Opinion · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Fay v. Gray
Fay v. Gray, 124 Mass. 500 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 1878)
- Type
- Opinion
- Court
- Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
- Jurisdiction
- Massachusetts
- Date
- 1878-06-28
- Topic
- bankruptcy
Soule, J. The transfer on the back of the certificate of stock, signed by Louise Page, was absolute in terms; but, in order to protect the defendant, the plaintiff signed the receipt of January 4, 1876, in which he admits that he received the stock as collateral security for a loan, and was not entitled to sell it till after one day’s notice of his intention to do so. This receipt contains in concise language the contract under which the plaintiff took the stock, and it was not competent for him to prove by paroi that, when he took it and signed the receipt, a different arrangement from that stated in the receipt was made. As pledgee, he was bound to keep the stock ready for delivery to the defendant on payment of the debt at maturity, or at any time afterward before sale in accordance with the terms of the pledge. Meanwhile he had no right to sell or lend or pledge the stock.
Citator
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- Cited by
- 9 opinions
The transfer on the back of the certificate of stock, signed by Louise Page, was absolute in terms; but, in order to protect the defendant, the plaintiff signed the receipt of January 4, 1876, in which he admits that he received the stock as collateral security for a loan, and was not entitled to sell it till after one day’s notice of his intention to do so. This receipt contains in concise language the contract under which the plaintiff took the stock, and it was not competent for him to prove by paroi that, when he took it and signed the receipt, a different arrangement from that stated in the receipt was made. As pledgee, he was bound to keep the stock ready for delivery to the defendant on payment of the debt at maturity, or at any time afterward before sale in accordance with the terms of the pledge. Meanwhile he had no right to sell or lend or pledge the stock. The evidence rejected was inadmissible therefore, because its only tendency was to show that the contract made when the stock was pledged was different from that set forth in writing at-the time.
The instructions to the jury, so far as they are recited in the exceptions, were substantially correct. They recognize the right