Opinion · Nclaw North Carolina
MURRAY v. LACKEY, 6 N.C. 368 (1818)
MURRAY v. LACKEY., 6 N.C. 368 (N.C. 1818)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Nclaw North Carolina
- Jurisdiction
- Nclaw
- Date
- 1818-01-01
- Topic
- general
MURRAY v. LACKEY, 6 N.C. 368 (1818) MURRAY v. LACKEY.Supreme Court of North Carolina July Term, 1818. From Iredell. To support an action for a malicious prosecution in taking out a warrant against plaintiff on a charge of perjury, it is necessary for plaintiff to show a discharge — a party bound over to court has only to attend, and, according to our practice, when the term expires stands discharged, unless rebound or his default recorded.
Citator
UpLaw has not yet analyzed MURRAY v. LACKEY, 6 N.C. 368 (1818). The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.
MURRAYv. LACKEY,6 N.C. 368(1818)
MURRAY v. LACKEY.
Supreme Court of North Carolina
July Term, 1818.
The recognizances were found on file among the records of the court, but no entry was made upon the docket or records that the defendant in the warrant, now the plaintiff, had been discharged. No bill of indictment could be found among the records, nor did anything appear from the records to have been done in the case, after the return of the recognizances, except that the clerk had made out a bill of costs. Plaintiff proved that the solicitor told the bail for his appearance at the return term that he was discharged and might go home; that the prosecuting officer would do nothing in the matter, (369) and that the State's witnesses need not attend another court. The magistrate who took the recognizances swore that the solicitor told him the parties were discharged at the return term. Upon the affidavit of the magistrate it was moved that the entry of discharge be madenunc pro tunc;this motion was refused. The evidence of discharge as above stated was received, subject to the opinion of the court.Page 270
It was referred to this Court to say whether the entrynunc pro tuncshould have been allowed; if it should, was it sufficient to prove the discharge of the defendant in the warrant? And further, were the facts proved as above, without any entry of discharge on the records, sufficient in law to establish the discharge of the now plaintiff from the prosecution of the warrant?