Opinion · Ohlaw Ohio
STATE EX REL. v. LYNDHURST, 168 Ohio St. 289 (1958)
STATE, EX REL. ASSOCIATED LAND Inv. CORP., APPELLEE v. CITY OFLYNDHURST ET AL., APPELLANTS., 154 N.E.2d 435 (Ohio 1958)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Ohlaw Ohio
- Jurisdiction
- Ohlaw
- Date
- 1958-11-26
- Topic
- general
STATE EX REL. v. LYNDHURST, 168 Ohio St. 289 (1958) 154 N.E.2d 435 THE STATE, EX REL. ASSOCIATED LAND INVESTMENT CORP., APPELLEE v. CITY OFLYNDHURST ET AL., APPELLANTS. No. 35492Supreme Court of Ohio.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed STATE EX REL. v. LYNDHURST, 168 Ohio St. 289 (1958). The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
STATE EX REL. v. LYNDHURST,168 Ohio St. 289(1958)
154 N.E.2d 435
THE STATE, EX REL. ASSOCIATED LAND INVESTMENT CORP., APPELLEE v. CITY OF
LYNDHURST ET AL., APPELLANTS.
No. 35492
Supreme Court of Ohio.
Decided November 26, 1958.
1. A determination by a legislative body of a municipal corporation that traffic conditions therein warrant the inclusion of provisions requiring off-street parking in a comprehensive zoning ordinance and the resultant passage of such ordinance constitute a proper exercise of municipal authority.
2. A provision in a comprehensive municipal zoning ordinance, which requires that buildings, other than dwellings, churches, theatres, assembly halls, retail stores and shops, thereafter erected or remodeled or altered shall have "parking space reasonably adequate for commercial vehicles necessary to carry on the business of the occupants of the premises and for the normal volume of car parking by persons coming to the premises on matters incidental to the uses thereof," does not contain sufficient criteria or standards to guide the administrative officer or tribunal in the exercise of the discretion vested in it and is unconstitutional and invalid. (Paragraph one of the syllabus inState, ex rel. Selected Properties, Inc., v.Gottfried,163 Ohio St. 469, approved and followed.)
This is an action in mandamus instituted originally in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County. The parties herein will be referred to as they appeared in that court.
The relator, Associated Land Investment Corporation, is an Ohio corporation. The respondent city of Lyndhurst is a municipal corporation located in Cuyahoga County, and respondent Walter L. Bookman is the building inspector of Lyndhurst.
The petition of the relator alleges that it is the owner of real estate located at 5470 Mayfield Road, Lyndhurst, having a frontage of 144.28 feet on Mayfield Road and 110 feet alongPage 290Sunview Road, which premises are improved with a one-story building and basement, approximately 69 feet by 35 feet, of brick construction.
The relator alleges that it filed an application with the respondent building inspector for a permit to add a second story to the building, submitting plans and specifications with the application; that the entire building, including both stories and basement, is to be used for offices; and that said property is located in a "local retail district" according to the zoning ordinance of the city.
The petition recites also that respondent building inspector denied the application on the ground that the proposed off-street parking facilities were not sufficient to comply with Section 1 (a)-(f), Article IV of such ordinance; that thereafter relator appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals of the city, which body recommended approval of the application so long as the employees and employers working on the premises in question do not exceed a total of 35; and that approval of the proposal of the Board of Zoning Appeals was denied by the council of the city of Lyndhurst.
Relator alleges that the off-street parking facilities proposed in its application provide spaces for 23 cars, which area would be in full compliance with Section 1 (a) 3, Article IV of the ordinance (which relates to surfaces, lighting and location of the areas); that the proposed addition and off-street parking facilities are in compliance with the zoning ordinance of the city of Lyndhurst, but, if it be determined that such off-street parking facilities are not in compliance with the ordinance, "the provisions of said zoning ordinance, and particularly Article IV, Section 1 (a)-(f) are vague, uncertain, discriminating and unreasonable; and that the standards and classifications with regard to off-street parking are arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory" and, as applied to the relator, deprive it of its property without due process of law.
The petition contains as an exhibit the full text of Section 1, Article IV of the zoning ordinance of the city of Lyndhurst.
A joint second amended answer was filed by respondents, the city of Lyndhurst and its building inspector, which admits that Article IV of the zoning ordinance is correctly set forth inPage 291the petition and pleads the applicable "administrative" provisions of the ordinance.
The answer says further that as proposed by the relator the office building would, when completed, consist of three full floors of office space; that the total inside floor area would be approximately 7,200 square feet, or 5,300 square feet exclusive of halls, stairs, utilities, lavatories and the like; that ordinances of the city prohibit all parking on Mayfield Road and on Sunview Road in the vicinity of the easterly side of such premises; that public transportation facilities to the location of the building are limited; that employees, as a general rule, come to their place of employment in automobiles; and that if the second floor is constructed, thereby making it possible to have three full floors of office space, such use would violate the zoning ordinance in the following respects:
"a. Said ordinance requires `at least one automobile per five persons engaged on the premises as employees and owners.' Allocating 60 square feet of usable floor area, exclusive of halls, stairs, lavatories, utilities and the like, for each person, which is reasonable for office buildings, said proposed building would accommodate in 5,300 square feet of usable floor area at least 88 employees. This would require 18 car parking spaces for employees.
"b. Said ordinance provides that in addition to the parking space for employees or owners engaged on the premises, additional car `parking space reasonably adequate for the commercial vehicles necessary to carry on the business of the occupants of the building,' shall be provided. The normal delivery vehicles and other vehicles necessary to service the building must be provided for, and for this purpose, two car parking spaces are required.
"c. Said zoning ordinance also provides that off-street parking shall be provided in addition `for the normal volume of car parking by persons coming to the premises on matters incidental to the uses thereof.' For such purpose, a minimum of 10 car parking spaces should be provided, based upon actual determination of cars used by persons presently coming to the premises on matters incidental to the uses thereof."
Respondents say further that the requirements of the zoningPage 292ordinance as set forth are a minimum of 30 automobiles, whereas the relator has provided parking for not more than 21 automobiles.
Respondents then deny all allegations in relator's petition. except where admitted, and pray the court for an order dismissing relator's petition.
Relator filed a demurrer to the amended answer, for the reason that "on its face it is insufficient in law because the zoning ordinance of respondent city is unconstitutional and void
The court found "that the demurrer of the relator is well with regard to Article IV, Sec. 1 (e)."
taken and that the second amended answer of the respondent, filed by agreement of the parties, does not state a sufficient defense to the petition." The court granted the writ of mandamus, and, the respondents electing not to plead further, a final writ of mandamus was granted and judgment entered.
A third amended answer was filed by the respondents under the provisions of Section2309.58, Revised Code, which added to the record of the cause the full text of the zoning ordinance.
The cause is before this court on appeal as a matter of right.
The zoning ordinance confers upon the building inspectorPage 293the duty of administering and enforcing its provisions and provides for an appeal from his decision to the Board of Zoning Appeals. The pleadings establish that such procedure was followed in this case.
Section 5 (d) 2 of Article V, dealing with variances and which is cited and quoted in part in respondents' brief, gives the board power to modify in certain applications. The last sentence of that paragraph reads:
"Such variance or modification shall be confirmed by resolution of the council of the village before becoming effective."
The applicability of this provision to the instant facts is doubtful but, for the purpose of this opinion, it is assumed.
It may be noted further that Section 5 (d) 6 of Article V, which establishes the procedure before the Board of Zoning Appeals, contains a subparagraph which concludes: "such decisions shall be confirmed by the council of the village before becoming effective."
It would appear, therefore, that the intent of the city council is to require approval by that body of decisions of the Board of Zoning Appeals before such decisions become effective. The pleadings on their face establish the fact that in this instance the city council has not approved any recommended decision of the board which admittedly does not (and need not) conform to the decision of the building inspector. To summarize factually, the building inspector insisted upon off-street parking spaces for 30 vehicles whereas the decision of the board would have granted the building permit provided the relator would "guarantee that the permanent users of said proposed building would not exceed 35 employees by deed restrictions or other form of covenants satisfactory to the city." The joint answer then states that "the council refused the permit and upheld the decision of the inspector of buildings by the unanimous vote of all its members for the reason that insufficient parking was provided as required by the zoning ordinance of the city."
The relator here certainly exhausted its administrative remedies and, in our opinion, had no remedy left except mandamus.
This then brings us to the real question presented whichPage 294is limited in scope. Although the petition alleges that the provisions of Section 1 (a)-(f), Article IV, are vague, uncertain, discriminating and unreasonable, the relator's demurrer and arguments are confined to its claim that Section 1 (e), Article IV of the Lyndhurst zoning ordinance, is unconstitutional. Relator admits that its application for a building permit falls within the category of this section which relates to "other buldings or uses."
Section 1 (e), Article IV, reads as follows:
"Each building or use other than those enumerated above in this section shall have off-street parking space sufficient in capacity for the parking at one time of at least one automobile per five persons engaged on the premises as employees or owners, and in addition parking space reasonably adequate for the commercial vehicles necessary to carry on the business of the occupants of the premises and for the normal volume of car parking by persons coming to the premises on matters incidental to the uses thereof. Any parking area which is used in whole or in part to meet the requirements of this paragraph and which exceeds ten car parking spaces in total capacity shall be improved as specified in Article IV, Section 1 (a) above."
Section 1 (a), referred to in the above-quoted provision, contains three numbered subdivisions, is general in nature, and provides in substance (so far as consideration here is necessary) that no building shall be erected, remodeled or altered to provide for a greater degree or intensity of use unless the requirements of the ordinance are fulfilled for off-street garaging or parking of motor vehicles of the occupants, employees, patrons or guests and for off-street loading and unloading. It defines one-car parking space as "not less than eight feet six inches in width, nor less than twenty feet in length, abutting on a driveway adequate in width for the angle of parking for which the car-parking area is designed and clearly marked; and `off-street parking' is such car-parking spaces and such abutting driveway both entirely off the right of way of any public street." Further requirements are provided as to grading, surfacing, draining, and lighting.
Section 1 (b), not in issue here, requires storage for at least one passenger automobile for each dwelling unit.Page 295
Section 1 (c), captioned "Churches, Theatres, and Assembly Halls," provides a requirement for off-street parking space on the basis of one automobile per six seats of planned seating capacity.
Section 1 (d) provides that each building containing banks, retail stores or shops having floor space in excess of 1,000 square feet shall have a parking lot sufficient to provide one car-parking space for each 200 square feet on the ground or basement floor, and for each 300 feet (the ordinance as contained in the third amended answer does not include the word, "square," following the figure, "300") on any floor above the ground floor.
It will be noted that subdivisions (b), (c), and (d) have fixed standards and criteria to guide the building inspector and Board of Zoning Appeals in the administration of the zoning ordinance. Where specificity is required, subdivision (a), although general in its nature, also meets this test.
The general power of a municipality to include in its comprehensive zoning ordinance requirements that applicants for building permits provide off-street parking space for the occupants of the premises and for those coming onto the premises for purposes in connection with the businesses being carried on therein does not seem to be questioned by the relator here, but such power is inferentially involved in the question before us. A discussion of this subject is found in 2 Yokley Zoning Law and Practice (2 Ed.), 82, Section 210. Therein we find that various municipalities have approached their respective parking problems in different ways, some having confined themselves to provisions relative to dwellings, some having included hotels and hospitals, and some having extended programs relating to numerous and various types of business buildings.
The problem of off-street parking is relatively new, and provisions for such parking are not as yet found in all municipal zoning ordinances but certainly it is a proper municipal concern as traffic conditions in municipalities become more and more complex. This court has already held inState, ex rel. Gordon,City Atty., v.Rhodes, Mayor,156 Ohio St. 81,100 N.E.2d 225, that a city may establish and maintain off-street parking facilities. It follows, therefore, that a determinationPage 296by a legislative body of a municipal corporation that traffic conditions therein warrant the inclusion of provisions requiring off-street parking in a comprehensive zoning ordinance and the resultant passage of such ordinance constitute a proper exercise of municipal authority.
The decisions of this court also have recognized the rule that a zoning ordinance of a municipality, which does not contain sufficient criteria or standards to guide the administrative officer or tribunal in the exercise of the discretion vested in it, is unconstitutional and invalid.State, ex rel. SelectedProperties, Inc., v.Gottfried,163 Ohio St. 469,127 N.E.2d 371;Cassellv.Lexington Township Board of Zoning Appeals,163 Ohio St. 340,127 N.E.2d 11. See, also,State, ex rel. IceFuel Co., v.Kreuzweiser, Inspr.,120 Ohio St. 352,356,166 N.E. 228.
Although relator contends that all of Section 1 (e) of Article IV is unconstitutional, there is no lack of sufficient criteria or standards to guide the building inspector in the language, "off-street parking space sufficient in capacity for the parking at one time of at least one automobile per five persons engaged on the premises as employees or owners."
The number of parking spaces required under this formula may readily be determined with reasonable accuracy from the plans, taking into consideration the available floor space, the number of offices, and purpose for which the building was constructed. If in the determination of the number of employees and employers, the administrative officer incorrectly finds the facts, this may be corrected in an administrative appeal. The possibility of calculative error does not impute unconstitutionality to this part of Section 1 (e) of Article IV. The other part, however, relating to "parking space reasonably adequate for commercial vehicles necessary to carry on the business * * * and for the normal volume of car parking by persons coming to the premises on matters incidental to the uses thereof," presents the difficulty in this case.
Reference to commercial vehicles requires an examination of Section 1 (f) of Article IV of the zoning ordinance, which treats with "loading and unloading spaces." The full text of subdivision (f) is as follows:Page 297
"In any district each occupied premises not used exclusively for a residence and its accessory uses shall be provided with adequate space on its lot for the loading and unloading of trucks and commercial vehicles serving the premises; whereever practical, access driveways to such loading-unloading space shall be so located as to make it unnecessary for vehicles to back into or out of public streets in order to reach it. The building inspector shall administer the requirements of this section in a manner to eliminate, so far as practical, congestion and interference with vehicular and pedestrian traffic on the public street. The Board of Zoning Appeals may notifyfn*or waive these requirements in the case of an office building, theatre, or other occupancy of similar limited trucking requirements."
As to loading and unloading spaces, Section 1 (e) provides for "parking space reasonably adequate," and Section 1 (f) for "adequate space on its lot" for the loading and unloading of trucks and commercial vehicles serving the premises. As to the parking of automobiles coming onto the premises with respect to the business carried on thereon, Section 1 (e) provides that there shall be sufficient spaces for the "normal volume of car parking."
It is the view of this court that these requirements are vague and insufficient to guide the building inspector or the Board of Zoning Appeals.
We hold, therefore, that a provision in a comprehensive municipal zoning ordinance, which requires that buildings, other than dwellings, churches, theatres, assembly halls, retail stores and shops, thereafter erected or remodeled or altered shall have "parking space reasonably adequate for commercial vehicles necessary to carry on the business of the occupants of the premises and for the normal volume of car parking by persons coming to the premises on matters incidental to the uses thereof," does not contain sufficient criteria or standards to guide the administrative officer or tribunal in the exercisePage 298of the discretion vested in it and is unconstitutional and invalid.
Here the decision of the building inspector that two spaces should be provided for commercial vehicles and ten spaces for the normal volume of cars to be used by persons coming onto the premises on matters incidental to the uses thereof, over and above the requirement for spaces for owners and employees calculated on the basis of one car per five of such, is unlawful as being made under authority of an unconstitutional provision. The plan of the relator includes space for the off-street parking of 23 cars, which number is greater than that lawfully determined necessary by the building inspector.
The conditional modification recommended by the Board of Zoning Appeals not having been approved by council, the relator was left without remedy other than this action. It follows that the demurrer of relator was properly sustained, and that relator is entitled to a building permit as requested.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.Judgment affirmed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., ZIMMERMAN, STEWART, TAFT, MATTHIAS and BELL, JJ., concur.
- Although not pertinent to the issue here, it is assumed for the purpose of this opinion that the word, "notify," was intended to be the word, "modify," since the provisions of Article V authorize the Board of Zoning Appeals to modify, vary or waive such requirements. ↩