Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Albrecht v. United States

Albrecht v. United States, 329 U.S. 599 (1947)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1947-02-03
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • "Thus, `just compensation' in the constitutional sense, has been held . . . to be fair market value at the time of the taking plus `interest' from that date to the date of payment."
  • “ ‘[J]ust compensation’ in the constitutional sense, has been held, absent a settlement between the parties, to be fan-market value at the time of taking plus ‘interest’ from that date to the date of payment.”
  • “And certainly where a party to such a contract stands upon its terms to enforce them for his own advantage, he cannot at the same time successfully disavow those terms so far as he conceives them to be to his disadvantage.”
  • when a property owner contracts for the sale of their property to the government “rather than to have ‘just compensation,’ in the constitutional sense, fixed by the courts, [a court] must look to those terms for the measure of their compensation, including them right to ... interest.”
  • when a property owner contracts for the sale of their property to the government "rather than to have `just compensation,' in the constitutional sense, fixed by the courts, [a court] must look to those terms for the measure of their compensation, including their right to ... interest."

Citator

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Cited by
99 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Constitutional Law — Just Compensation The Fifth Amendment's guarantee of just compensation does not prohibit the Government and a landowner from agreeing between themselves on the amount that constitutes just compensation for property taken, nor does it bar them from embodying that agreement in a contract. 329 U.S. at 601-602
  2. Constitutional Law — Just Compensation Where the parties have not agreed on compensation, courts have evolved a rule under which just compensation consists of the fair market value of the property at the time of taking plus an additional element measured in terms of reasonable interest from the date of taking to the date of payment, to make the property owner whole for deferred payment. 329 U.S. at 601
  3. Contracts Law — Measure of Compensation Where a landowner stands on the purchase-price provisions of his contract to enforce those terms for his own advantage, he cannot simultaneously disavow other terms of the same contract as disadvantageous to him; having bound the Government to the contract price as the measure of just compensation, he cannot invoke the Fifth Amendment to obtain more than the contract provides. 329 U.S. at 602-603
  4. Constitutional Law — Just Compensation The constitutional rule adding interest to bare value as part of just compensation is a method for courts to calculate compensation in the absence of an agreement and does not apply to compensation fixed by contract; where landowners have chosen to stand on their contract terms rather than have just compensation fixed by the courts, the contract, not the Fifth Amendment, governs their compensation, including any right to interest. 329 U.S. at 603-604
  5. Contracts Law — Government Contracts In the absence of a specific contract provision or statutory authorization, interest does not run against the United States even though the Government's payment for contract purchases is delayed. 329 U.S. at 604-605
  6. Real Property Law — Declaration of Taking Act The interest provision of the Declaration of Taking Act is a statutory embodiment of the rule for determining constitutional just compensation in the absence of a governing contract; it contains no provision for interest on Government contracts of purchase, and where landowners rely on their purchase contracts as to value, their claims for interest fall outside the Act's interest provisions and are governed by the rule that no interest runs absent a contract or statute providing for it. 329 U.S. at 605-606
  7. Real Property Law — Interest There is no interval for which interest may be allowed between the taking of property and payment for it where the Government has paid the agreed price into court upon taking title, and the owner's reliance on the purchase price as value does not entitle him to interest under the condemnation statute. 329 U.S. at 604-606
ALBRECHTv. UNITED STATES,329 U.S. 599(1947)
67 S.Ct. 606
ALBRECHT ET AL.v. UNITED STATES.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.fn*
No. 148.
Argued January 8, 1947.
Decided February 3, 1947.
Contracts for the purchase of lands by the Government stipulated the purchase price, granted the right of immediate possession, but contained no provision for interest. The Government subsequently instituted condemnation proceedings, filed a declaration of taking, and deposited in court sums substantially less than the contract prices. The landowners asserted their contract rights. The validity of the contracts having thereafter been judicially established, the Government paid into court the full contract price.Held:1. The Government is not obligated in these circumstances to pay interest, since the compensation of the landowners is controlled by the contracts, which contained no provision for interest, rather than by the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 600, 602. 2. The landowners having relied upon the purchase-price provisions of their contracts, the interest provisions of the Declaration of Taking Act are inapplicable. P. 604.155 F.2d 73,77, affirmed.
In condemnation proceedings instituted by the Government, the
landowners, petitioners here, relied upon the purchase-price
provisions of earlier contracts and in addition claimed interest.
In No. 151, the District Court, on the question of interest, held
for the Government.60 F. Supp. 741. In the other cases, the
District Court held for the landowners.61 F. Supp. 199. The
Circuit Court of Appeals held for the Government.155 F.2d 73,
77. This Court granted certiorari.329 U.S. 694.Affirmed, p.
606.
Page 600
Richmond C. CoburnandSamuel M. Watsonargued the cause for petitioners. With them on the brief wereGeorge Eigel,William L. IgoeandWilliam H. Allen. Roscoe Andersonfiled a brief for petitioner in No. 149.Roger P. Marquisargued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief wereActing Solicitor General Washington,Assistant Attorney General BazelonandWilma C. Martin.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question here is whether the Government is obligated to pay interest in connection with the following land-purchase arrangements and condemnation proceedings. The Government made separate contracts with the petitioners to buy certain lands from them to be used for a public purpose. The contracts stipulated a purchase price to be paid at an indefinite future time when certain conditions had been fulfilled.1They also granted the Government the right to immediate possession. Later the Government questioned the validity of the contracts and attempted to rescind them on the ground that by reason of fraud and other things the contract prices were grossly excessive and represented far more than the "just compensation" required by the Fifth Amendment. It filed condemnation proceedings in District Courts under40 Stat. 241, as amended,50 U.S.C. § 171, asking the Courts to fix "just compensation" after hearing evidence on that subject. It also filed a declaration of taking underPage 60146 Stat. 1421, 40 U.S.C. § 258a, at the same time depositing in the Courts sums of money, substantially less than the contract prices, which it estimated to be the true "just compensation" for the property taken. The Courts then entered orders divesting the property owners of all title and vesting it in the Government. A companion case in which a District Court held an identical contract valid was appealed and eventually reached this Court. Prior to and pending this appeal these petitioners vigorously asserted the validity of the terms of the contracts which fixed the agreed prices for transfer of possession and title to their properties. Several years later this Court upheld the validity of the identical contract in the companion case.2Thereupon the Government, complying with that decision, paid the full contract purchase prices into the District Courts. It prayed that the landowners' compensation be fixed as the contract price without interest. Petitioners asserted that they had a right to interest from the time of the "taking," guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment's provision for "just compensation." The Government contended that the "just compensation" provision was not applicable, and that petitioners had no right to interest because their purchase contracts did not provide for it. One District Court decided this question in favor of the Government,60 F. Supp. 741, but two decided against it.61 F. Supp. 199.3The Circuit Court of AppealsPage 602held for the Government.155 F.2d 73,77. In a case involving somewhat similar facts,United Statesv.Baugh,149 F.2d 190, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had decided against the Government. Because of the apparent conflict presented and because the question is of widespread importance, we granted certiorari. The facts and issues, so far as we deem them relevant to disposition of all the cases are identical, and so we consider all of them together.

We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that the Government is not obligated to pay interest in these cases. It is true that in cases submitted to them for determination of "just compensation," courts have evolved a rule whereby an element of compensation designated as interest is sometimes allowed. Under this rule, and in the absence of an agreement of the parties fixing compensation, courts first fix the fair market value of property as of the time it is taken. The property owner, against whom there is no counterclaim is always entitled to payment of this much. But where payment of that fair market value is deferred, it has been held that something more than fair market value is required to make the property owner whole, to afford him "just compensation." This additional element of compensation has been measured in terms of reasonable interest. Thus, "just compensation" in the constitutional sense has been held, absent a settlement between the parties, to be fair market value at the time of taking plus "interest" from that date to the date of payment.4

But the method used by courts to determine "just compensation" in an adversary proceeding where the partiesPage 603have failed previously to agree on its amount is not the exclusive method for determining that question. The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit landowners and the Government from agreeing between themselves as to what is just compensation for property taken. SeeDanforthv.United States,308 U.S. 271. Nor does it bar them from embodying that agreement in a contract, as was done here. And certainly where a party to such a contract stands upon its terms to enforce them for his own advantage, he cannot at the same time successfully disavow those terms so far as he conceives them to be to his disadvantage. That is precisely the position of the petitioners here. They made contracts for the transfer and possession of lands at prices concerning which they have never complained. At the end of prolonged litigation, the Government was barred from showing that compensations fixed by the contracts were not just, but were excessive. Having thus bound the Government to the contract prices as the measure of "just compensation," which prices to say the least, generously meet the Fifth Amendment's "just compensation" requirement, they now seek to escape the burdens of these identical contract provisions. They invoke the Fifth Amendment in pursuit of something more than the compensation for which their contract provide — contracts which they are not willing to abandon.

The answer to their contention is that in this posture of the cases these transactions have passed out of the range of the Fifth Amendment. For the reasoning on which interest is added to value as a part of "just compensation" in court condemnation proceedings is not applicable to this situation. That reasoning is that when a court determines just compensation, it first fixes bare value at the time of the taking and adds a sum to compensate for deferred payment of bare value so as to make the property owner whole as required by the Fifth Amendment. WePage 604do not think this formula fits contractual arrangements for compensation. Exactly what factors the parties consider, in addition to bare value, cannot easily be ascertained. This very group of transactions illustrates that there may be many such additional factors. For example, all the contracts here provided for immediate Government possession, though none contemplated immediate payments. We cannot know what amounts were added in the bargains to the bare market values as estimated, though unarticulated, allowances for the anticipated delays in payment. And other factors, which need not be enumerated, entered into the contract prices. These things demonstrate the inadvisability of applying a constitutional rule as to interest, specially designed to enable courts to calculate "just compensation," to an entirely different situation in which parties, supposedly with due regard to their own interests, bargain between themselves as to compensation. Since these petitioners have chosen to stand on their contract terms as to the amount they will receive for their property, rather than to have "just compensation," in the constitutional sense, fixed by the courts, we must look to those terms for the measure of their compensation, including their right to that part of compensation which courts have called interest.

We have not overlooked the contention that this conclusion is in conflict with our holding inDanforthv.United States,308 U.S. 271. We do not think it is. That was also a case in which a statute authorized Government agents to purchase property, and a price had been agreed on prior to condemnation proceedings. But the asserted interest claim was there denied. The decision in that case reasserted the principle that interest in condemnation proceedings does not begin until there has been a taking. After noting the several incidents asserted to constitute a taking, we held that there was no interval between thePage 605taking of the property there and payment for it. Thus the question we have considered here was neither directly involved, raised, nor given special consideration. A further incidental distinction between that case and this is that in theDanforthcase the contract did not anticipate that the taking would precede payment.

Turning now to the right to interest under the contracts, and apart from the contention regarding the Fifth Amendment, we find that the contracts have no provision for payment of interest. No statute authorizes the payment of interest in cases like this. In the absence of specific contract or statutory provisions no interest runs against the Government even though the Government's payment for the contract purchases be delayed. SeeSmythv.United States,302 U.S. 329,353;United Statesv.Thayer-West Point Hotel Co.,329 U.S. 585,588;United Statesv.N.Y. Rayon Importing Co.,329 U.S. 654,659-660.

There is some argument that interest should be allowed because the Declaration of Taking Act,46 Stat. 1421, 40 U.S.C. § 258a, under which condemnation proceedings were filed, authorizes payment of interest from the date property is taken.Cf. UnitedStatesv.Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., supra, p. 588. This provision, however, is no more than a statutory embodiment of the rule for determining constitutional "just compensation" in the absence of a governing contract, and what we have already said is equally applicable to the claim for interest under the statute. It contains no specific provision for interest on Government contracts of purchase. And here, while the litigation was under the condemnation statute, the petitioners' reliance on the purchase price provisions of the contracts as to value took these claims for interest outside the purview of the interest provisions of the Declaration of Taking Act, and left them to be governed by the interest rules which would have applied had suit beenPage 606brought by petitioners to enforce the contract terms. Petitioners were barred from receiving interest in any proceeding for the reason that their contracts contained no promise to pay interest.Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.
"The stipulation merely had the effect of relieving the Government from having to make proof as to what was just compensation and of running the risk of having an amount fixed which might be unsatisfactory."United Statesv.Baugh,149 F.2d 190,192. The landowners' "right to have interest is found in the Constitution and is neither found nor lost in the contract."Id., p. 193. The justness of the claim for interest in these cases is underlined by the fact that the land was taken over four years before full payment was made. The United States renounced these contracts and retained possession of the properties by the Declaration of Taking Act, which by its terms,46 Stat. 1421, 40 U.S.C. § 258a. entitled the condemnee to interest on the value from the date of taking except as to sums paid into court. After the decision inMuschanyv.UnitedStates,324 U.S. 49, the Government carried out its condemnation suits and obtained titles to these properties by condemnation.

In these condemnation actions the agreed price, stated in the contracts, became the "just compensation" of the Declaration of Taking Act and by that Act interest was due for such amount as had not been deposited with the trial court when the declaration was filed. Interest for the period between the declaration and the payment of the value into the trial court should be allowed on the amount by which the sum fixed in the final decree exceeded the sum deposited with the declaration of taking.Page 607
  1. Page 599 Together with No. 149,Linnenbringer,v.United States;No. 150,Pitman et al. v.United States;No. 151,Oliver,Executor, et al. v.United States;and No. 155,Q.W.S.S.Realty Investment Co. v.United States,also on certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. ↩
  2. Page 600 The first contract condition as to payment was that it should be made upon conveyance of a good and merchantable title. The second was that if "for any reason" the Attorney General did not approve the title, the Government could obtain a good title by condemnation proceedings in an appropriate district court, in which event the agreed compensation was to be deposited in court. ↩
  3. Page 601Muschanyv.United States.324 U.S. 49. ↩
  4. Page 601 Some of the petitioners claimed interest from the date the Government took possession of the lands under the contract to the date the Government deposited the full contract price. One petitioner claimed interest only from the date of the filing of the declaration of taking on the difference on that date between the sum the Government deposited as the estimated "just compensation" and the full contract price finally deposited. Interest was awarded by the two District Courts on this latter theory only from the date of the declaration of taking. ↩
  5. Page 602Seaboard Air Linev.United States.261 U.S. 299,306;Shoshone Tribev.United States,299 U.S. 476,496,497;Jacobsv.United States,290 U.S. 13,16-17;United Statesv.Klamath Indians,304 U.S. 119,123. ↩