IN RE M.S., 239 Ill. App.3d 938 (1992)

"under [section 3-8-7 of] the Unified Code of Corrections [(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 1003-8-7)] * * *, the legislature has provided for specific disciplinary procedures, has afforded inmates or residents * * * basic due [process] protection before loss of good time can be imposed. And, * * * I believe thePage 942results of those procedures do purport verity, until and unless, at leastprima facieis overcome by some other showing."

"THE COURT: I believe that if I understand the State's theory here, * * * [the] effort expected of Mr. Williams towards correcting the conditions which led to removal of his children, progress towards their return of custody to him, included as a rather basic and fundamental step that he obtain his release from incarceration as soon as possible, and that if he failed to do that then the State will be arguing that was a failure to make reasonable efforts or failure to make reasonable progress. I believe once the Court allows resort to these records in [the State's exhibit], to establish that he failed to achieve and maintain all possible good time, and that he failed to achieve his earliest possible release from [DOC] the State has then been afforded the opportunity to prove all it validly can.

As I indicated earlier, I believe under the statutory provisions, this Court must presume that the action of the Department of Corrections was correct. I am not saying that's an irrebutable presumption, I am not saying it can't be overcome. I don't know. I don't have to deal with that right now. The point is, I don't think the State has to bring the people involved in the original incident which led to the discipline, I don't think you have to bring those [people] into court. But, I don't believe you can go further than that * * *."

"Meanwhile, [as Williams sits in prison due to a loss of good time, R.W.] is sitting in foster care. In [Williams'] position, there is nothing more important for him to do, as far as making progress, than to get out as soon as he can, to * * * put himself in a position where he can provide an environment for his child and parent his child. There is nothing more important for him to do while he's in the Department of Corrections than to get out as early as he can. We have a situation where Mr. Williams' projected out date, again, was July 3rd of last year. If he had earned his good time and made progress, he would have been out eight or nine months ago. As we stand now, it's going to be another year or fifteen months until he's even released. So again, that's my theory on him not making progress. And again, most of the loss of his good-time has come following his inclusion in client service plans and involvement with the court."

"In fact, there is only one thing to which the Court could hold [Williams] responsible in regard to making progress in this case, and that is, get out of the penitentiary. That's the only thing that could be expected of him under the facts of this case. So, the question is, in terms of requiring [him to] secure his release from [DOC], what is reasonable. * * * It would * * * be reasonable to say, all right, Mr. Williams, the first step to take towards the return of custody to you is get out of jail * * * in two years, or by July 3rd of 1990. It is within his control as to when he gets out. And, I believe that is a reasonable requirement, get out as soon as you can. Mr. Williams hasn't done so. And, in fact, he could not have more profoundly frustrated that step towards reunification with his son. * * *

One must bear in mind that Mr. Williams, at this point, has not [sic] been incarcerated in the penitentiary for better than a third of his son's life, and that percentage will be even greater when he is finally released. He could have been out July 3rd of 1990. He could have now been seven months towards the reunification of himself with his son. And, in fact, he may well have accomplished it by now, if he had simply obeyed the [DOC] rules * * *. He not only failed to do so, he failed to do so repeatedly, over and over and over again * * *. That's not reasonable. That's a failure to make reasonable progress. And, I don't believe it is reasonable or consistent with the legislative purpose underlying this provision, to require a child to wait four years in foster care when he only had to wait two.

For that reason, I believe that the State has proven Count I, and I find by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent father, Robert Williams, is an unfit parent by reason of having failed to make reasonable progress towards the return of the child to him within twelve months of the time the child was adjudged to be neglected."

"Illinois state prisoners have a statutory right to receive good time credits, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3, and such a state-created entitlement to good time credits is a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.Wolff v. McDonnell,418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Where a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of good time credits, due process requires that the inmate receive: (1) advance written notice of the claimed violation; (2) the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals; and (3) a written statement by the fact finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.Id.at 563-66, 94 S.Ct. 2978-79. In addition, the revocation of good time credit `does not comport with the minimumPage 948requirements of due process unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported bysome evidencein the record.'Superintendent,Mass. Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill,472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2773, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985) (citation omitted, emphasis added)."Hamilton,976 F.2d at 344-45.

"According to the facts set forth in the amended complaint and its attachments, the evidence before the Adjustment Committee was that six homemade weapons were found in Cell C-227 which was occupied by and under the control of [plaintiff] and his three cellmates. Thus, on the record before the Adjustment Committee, there was a 25% probability that [plaintiff] was the owner of the weapons. As the evidence inHill,this evidence `might be characterized as meager' and there is no direct evidence identifying one of the four cellmates as the owner of the contraband. 472 U.S. at 457, 105 S.Ct. at 2775. But given the 25% chance of guilt, `the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.'Id.Since the complaint (and its attachments) establish that the Adjustment Committee's decision was supported by some evidence, it fails to state a claim."Hamilton,976 F.2d at 346.

"On the record before the committee, the probability that the plaintiff had possessed one or more of these weapons cannot be reckoned as greater than one in eight, or 12.5 percent. That is not my idea of `some evidence,'Superintendentv. Hill,472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2773 (1985),unless purely collective guilt is deemedto satisfy due process — which in prisoncircumstances it might be, cf. Ustrak v. Fairman,781 F.2d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 1986), but the defendants do not defend thePage 949disciplinary committee's action on that ground." (Emphasis added.)Hamilton,976 F.2d at 347 (Posner, J., dissenting).

"While prisoners retain rights under the due process clause, this in no way implies that these rights are not subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully committed. There must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application. (Wolff v.McDonnell(1974),418 U.S. 539, 556, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975.)"