Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Matton Steamboat Co. v. Murphy

Matton Steamboat Co. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 412 (1943)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1943-06-01
Topic
general

How later courts describe this case

  • explaining the importance of statutes limiting the 9
  • period for appeal to a definite point of time
  • stating the purpose of Rule 4 is “to set a definite point of time when litigation shall be at an end, unless within that time the prescribed application has been made; and if it has not, to advise prospective appellees that they are freed of the appellant’s demands”
  • purpose of statutes limiting period for appeal is to set definite point of time when litigation shall end
  • construing Fed. R. A. P. 4[a]

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Matton Steamboat Co. v. Murphy. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
69 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Civil Procedure — Timeliness of Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. § 350, no appeal intended to bring a judgment or decree before the Supreme Court for review may be allowed or entertained unless application therefor is duly made within three months after entry of the judgment or decree; the peremptory language of the statute requires that the appeal allowed be one applied for within the three-month period. 319 U.S. at 413-416
  2. Civil Procedure — Allowance of Appeal by State Judge An appeal from a state court of last resort for which a timely application was made to the chief judge of the state court within the three-month period may be allowed by that judge either before or after expiration of the period. 319 U.S. at 414
  3. Civil Procedure — Concurrent Applications Nothing in the statute or the Rules of the Supreme Court precludes an application within the three-month period to both the state judge and a justice of the Supreme Court at the same time, where shortness of time makes that necessary to preserve the right of appeal. 319 U.S. at 414
  4. Civil Procedure — Effect of Denial of Timely Application Where a timely application for allowance of an appeal has been made to a judge within the three-month period and has been denied, a subsequent application filed after the period has expired, even if allowed, is too late; the denied application no longer satisfies the statutory requirement, and the appeal may thereafter be allowed only on a new application made within the statutory period. 319 U.S. at 414-415
  5. Civil Procedure — Purpose of Appeal Time Limits The purpose of statutes limiting the period for appeal is to set a definite point of time when litigation shall be at an end unless within that time the prescribed application has been made, and if it has not, to advise prospective appellees that they are freed of the appellant's demands; any other construction would let would-be appellants prolong the appeal period indefinitely by successive applications to different judges after the time had expired. 319 U.S. at 415-416
MATTON CO.v. MURPHY,319 U.S. 412(1943)
63 S.Ct. 1126
MATTON STEAMBOAT CO., INC. ET AL.v. MURPHY, ACTING INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSIONER, ET AL.fn*
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD
DEPARTMENT.
No. 783.
Argued May 5, 1943.
Decided June 1, 1943.
Section 350 of 28 U.S.C. provides that "no appeal . . . intended to bring any judgment or decree before the Supreme Court for review shall be allowed or entertained unless application therefor be duly made within three months after the entry of such judgment or decree." Rule 36 of the Rules of this Court provides that an appeal to this Court from a state court of last resort may be allowed "by the chief justice or presiding judge of the state court, or by a justice of this court."Held:1. An appeal for which a timely application was made to the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of New York could have been allowed by him either before or after the expiration of the three months period. P. 414. 2. Within the three months period, application for appeal may be made to the state judge and a justice of this Court at the same time, when necessary to preserve the right of appeal. P. 414. 3. Where an application for appeal has been made to the state judge within the three months period and has been denied, a subsequent application to a justice of this Court, filed after the three months period has expired, is too late. P. 414. Appeals dismissed.
APPEALS from a judgment,289 N.Y. 119,44 N.E.2d 391(entered
in the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, on remittitur)
sustaining the validity of the New York Unemployment Insurance
Law. See also263 A.D. 756,774;30 N.Y.S.2d 930,32 N.Y.S.2d 373.
Mr. Frank C. Mason, with whomMessrs. H. Maurice FridlundandEdward L.P. O'Connorwere on the brief, for appellants in No. 783.Mr. Francis S. Bensel, withPage 413whomMessrs. Hersey EggintonandNicholas Kelleywere on the brief, for appellant in No. 813.Mr. Orrin G. Judd, Solicitor General of New York, with whomMessrs. Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney General,WilliamGerard RyanandFrancis R. Curran, Assistant Attorneys General, were on the brief, for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
In these cases appellants have sought to appeal under § 237(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 344 (a), from judgments of the New York courts sustaining the validity of the New York Unemployment Insurance Law (N.Y. Labor Law, § 500et seq.). The applicable section, 28 U.S.C. § 350, provides that "no appeal . . . intended to bring any judgment or decree before the Supreme Court for review shall be allowed or entertained unless application therefor be duly made within three months after the entry of such judgment or decree."

The question for our decision is whether the appeals to this Court in these cases were timely. In each, within three months after the judgment of the Court of Appeals (seeDepartment ofBankingv.Pink,317 U.S. 264), the appellant made timely application for allowance of the appeal to the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals who, being in doubt as to the finality of the judgments, denied the applications shortly before the expiration of the three months period. On application to an Associate Justice of this Court, made shortly after the three months had expired, the appeals were allowed by him with the Court's approval, in order that we might resolve an unsettled question of our practice (see Robertson and Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States, pp. 717-18). When we set the cases for argument together with two companion cases,Standard Dredging Corp. v.Murphy, ante, p. 306, andInternationalPage 414Elevating Co. v.Murphy, ante, p. 306, we requested counsel to discuss the question whether the appeals were "applied for within the time provided by law."

By Rule 36 of our Rules, an appeal to this Court from a state court of last resort may be allowed "by the chief justice or presiding judge of the state court, or by a justice of this court." But such an appeal may not be allowed when no application is made to the judge or justice authorized to allow it within the period prescribed by the statute. Here appellants' applications to the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals were timely, and could have been allowed by him either before or after the expiration of the three months period.Cardonav.Quinones,240 U.S. 83;Lathamv.United States, 131 U.S. Appendix, xcvii;UnitedStatesv.Vigil, 10 Wall. 423, 427. The appeals could also have been allowed, on such timely applications, by a justice of this Court. And there is nothing in the statute or Rules to preclude application within the three months to both the state judge and a justice of this Court at the same time, where shortness of time makes that necessary to preserve the right of appeal. Cf.Spiesv.Illinois,123 U.S. 131,142.

But when the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals denied appellants' applications and disallowed the appeals, the applications were no longer pending before him and, at least in the absence of any reconsideration by him, appeals could be allowed only on a new application either to him or to a justice of this Court. The time within which such applications could be made is that prescribed by the statute. Its language is peremptory — "no appeal . . . shall be allowed or entertained unless application therefor be duly made within three months." The purport of the words is that the appeal allowed must be one that is applied for within the three months period. An application which has been made within that period and denied does not satisfy that requirement, nor does a laterPage 415application filed after the time limit has expired even though it be allowed.

The purpose of statutes limiting the period for appeal is to set a definite point of time when litigation shall be at an end, unless within that time the prescribed application has been made; and if it has not, to advise prospective appellees that they are freed of the appellant's demands. Any other construction of the statute would defeat its purpose. Would-be appellants could prolong indefinitely the appeal period, by making application to one judge within the three months and upon its denial by applying successively to other judges even after the prescribed time for appeal had ended. Moreover, in such cases extension of the period for appeal could be limited only by recourse to the doctrine of laches applied in the particular circumstances of each case.

We conclude that appellants' applications for allowance of the appeals, after the expiration of the three months period, were too late, and that this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeals, which are accordingly.Dismissed.
  1. Page 412 Together with No. 813,Lake Tankers Corp. v.Murphy, ActingIndustrial Commissioner, et al.,also on appeal from the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department. ↩