Opinion · Supreme Court of North Carolina
State v. . Sizemore
52 N.C. 206
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Supreme Court of North Carolina
- Jurisdiction
- North Carolina
- Date
- 1859-12-05
- Topic
- general
Pearson, C. J. There is error in the instructions given to the jury: 1. “ If, at the time the prisoner shot, he was smarting under the blow he had received from the axe, and there had not been time to cool, this would be, in law, a legal provocation, &c.” What is time to cool, is a question for the Court, and *209 his Honor ought to have instructed the jury, whether, according to the facts of the case, there was, or was not, in contemplation of law, time for the passions to cool; consequently it was error to leave that question to be passed on by the jury. 2. “ If, at the time he was walking backwards, with his gun in his hands, the deceased threw the shovel at him, which endangered his Ufa, and in consequence of it, he shot the deceased, it would be a case of manslaughter.” According to the doctrine of homicide, it is not necessary that the life of the party should be endangered by the assault or blow, in order to mitigate the killing, and make the offense manslaughter. The mitigation is allowed, not because of the danger in which the party is put, but because the fv/ror brevis is presumed to be excited by a legal provocation, and the law imputes the killing to sudden passion, and not to malice prepense. 3. “ If the jury should be satisfied that the prisoner had determined to kill, and used the expression, “ If you follow me, I’ll shoot you,” to induce the deceased to follow, it would be a case of murder.” After a careful examination of the testimony, we are unato see any ev…
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed State v. . Sizemore. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
- Cited by
- 4 opinions
2. It is not necessary that a blow, in order to amount to legal provocation, should be one that endangered the life of the slayer.
3. A hypothesis as to the motives of the accused in striking a fatal blow, submitted to the jury by the court without sufficient evidence to justify it, is error.
One of the witnesses swore that from the time the prisoner was struck with the axe by Alred till the deceased was shot was about five or six minutes.
Another witness, Grice, stated that "it all occurred in as short a time as could have been."
The court charged the jury that if, at the time the prisoner shot, he was smarting under the blow he had received from the axe, and there had not been time to cool, that this would be, in law, a legal provocation, provided the deceased was aiding and abetting John Alred in throwing the axe.
2. That if, at the time he was walking backwards with his gun in his hands, the deceased threw the shovel at him, which endangered his life, and in consequence of it he shot the deceased, it would be a case of manslaughter, as the counsel contended; but that if they should be satisfied he had determined to kill, and used the expression, "If you follow me, I will shoot you," to induce the deceased to follow, and he killed him, it would be a case of murder.
The defendant's counsel excepted to these instructions for error.
The jury found the defendant guilty of murder, and sentence being pronounced, the defendant appealed.
1. "If, at the time the prisoner shot, he was smarting under the blow he had received from the axe, andthere had not been time to cool, this would be, in law, a legal provocation," etc. What is time to cool is a question for the court, and his Honor ought to have instructed (209) the jury whether, according to the facts of the case, there was or was not, in contemplation of law, time for the passions to cool. Consequently, it was error to leave that question to be passed on by the jury.
2. "If, at the time he was walking backwards, with his gun in his hands, the deceased threw the shovel at him,which endangered his life, and in consequence of it he shot the deceased, it would be a case of manslaughter." According to the doctrine of homicide, it is not necessary that the life of the party should be endangered by the assault orPage 163blow in order to mitigate the killing and make the offense manslaughter. The mitigation is allowed, not because of the danger in which the party is put, but because thefuror brevisis presumed to be excited by a legal provocation, and the law imputes the killing to sudden passion, and not to malice pretense.
3. "If the jury should be satisfied that the prisoner had determined to kill, and used the expression, `If you follow me, I'll shoot you,'toinduce the deceasedto follow, it would be a case of murder."
After a careful examination of the testimony, we are unable to see any evidence to support this view of the case, and it was error to submit it to the jury. The prisoner had been struck a violent blow with an axe, and was in the act of starting off, going backwards for fear of being struck. The deceased had the shovel. The prisoner said, "If you follow me, I'll shoot you." The deceased then threw the shovel at him, and he fired the gun. Can there be any ground to support the inference that the prisoner gave this warning deceitfully and for the purpose of inducing the deceased to follow him? We think not, and although the words used by the prisoner after the killing tended to show malice pretense, it did not tend to support this view of the case. We think his Honor ought to have instructed the jury that if the evidence was believed, the killing was manslaughter, unless they were satisfied that the prisoner had formed a determination beforehand to kill the deceased, and sought this occasion to effect his purpose, and if so, it was murder; and it would have been proper, in reference to what the (210) prisoner said after the act, to call attention to the difference between threats, deliberately made beforehand, and words used afterwards in a state of excitement.
PER CURIAM.Venire de novo.Cited: S. v. Matthews,78 N.C. 532;S. v. Merrick,171 N.C. 793.