Opinion · Supreme Court of North Carolina

State Ex Rel. Underwood, Marsh & Co. v. Parks

State Ex Rel. Underwood, Marsh & Co. v. Parks, 25 N.C. 296 (N.C. 1843)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction
North Carolina
Date
1843-06-05
Topic
general

GastoN, J. It is essential to the uniform administration of justice, which is one of the best securities for its faithful administration, that the rules of evidence should be steadily observed. Among these, the rule, which regulates the admission of testimony, offered to impeach the character of a witness, is now so well established and so clearly defined, that a departure from it must be regarded as a violation of law. The witness is not to be discredited, because of the opinions which any person or any number of persons may have expressed to his disadvantage, unless such opinions have created or indicate a general reputation of his want of moral principle. The impeaching witness must, therefore, profess to know the general reputation of the witness sought to be discredited, before he can be heard to speak of his own opinion or of the opinions of others, as to the reliance to be placed on the testimony of the impeached witness.

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Cited by
22 opinions
STATEv. PARKS,25 N.C. 296(1843)
STATE TO THE USE OF UNDERWOOD, MARSH CO.v. JOAB PARKS
AND OTHERS.
Supreme Court of North Carolina
(June Term, 1843.)
A witness, who is introduced for the purpose of discrediting another witness in the cause, must profess to know the general reputation of the witness sought to be discredited, before he can be heard to speak of his own opinion or of the opinions of others, as to the reliance to be placed on the testimony of the impeached witness.
APPEAL fromBattle, J., Spring Term, 1843, of RANDOLPH.

The action was on a constable's bond, to which the defendants pleaded "conditions performed and not broken." After the plaintiffs had madePage 206our aprima faciecase, the defendants, in support of their plea, introduced as a witness, oneTidence Lane, who testified that some time before the action was commenced, he saw the principal defendant pay to one of the plaintiffs a sum of money larger than that now claimed by the plaintiffs. On the part of the plaintiffs,Jonathan Worthwas then called to impeach the credibility of Lane, and stated that he, Worth, had resided for many years in Asheboro, while Lane lived about twelve miles from that place; that he did not know Lane's general character in the immediate neighborhood where he lived, but that Lane had been for many years a public man in the county of Randolph, and he had often seen him in Asheboro at Court, and on other public occasions, and had heard a great deal said about his character; that he was not certain that he knew his general character; that he did not know whether a majority of those he heard speak of it spoke well or ill of it, but he had heard a great many respectable men speak well of Lane's character, (297) and a great many equally respectable, speak ill of it. The plaintiff's counsel then asked the witness whether, from his knowledge of Lane's general character, he would believe him on oath. This question was objected to by the defendant's counsel, but permitted by the Court; when the witness said he would not believe him, if his story was at all improbable. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant moved for a new trial, because the Court permitted this last question to be asked. The Court overruled the motion and gave judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendants appealed.
No counsel for the plaintiffs.J. T. Moreheadfor the defendants.
GASTON, J.
It is essential to theuniformadministration of justice, which is one of the best securities for itsfaithfuladministration, that the rules of evidence should be steadily observed. Among these, the rule which regulates the admission of testimony, offered to impeach the character of a witness, is now so well established and so clearly defined, that a departure from it must be regarded as a violation of law. The witness is not to be discredited, because of the opinions which any person or any number of persons may have expressed to his disadvantage, unless such opinions have created or indicate ageneral reputationof his want of moral principle. The impeaching witness must, therefore, profess to know the general reputation of the witness sought to be discredited, before he can be heard to speak of his own opinion or of the opinion of others, as to the reliance to be placed on the testimony of the impeached witness.S. v. Boswell,13 N.C. 209.Downey v. Smith,18 N.C. 62. This rule, we think, was not observed in the case beforePage 207us, and the exception taken to the reception of Mr. Worth's testimony was, therefore, well founded.

PER CURIAM. New trial.Cited: S. v. Lanier,79 N.C. 624;S. v. Efler,85 N.C. 588;S. v.Wheeler,104 N.C. 894;S. v. Coley,114 N.C. 883;S. v. Spurling,118 N.C. 1253.

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