Opinion · Nclaw North Carolina

GRIFFIN v. FOSTER, 53 N.C. 337 (1861)

53 N.C. 337

Type: Opinion
Court: Nclaw North Carolina
Jurisdiction: Nclaw
Date: 1861-01-01
Topic: general

GRIFFIN v. FOSTER, 53 N.C. 337 (1861) JOSEPH GRIFFIN v. PETER G. FOSTER.Supreme Court of North Carolina (June Term, 1861.) 1. The continuance of an overflow of land by the ponding back of water for twelve years does not justify the presumption of the grant of an easement. 2.

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UpLaw has not yet analyzed GRIFFIN v. FOSTER, 53 N.C. 337 (1861). The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

GRIFFINv. FOSTER,53 N.C. 337(1861)

JOSEPH GRIFFIN v. PETER G. FOSTER.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

(June Term, 1861.)

1. The continuance of an overflow of land by the ponding back of water for twelve years does not justify the presumption of the grant of an easement.

2. It is not competent, either as a bar to the action, or in mitigation of damages, for the defendant to show that for twelve years neither the plaintiff nor the party from whom he purchased had complained of the overflow of his land.Page 259

PETITION to recover damages for ponding back water upon the plaintiff's land, tried beforeHeath, J., at Fall Term, 1860, of MARTIN.

The case was brought up by appeal from the finding of a jury of view.

On the trial below it appeared that the dam in question had (338) been erected twelve years theretofore, and the water kept up to its then height by one Williams, who, about two years before, had sold to the defendant. When the dam was erected the plaintiff's land was owned by one Harman Griffin, who some six years before sold it to the plaintiff. The defendant offered to show that before the present petition was filed no complaint was made of the overflowing by either the plaintiff or Harman Griffith, and no suit was brought. This evidence was offered in bar and in mitigation of damages.

The court held that it was not competent in either point of view. Defendant's counsel excepted.

Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and appeal by defendant.

Warren for plaintiff.Winston, Jr., for defendant.

MANLY, J.

Two questions are presented in the case transmitted to this Court:

1. Whether the continuance of the pond of water on the petitioner's land for twelve years would justify the presumption of a grant of the easement.

2. Whether it was competent to prove in bar or in mitigation of damages that no complaint had been made prior to the filing of the petition.

Both questions were properly ruled against the defendant below.

The provisions of the Revised Code, ch. 65, secs. 18 and 19, raising a presumption of payment or abandonment upon judgments, decrees, contracts, equities, or redemptions, and other equitable interests after the lapse of ten years, do not embrace cases of the kind before us; so that the presumptive bar in favor of a private easement stands as at common law. In England twenty years seems to have been adopted by judges by analogy to the statute, 21 James I., which makes an adverse enjoyment for that time a bar to an action of ejectment. A less time than this does not seem to have been held, in any instance, of (339) itself sufficient to justify the presumption.

In North Carolina we have followed the English rule, and have held twenty years necessary and sufficient. The cases upon this point are collected in the opinion of the Court delivered inIngraham v. Hough,46 N.C. 49. Since that case, it may be regarded as settled that twentyPage 260years enjoyment of an easement, uninterrupted and unexplained, will raised the presumption of a grant. Nothing less than this will do. The eleven or twelve years, therefore, set forth in the case as the period during which the pond of water has been kept up, is not sufficient to create a presumptive bar to the right of redress of the owner of the land covered.

The evidence offered and rejected by the court was inadmissible for either of the objects avowed, or for any other that we are aware of. No demand of damages or notice of the petition, prior to the filing of the same, was necessary. Previous complaint, therefore, not being a prerequisite, the want of it was not a bar to the suit. So we cannot perceive how or in what way it can have a legitimate effect upon the amount of damages. Suffering can rarely be measured, with truth, by amount of complaint indulged; and the absence of the one cannot be inferred, with any reasonable certainty, from the absence of the other. Such matters depend so much on temperament and education that they cannot be relied upon as indices from which a jury may infer facts upon which to base a verdict.

PER CURIAM. No error.Cited: Power Co. v. Navigation Co.,152 N.C. 493.

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