Opinion · Nclaw North Carolina
GULLY v. HOLLOWAY, 63 N.C. 84 (1868)
W. H. GULLY, Adm'r c., v. MARY E. HOLLOWAY & others., 63 N.C. 84 (N.C. 1868)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Nclaw North Carolina
- Jurisdiction
- Nclaw
- Date
- 1868-01-01
- Topic
- general
GULLY v. HOLLOWAY, 63 N.C. 84 (1868) W. H. GULLY, Adm'r c., v. MARY E.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed GULLY v. HOLLOWAY, 63 N.C. 84 (1868). The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
GULLYv. HOLLOWAY,63 N.C. 84(1868)
W. H. GULLY, Adm'r c.,v. MARY E. HOLLOWAY and others.
Supreme Court of North Carolina
June Term, 1868.
In such case, if it becomes necessary to resort to the land devised to the wife she is entitled, under Rev. Code, ch. 118, s. 8, to one-third of the whole of the realty for life, as if the husband had died intestate.
The will, after giving certain slaves to his wife, contains the following clauses: "I also give to my wife half of my tract of land, on which I now live, including the dwelling-house and other improvements thereto belonging. I also give unto myPage 85wife all my stock," c. "I give to my daughter Fannie, half of the tract of land on which I now live, Judy and her increase, William and Jacob." * * * "My will is that my executor dispose of enough of my property, such as he may think can be spared best, to pay all of my just debts. My will is that my wife, M. E. Holloway, have, hold and possess the residue of the property, which I have given her, after my just debts are paid, during her life time, and then if any remain, my will is that her bodily heirs have, hold and possess it."
The bill sets out that the testator's daughter, Fannie, died in his life-time in tender infancy, that the personalty belonging to the estate, in consequence of the emancipation of the slaves was insufficient to pay the debts, and it would be necessary to sell some of the land. The prayer was that the plaintiff, as Administratorcum testamento annexo, should be instructed whether the debts were a charge upon the real as well as the personal property given to the wife; whether the land lapsing by the daughter's death should be exhausted before that given to the widow is taken, c.
The answers admitted the material allegations of the bill.
In our case the contest is between the heirs and a devisee; and the land devised to the widow subject to the payment of the debts must be applied before that descended. The devisee is generally preferred to the heir, but when land devised isPage 86charged with payment of debts, c., the devisee takes itcum onere, Palmerv.Armstrong, 2 Dev. Eq. 268;Robardsv.Wortham, Ibid. 173. If the daughter had lived,herland would have been exonerated; her dying does not affect the testator's intention to subject the property given to the wife to the payment of debts.
The widow should havedissentedfrom the Will, in order to have any part of her land exempt from payment of debts. The words of Rev. Code, ch. 118, s. 8, do not embrace our case, and a review of the legislation on the subject shows that it does not come within their spirit. See Acts of 1784, ch. 204, secs. 8, 9; ch. 225; Acts of 1787, ch. 271, and 1771, ch. 351.
PER CURIAM. Decree accordingly.