Opinion · Oregon Supreme Court
Liggett v. Ladd
Liggett v. Ladd, 17 Or. 89 (Or. 1888)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Oregon Supreme Court
- Jurisdiction
- Oregon
- Date
- 1888-11-22
- Topic
- general
Thayer, C. J. The appellants as plaintiffs brought suit against W. S. Ladd and others, regents of the State Agricultural College of the state of Oregon, under the act of February 11, 1885, and the Corvallis College, alleging in their complaint the following facts: That they were members in good standing of the Methodist Episcopal Church South, of the state of Oregon, and brought the suit for themselves, as members of said church, and for other members thereof, in the state; that said church was an unincorporated religious association, embracing in its membership a large number of persons in various parts of the state, with societies, churches, and ministers devoted to the support and spread of the Christian religion; that the Corvallis College was an educational institution located at Corvallis, Oregon, and duly incorporated under the laws of the.state, and the other defendants were persons claiming to be and assuming to act as the' board of regents of the State Agricultural College of the state of Oregon; that said Corvallis College was duly incorporated under the laws of the state on the twenty-second day of August, 1868, by certain persons or trustees; that by the second article of the articles of incorporation of said college, it'is provided as follows: “The object of *913 incorporation is to acquire and hold property in t* 3t for the Methodist Episcopal Church South in the sta«,e of Oregon, and to endow, build up, and maintain an institution for educational purposes, and…
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed Liggett v. Ladd. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 14 opinions
The appellants as plaintiffs brought suit against W. S. Ladd and others, regents of the State Agricultural College of the state of Oregon, under the act of February 11, 1885, and the Corvallis College, alleging in their complaint the following facts: That they were members in good standing of the Methodist Episcopal Church South, of the state of Oregon, and brought the suit for themselves, as members of said church, and for other members thereof, in the state; that said church was an unincorporated religious association, embracing in its membership a large number of persons in various parts of the state, with societies, churches, and ministers devoted to the support and spread of the Christian religion; that the Corvallis College was an educational institution located at Corvallis, Oregon, and duly incorporated under the laws of the.state, and the other defendants were persons claiming to be and assuming to act as the' board of regents of the State Agricultural College of the state of Oregon; that said Corvallis College was duly incorporated under the laws of the state on the twenty-second day of August, 1868, by certain persons or trustees; that by the second article of the articles of incorporation of said college, it'is provided as follows: “The object of
It was alleged in the complaint that said regents, at the time said deed was so executed to them, were not and never have been a lawful or corporate body, or had had capacity to take or hold the property described in the deed; that the Corvallis College received and held the property in trust for the appellants and the other members of the said church; and that the said resolution and the said deed Were in violation of said trust, and contrary to the known and expressed will of said church, and, if held valid, will work irreparable injury to said college as the Agricultural College of the state, and will weaken the influence and power of said church for educational and religious purposes; that the persons named as defendants in the complaint belonged to the board of regents as constituted under said act of 1885; that they denied the alleged
The relief demanded in the complaint was, that the said deed last' referred to be set aside. To this complaint the respondents, Ladd and others, interposed a demurrer, upon several grounds, among which were, that the appellants had no right to bring the suit, and that the Methodist Episcopal Church South had no interest in the subject-matter of the suit. The circuit court sustained the demurrer on both of these grounds, and from the decree entered thereon this appeal was taken.
Whether the appellants had a right to bring the suit depends upon the question of their having an interest in the subject-matter of it, cognizable in equity. They could maintain such an interest in no other way than by a suit in the form of the one brought. The right which the appellants claimed had been violated belonged to them as members of a particular association, but as the association was not incorporated, it could not sue, and the various members comprising it were evidently so numerous that it would have been impracticable to bring them all before the court in one suit. The law, in such cases, permits one or more to sue or defend for the benefit of the whole. (Code, sec. 385.)
It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider any other question in the case than the one appertaining to the rights of the appellants as members of the said religious association. The right of mankind to believe and teach such doctrines regarding religion as meet the approval of their consciences is recognized under our form of government as inherent; it is freely accorded to every sect
Mere voluntary associations, however, cannot take the title to real property in their society name, as they are not in law regarded persons, but it may be held for their use and benefit by trustees, and their right to the enjoyment of the property be secured in that way. Such trustees, as I view it, may be artificial persons as well as natural ones. If this is correct, then, while the Methodist Episcopal Church South could not, in consequence of its being unincorporated, take the legal title to real property, yet it could secure the benefit of the property by having the legal title to it conveyed to a corporation for its use.
Such is the course which seems to have been pursued by the church in the establishment of a literary institution at Corvallis. It caused the formation of a corporation known as the “ Corvallis College,” and a provision to be inserted in its charter that the object of the incorporation was to acquire and hold property in. trust for the Methodist Episcopal Church South in the state of Oregon. It also, in order to secure a faithful execution of the trust, caused a further provision to he inserted therein to the effect that the trustees of the college should he appointed by its conference.
By the incorporation of the college, it became a distinct legal entity; yet it was the mere offspring of the church, — • an instrument employed by the latter “ to endow, build
Counsel for the respondents have attempted to show that the college held the Roberts property independently of the church. They claim that an express trust was impressed upon the property by the said deed; that it was devoted by that instrument to the use and purpose of the Agricultural College of the state of Oregon, and that the church could not divert it to a different purpose or exercise control over it in any manner.
It will be observed that, prior to the time of the execution of the deed to the property, the legislative assembly passed the act designating and permanently adopting the Corvallis College as the Agricultural College of the state, subject to its'acceptance of the provisions of the act, and that it had duly accepted them.
The question then arises as to the extent of power and control which the state acquired over the college by that act and its acceptance, and what authority of the church over it was thereby relinquished. . Making the Corvallis College the Agricultural College .of the state was not an arbitrary act of sovereignty on the part of the state. The legislature had no .power to compel the Corvallis College
Viewed in this light, I do not see how the state acquired any interest in or control over the property in question through. the arrangement between. it and the college, as set out in the complaint; or how the said chufch could, have been deprived of any of its rights' in. the property held in the name of the college in consequence thereof There is no stipulation shown or intimated entitling the state to control the property conveyed to the college, nor that it should not be held in trust for the church, as provided in the charter of the college.
The claim of the respondent’s counsel that the title to the property was taken in the name of the Corvallis College for the uses and purposes of the. State Agricultural College cannot be maintained. It was deeded to the Corvallis College in consideration of four thousand five hundred dollars, and the only clause in the deed which limits
This clause created a conditional limitation. The college, at the time the deed was executed, had been designated, as has already been mentioned, the “Agricultural College of the state”; and it is very apparent from the circumstances of the transaction that the founders and patrons of the college, who doubtless were instrumental in procuring for it the distinction referred to, bought the said lands from Roberts, and had the said deed, with the condition therein contained, executed for the benefit of the Corvallis College, and for their own benefit. The condition is in favor of those who contributed the purchase-money; no other person can, take advantage of it; and the premises were given to the Corvallis College, sub-' jeet to the condition to enable it to carry out its compact with the state. It was the latter institution which was to use the premises; it had agreed with the state, in effect, that it would add another branch to its course of instruction, and - that its leading object should be “to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts,” and it needed the premises for an agricultural farm.
The deed itself created no trust that I can discover; it did not vest the title to the land in the college, to hold for the use of any other institution or person, although it required the grantee to use it for the purposes mentioned. How a
But I do not see that it is necessary for the state to found a college in order to secure such benefit. It appears to me that it would be sufficient, to entitle the state to the benefit of the act, to endow, support, and maintain, so far as the income of the fund will permit, an existing college to cárry out the object indicated, and that it would matter not whether it was called the Agricultural College of the state or was known by some other name. The Agricultural College fund is undoubtedly a trust fund in the hands of the state, and if the state were to endow a college out of it, in compliance with the provisions of said act of Congress, it would unquestionably be entitled to exercise visitorial powers over the college; but it would have no authority to interfere with the charter of the institution!
The old case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, settled that question; besides, private corporations, by our constitution, can only be formed under general laws. If the theory of the respondent’s counsel is correct, that Roberts and wife conveyed the said land in trust for some one, I am unable to discover who the cestui que trust could have been; nor do I think that any trust, as claimed, is indicated in the deed of conveyances.
As I view the matter, there was no such institution as the Agricultural College, except in name. The appellants allege in the complaint that the Corvallis College became the Agricultural College of the state; they probably thought so from the fact that the legislative assembly, by an act approved October 21, 1870, so declared; but it does not appear that any such institution was ever organized, and the legislative assembly has no power by its fiat to transform one corporate institution of that character into another. It cannot create a corporation by direct enactment, except for municipal purposes (Const., art. 2, sec. 2), although it may provide, by a general law, for organization of such a corporation. I apprehend that it will be discovered, upon close inspection, that the “Agricultural College of the state of Oregon ” has only an ideal existence. When the Corvallis College was organized into a corporation, the name it assumed, and by which it- was to be known, was specified in its articles of incorporation; ■and the legislature had no power to change it, or to merge the corporation into another organization, either real or imaginary.
This view did not affect the relations between the Corvallis College and the state, nor question the former being such-a college as is required by said act of Congress; it merely regards its legal status.
I am aware that the church has no tangible or real interest in the land; that it cannot divert it from the use specified in the deed, or- derive any direct pecuniary benefit from it whatever; nor that its right to appoint trustees to manage and control it is of any immediate advantage; but it .is, nevertheless, entitled to exercise such right, and the legislature has no power to deprive it of its authority in that particular. It belongs to that character of rights wbich courts of equity are required to defend against
In arriving at this conclusion, I am not consoled Dytne reflection that the view expressed will promote the best interests of the public. I think it would be far better for the community if the Corvallis College, in its present condition of affairs, were under the exclusive control of the state. But if this court were to hold, under the facts of the case, that the interest of the Methodist Episcopal Church South in that institution, and authority over it, as provided by its charter, were cut .off by the legislation referred to, or that the said deed from Roberts and wife created a trust in favor of any other party than the said church,it would, I am constrained to believe, overturn well-settled principles of law, and tend to establish a pernicious and dangerous precedent. ■ If counsel for the respondents are able to show that the conclusions arrived at are erroneous, we trust they will do so in a petition for a rehearing, and we will gladly correct them. According to the view herein expressed, the decree appealed from must be reversed, and the case remanded to the circuit court, with directions to overrule the said demurrer, and for such further proceedings as that court may deem proper.