Opinion · Oregon Supreme Court
Sun Dial Ranch v. May Land Co.
Sun Dial Ranch v. May Land Co., 61 Or. 205 (Or. 1912)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Oregon Supreme Court
- Jurisdiction
- Oregon
- Date
- 1912-01-02
- Topic
- general
How later courts describe this case
- the margin of the bed of a river which lies between high and low water mark is called the "beach" or "shore"
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Sun Dial Ranch v. May Land Co.. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
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delivered the opinion of the court.
At the conclusion of plaintiff’s testimony, defendant moved for a nonsuit, and assigns as error the judgment of the court in overruling the same, contending upon this appeal: (1) That the findings of facts made by the trial court were not supported by any evidence; (2) that the findings of facts do not support the decree.
The Sandy River branches a short distance above its month; the western fork thereof forming the Little Sandy River. These, with the Columbia into which they flow, embrace an island of about 447 acres, and several small islands south of the Greenleaf line. For several years there has been a bar, opposite the large island in the Columbia, the area and elevation of which has been increased to a large extent by the alluvion brought down by the Sandy River and augmented by that washed by the waters of the Columbia. This bar is about 1,000 feet across from north to south at the widest part, tapering toward the mouth of the Little Sandy River, and being narrower and of very irregular shape at the outlet of the Sandy. This bar, with some other small strips, constitute the basis of the controversy in this case. High water, which at times covers the bar and many low lands in the vicinity, is chiefly
The evidence tends to show that this tract, which is referred to in the testimony as a bar, has, since 1882, been nearly the same elevation, except for slight rises and falls. For years steamboats have endeavored to avoid this barrier. Along the Greenleaf line for the greatest part of the distance, there is a bank clearly outlined 10 or 12 feet high with distinct water marks on it, with vegetation above, and sand and gravel below, except for small deposits caused by back water in a few places. This formation could not possibly grow vegetation. The annual recurring spring rises of the
The various estimates of the time the bar is covered with water are from four weeks to six months, and perhaps eight months of the year. Mr. R. S. Greenleaf, who surveyed the tract in 1907, indicates that along his line of survey the bank on one island is nearly vertical, on another, oval; that of the large island gently sloping, being 50 or 60 feet horizontally, the line running with the vegetation at an elevation of about nine feet. The large island is at an elevation of 25 feet above zero. There is a fall of six feet from the foot of the bank to the water’s edge. A rise of five feet of water would cover the north half of the bar, and four feet more would cover the balance. There is a movement of gravel on the bar every year, and out beyond the four-foot line it is mostly quicksand which is unstable like the water itself and changes with every flood. Other witnesses state that the bar is used for pasture; that it has a willow growth, and is like the land up the river for three or four miles; that there is more vegetation on the island than on the bar; that it is not affected by the waters of the Sandy River, and estimate that other bottom land near is lower. Mr. Philo Plolbrook, county surveyor, states that his line is one foot above water and in some places higher; that there are about 75 acres of land not taken in by his survey, which was made January 18, 1907; that he estimates his line to be six or seven feet above zero. The trial judge visited the locus in quo, and made an investigation in October, 1908, before taking the testi
Counsel for plaintiff and defendant are in accord in their statements that the ordinary high-water mark on the Columbia River is the line of demarcation between the land which should be measured and the bed of the river. We need only to state the rules of law, as enunciated by this court and others, as the controversy in this case is largely as to the application of principles already adjudicated.
1. Mr. Farnham, in his valuable work on Waters and Water Rights, digest the definitions of high-water mark given in several cases as follows:
“With reference to rivers which are not affected by the tide, the meaning of the term is somewhat more difficult to determine. But the definition which best meets all requirements of the case and which has in effect been adopted by the weight of authority is that “high-water mark” is the point below which the presence and action of the water are so common and usual and so long continued in all ordinary years as to mark upon the soil a character distinct from that of the banks with respect to vegetation as well as with respect to the soil itself. This definition applies both to navigable and to nonnavigable streams. 2 Farnham’s Waters and Water Rights, § 417.
Mr. Justice Thayer in Johnson v. Knott, 13 Or. 308, 310 (10 Pac. 418, 420), said: “The only matter to be decided in such a case is the location of the line indicating high-water mark, and that involves a discrimination between the upland and the bank proper of the stream. The banks of a river serve, of course, to hold its waters within its bed, and the point to which the ' water usually rises, in an ordinary season of high water, I would regard as high-water mark, and that it constituted the
“A fresh water river, like a tidal river, is composed of the alveus, or bed, and the water; but it has banks instead of shores. The banks are the elevations of land which confine the waters in their natural channel when they rise the highest, and do not overflow the banks.” Gould, Waters § 45.
In the case of Land in New Orleans, Called the Batture, 17 Amer. State Papers, p. 91,- there is deduced from the many authorities noted the conclusion said to be most rigorously exact.
“That all is river, or river’s bed, which is contained between the two banks, and the high-water line on them; and all is bank which embraces the waters in their ordinary full tide.”
This most valuable state paper contains further information to the effect that in the Roman or civil law the channel or hollow containing the river was distinguished as the bed and the bank, the river itself being water; thus alveus, aqua et ripa, the bed, water, and bank. All above high-water mark the Roman law considered as “ripa,” bank, and all below as “alveus,” or bed.
2. This distinction appears iif the English law, with this addition, that the bank or margin of the bed of the river, which lies between the high and low-water marks, is called the “beach” or “shore.” There is a difference-
3. The bank may be rightly defined as that line or ridge of earth which contains the river, holding the natural direction of its course. But if at any time, either from rains or other cause, it has overflowed for a time that line, it does not by such overflow change its banks, for the reason that the overflow is for a time only, while the natural flow is more or less constant. Houck, Rivers, § '8.
4. In 1 Words & Phrases, p. 99, we find this definition:
“Accretion is the imperceptible accumulation of land by natural causes, and the owner of the property to which the addition is made becomes the owner of such ground, as where land is bounded by a stream of water which changes its course gradually by alluvial formation, the owner of the land still holds the same boundary, including the accumulated soil” — citing Inhabitants of New Orleans v. U. S., 10 Pet. 662, 717 (9 L. Ed. 573).
5. It. is the law, as settled in this State, that, where a stream is intended to be meandered by public surveys, the stream, and not the actual meander line as run on the ground, is the true boundary of the riparian owner. Johnson v. Tomlinson, 41 Or. 198, 200 (68 Pac. 406), citing Minto v. Delaney, 7 Or. 337; Weiss v. Oregon Iron & Steel Co., 13 Or. 496 (11 Pac. 255) ; French Live Stock Co. v. Springer, 35 Or. 312 (58 Pac. 102). See, also, Bowlby v. Shively, 22 Or. 410 (30 Pac. 154), and Taylor
6. It is contended by counsel for defendant that the court was controlled solely by the question of vegetation in ascertaining the high-water mark or the line of demarcation between the land sold. But from the testimony as well as from the findings themselves we are unable to agree with counsel as to this claim. From the evidence, a portion of which has been set forth, the trial court evidently took into consideration, and in eifect found: (1) That this bar is under water from two to four months; (2) that it is barren sand and gravel by reason thereof; (3) that it is wholly devoid of vegetation; (4) that it is from two to nine feet above low-water mark; (5) that it is a permanent bar consisting ■for the most part of hard, firm sand and gravel, varying slightly from year to year in its general outline, but the surface thereof changes with the recurring periods of overflow, by the erosion of the surface and the depos
7. The action was tried by the court without a jury, and we can only examine the testimony to ascertain whether or not there was any competent evidence tending to support the findings made by the trial judge. Salem Traction Co. v. Anson, 41 Or. 562, 570 (69 Pac. 675) ; Glenn v. Dorsheimer, 51 Fed. 404 (2 C. C. A. 309). The trial court reached the conclusion that the bar in question was below the high-water mark, and that it was not raised, by the deposit of alluvion, to the dignity of being an accretion to the mainland. We think there was competent evidence to support the findings, and that they should not be disturbed.
8. Were we to try the case de novo, we should be compelled to remember that the trial court had a peculiar advantage in inspecting the premises at two different seasons of the year, and, as held in Montgomery v. Shaver, 40 Or. 244 (66 Pac. 923), this would lend a
“Was it that character of land which by action of the water so permanently remaining upon it, when it reaches its high-water mark, would be deprived of its usefulness as land, and become simply what we all know to be the bed of a river?”
Was answered by the trial court in the case at bar to the effect that the tract was so deprived of its usefulness as land, and was a part of the bed of the river. There was no error in overruling the motion for a nonsuit; and we cannot say that the lower court abused its discretion in denying the application for a new trial.
9. It is suggested by counsel for defendant that, before plaintiff can recover on the warranty in its deed, there must be an eviction from the premises by the true owner, or the title must at least be brought in question by the true owner. This action, however, is based upon a contract set forth above, by which the parties stipulate as to the conditions upon which the defendant will make payment to plaintiff, and the latter asserts that these conditions have been fulfilled. The primary question which was determined by the trial court, according to these stipulations, was the number of acres of land conveyed by defendant to plaintiff. We think the complaint states a cause of action.
It follows from these considerations that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed, and it is ordered.
Affirmed: Rehearing Denied.