Opinion · Wilaw Wisconsin

DOSTAL v. MAGEE, 273 Wis. 228 (1956)

DOSTAL, by Guardian ad litem, & another, Appellants, v. MAGEE,Respondent., 77 N.W.2d 604 (Wis. 1956)

Type
Opinion
Court
Wilaw Wisconsin
Jurisdiction
Wilaw
Date
1956-06-05
Topic
general

DOSTAL v. MAGEE, 273 Wis. 228 (1956) 77 N.W.2d 604 DOSTAL, by Guardian ad litem, and another, Appellants, vs. MAGEE,Respondent.Supreme Court of Wisconsin.May 3, 1956 — June 5, 1956. APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Pierce county: KENNETH S. WHITE, Circuit judge.

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed DOSTAL v. MAGEE, 273 Wis. 228 (1956). The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

DOSTAL v. MAGEE,273 Wis. 228(1956)
77 N.W.2d 604
DOSTAL, by Guardianad litem, and another, Appellants, vs. MAGEE,
Respondent.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
May 3, 1956 —
June 5, 1956.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Pierce county: KENNETH S. WHITE, Circuit judge.Affirmed.
This action, commenced on May 7, 1955, arises out of the same accident as was involved inDostal v. Magee, reported in272 Wis. 509,76 N.W.2d 349. Defendant in this action is the father of John F. Magee, the individual defendant named in the prior action. This action against the father is based upon the theory set forth in the following allegations of the complaint:Page 229

"On information and belief for a long period of time prior to May 6, 1953, John F. Magee had habitually driven automobiles on the highways of the state of Wisconsin at a high and dangerous rate of speed and in a reckless manner, without regard to the safety of other person's on the highway. By reason of this recklessness, on May 6, 1953, John F. Magee was unfit to operate a motor vehicle on the highway of the state of Wisconsin. Irwin Magee knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of John F. Magee's recklessness in the operation of a motor vehicle. Irwin Magee was negligent in permitting John Magee to drive his 1953 Mercury automobile on the night of May 6, 1953."

The accident occurred on May 6, 1953. On May 4, 1955, John Doar, one of plaintiffs' attorneys, went to Ellsworth, Wisconsin, from which place defendant appears to have operated some of his business, for the purpose of serving upon him notices of injury pursuant to the provisions of sec. 330.19(5), Stats. He was informed that defendant had left unexpectedly on May 2d for Chicago and that he was expected to return on May 5th. Doar then went to defendant's home at Prescott, Wisconsin, for the purpose of attempting to serve the notices upon the wife of the defendant. He found no one at home. On the same day, May 4, 1955, and after his unsuccessful effort to serve the notices, Doar delivered them to the sheriff of Pierce county with instructions to serve them upon defendant. The sheriff was unable to find him or to obtain information as to his whereabouts.

On May 5, 1955, W. T. Doar, Jr., another of plaintiffs' attorneys, filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court for Pierce county notice of injury and a summons and complaint. On the same day a copy of the summons and complaint was also delivered to the sheriff for service upon defendant. A search for the defendant was continued on that day by both W. T. Doar, Jr., and the sheriff. They were unsuccessful. The effort was continued on May 6th without SUCCESS. The notices of injury and the summons and complaintPage 230were finally served on defendant on May 7, 1955, at his home in Prescott, Wisconsin.

The defendant answered and, among other things, set up the defense that neither the notices nor the summons and complaint were served upon him within two years of the happening of the accident. Upon that ground he moved for summary judgment, which was granted on November 28, 1955. Plaintiffs appeal.
For the appellants there was a brief byDoar Knowlesof New Richmond, and oral argument byJohn Doar.

For the respondent there was a brief byGwin Petersenof Hudson, and oral argument byWendell A. Petersen.
GEHL, J.
The plaintiffs concede frankly that our conclusion inMartin v. Lindner(1950),258 Wis. 29,44 N.W.2d 558, is against them. They contend, however, that in some of our recent cases we have displayed a tendency to construe the provisions of sec. 330.19(5), Stats., quite liberally in favor of claimants and suggest that we continue on that course and thereby find a means of accommodating them. They contend that sec. 330.40 should be read in connection with the provisions of sec. 330.19(5), and that such reading when applied to the circumstances of this case will compel the conclusion that the service was timely.

Sec. 330.19(5), Stats., provides that:

"No action to recover damages for an injury to the person shall be maintained unless, within two years after the happening of the event causing such damages, notice in writing, . . . shall be served upon the person or corporation by whom it is claimed such damage was caused, . . . [here follows a statement of the required contents of the notice]. Such notice shall be given in the manner required for the service of summons in courts of record. . . . When an action shall be brought and a complaintactually servedwithin two years after the happening of the event causing such damages, the notice herein provided for need not be served." (Italics ours.)Page 231

Sec. 330.40, Stats., provides as follows:

"ATTEMPT TO COMMENCE ACTION. An attempt to commence an action shall be deemed equivalent to the commencement thereof, within the meaning of any provision of law which limits the time for the commencement of an action, when the summons is delivered, with the intent that it shall be actually served, to the sheriff or other proper officer of the county in which the defendants or one of them usually or last resided; . . . But such an attempt must be followed by the first publication of the summons or the service thereof within sixty days. . . ."

Neither of the statutes has been amended in any respect material to the issue here presented since the decision inMartin v. Lindner, supra.

The provisions of sec. 330.40, Stats., have reference only to the requirements of the law which limit the time for the commencement of an action, and the statute contains nothing which would indicate that the legislature intended that by its provisions those of sec. 330.19(5) should be affected. Those of sec. 330.19(5) require more than that an action be commenced to excuse the failure to give notice; they require in plain language that if the failure is to be excused the complaint must beactually servedwithin the two-year period.

Such was the holding inMartin v. Lindner, supra, by which we consider ourselves bound. Counsel for plaintiffs call attention to the fact that sec. 330.40, Stats., was not referred to in the court's opinion. That is true, but that it was considered by the court must be assumed; it was referred to and discussed in each of the briefs presented.

It may be conceded that in some cases there are circumstances which would call for the application of a rule less technical than that which is of necessity applied here. But the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, the ruling inMartin v. Lindner, supra, and the omission of the legislature since the announcement of the decision in that case to amend the statute leave for us no alternative but toPage 232affirm the judgment of the court below. To do otherwise would be to legislate by judicial action.

Plaintiffs contend that to construe the statute as we do would be to render it unconstitutional and urge that we so hold. We may not consider it since the question was not raised in the court below.C. F. Trantow Co. v. IndustrialComm.(1952),262 Wis. 586,55 N.W.2d 884.By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.
CURRIE, J. (concurring).
The result in this case points up the need for legislative revision of sec. 330.19(5), Stats. While in the instant case the defendant Magee was only absent from the state, with whereabouts unknown, for the last few days of the two-year period available, a plaintiff, who has sustained personal injury through the negligence of a resident of this state, would be entirely remediless if such resident soon after the accident had left on a legitimate trip abroad which would have taken him out of the state for all of the remaining portion of the two-year period.

It would seem highly advisable that the legislature either provide that absence from the state by a resident should toll the two-year period for giving notice under sec. 330.19(5), Stats., or better yet, that service of such notice be permitted to be made by registered mail addressed to the last-known address of the party whose negligence caused the injury. If such service by registered mail were authorized by legislation, not only would the problem be equitably solved of serving on an absent resident, but also a more practical means would be provided for obtaining service on nonresidents, thus preventing such a result as occurred inOldenburg v.Hartford Accident Indemnity Co.(1954),266 Wis. 68,62 N.W.2d 574.Page 233