; CA A74654Oregon Court of Appeals.Submitted on petitioners' petition for reconsideration filed August 18, 1992 Reconsideration allowed; decision (114 Or. App. 233, 832 P.2d 1279)withdrawn; reversed and remanded November 12, 1992Reconsideration denied February 10, 1993Petition for review denied March 23, 1993(315 Or. 643) Judicial Review from Land Use Board of Appeals.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE GROWTH v. CITY OF SEASIDE, 116 Or. App. 275 (1993). The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
Argued and submitted June 10, 1992.
Lawrence R. Derr, Portland, appearedcontrafor intervenor — respondent.
Reconsideration allowed; decision withdrawn; reversed and remanded.Page 277
Petitioners first argue that LUBA erred by concluding that city's comprehensive plan policies 5.12 and 5.16 were not applicable as approval standards for the permit application. They contend that that conclusion was contrary to city's interpretation of the policies, which petitioners maintain did treat the two provisions as approval standards. Therefore, petitioners conclude, LUBA exceeded the permissible scope of its review of local interpretations of local land use legislation as recently defined inClark v. Jackson County,313 Or. 508,836 P.2d 710(1992).
Intervenor responds that city's findings do not address policy 5.12 and do not mention policy 5.16. Hence, in intervenor's view, city made no interpretation of the two provisions; therefore, it contends thatClark v. Jackson County, supra,has no bearing on the case.
There is a factual component to the question about which the appearing parties disagree. The record lends some support to both positions. Petitioners' bases for contending that city concluded that the plan policies were applicable and applied them are tenuous, but we are not prepared to say that the record conclusively refutes their argument as a matter of law. This court does not make factual determinations in reviewing land use cases. Therefore, we remand to LUBA to make any necessary factual determinations and to resolve, in the first instance, any questions of law that are relevant to the disposition of the appeal to it in the light of those facts.See Dept. of LandConservation v. Coos County,115 Or. App. 145,Page 278838 P.2d 1080(1992). We emphasize that our summaries of the parties' arguments imply no view about the correctness of the legal conclusions that they draw from their various versions of the facts.1We also do not imply that LUBA may not remand the case to city to make appropriate factual or legal determination.Larson v. Wallowa County,116 Or. App. 96,840 P.2d 1350(1992).
Petitioners make a number of arguments pertaining to issues other than the one that we have addressed. We reject those arguments without discussion.
Reconsideration allowed; decision withdrawn; reversed and remanded.Page 279
- Petitioners argue thatClark v. Jackson County, supra,established a new standard of LUBA and judicial review of local interpretations of local land use legislation that is far narrower than the standard articulated in earlier Supreme Court and Court of Appeals decisions relating to the same issue. Petitioners note that the court did that inClarkwithout any mention or discussion of those earlier contrary decisions. InCope v. City of Cannon Beach,115 Or. App. 11,836 P.2d 775(1992), we analyzedClarkand made that same point, among others.
Petitioners add that the Supreme Court should review this case, because doing so would provide it with "an opportunity * * * to reconcile, distinguish or overrule" the relevant precedent that it failed to address inClark.That is up to the Supreme Court, of course, and petitioners remain free to pursue that court's review. ORAP 9.15(5). For purposes of reconsideration, we are bound byClark. ↩