Opinion · Supreme Court of the United States

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. United States

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 476 (1935)

Type
Opinion
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Date
1935-05-20
Topic
general

Me. Justice Robeets delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a suit for the annulment of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission fixing minimum rates on ex-river coal from Ohio River points to destinations in Northern Ohio. The District Court entered a decree of dismissal. 1 The appellants attack the rate order as based upon matters the Commission had no authority to consider, and as unsupported by evidence. The appellees oppose these charges and add that the appellants have no standing to maintain the suit.

Citator

UpLaw has not yet analyzed Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. United States. The absence of a flag is not a finding that it is good law.

Cited by
36 opinions

Headnotes

  1. Administrative Law — Standing A shipper who claims that an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission infringes his right to reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates, and who was a party to the proceeding before the Commission, has a sufficient legal interest to sue to set the order aside under 28 U.S.C. §§ 46 and 47; a plaintiff lacking such a legal interest or capacity to sue, or who fails to allege that the rates under attack were unreasonable or discriminated against him, may not maintain such a suit. 295 U.S. at 479
  2. Administrative Law — Rate Regulation — Commission's Consideration of Rate Structure In determining the reasonableness of a rate, the Interstate Commerce Commission may consider the effect of the rate upon an existing rate structure that it has already found to be just and reasonable; the Commission's authority is not limited to the reasonableness of the rate in isolation. 295 U.S. at 479–480
  3. Administrative Law — Rate Regulation — Comparative Rates as Evidence Comparisons with other rates in the same or adjacent territory, though not conclusive of the reasonableness of the rate under investigation, have probative value in supporting a finding of reasonableness. 295 U.S. at 480
  4. Administrative Law — Rate Regulation — Characterization of Commission Order An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission fixing minimum rates, made upon findings that the prescribed minima are reasonable and that lower rates would create undue discrimination against shippers in origin districts unable to use the water-rail route and would tend to disrupt the rate structure and destroy proper differentials among producing districts, is essentially an order under § 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act rather than one under § 3, and is not invalid for failure to afford the carriers the alternative of raising the contested rate or lowering others to remove the discrimination. 295 U.S. at 480
YOUNGSTOWN CO.v. UNITED STATES,295 U.S. 476(1935)
55 S.Ct. 822
YOUNGSTOWN SHEET TUBE CO. ET AL.v. UNITED STATES ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF OHIO.
No. 552.
Argued April 30, 1935.
Decided May 20, 1935.
1. A shipper claiming that an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission infringes his right to reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates, and who was a party to the proceeding before the Commission, is entitled to sue to set the order aside under U.S.C. Title 28, §§ 46 and 47. P. 479. 2. In determining the reasonableness of a rate, the Commission may consider its effect upon an existing rate structure which it has found to be just and reasonable. P. 479. 3. Comparisons with other rates in the same or adjacent territory, though not conclusive of the reasonableness of the rate under investigation, have probative value. P. 480. 4. An order of the Commission fixing minimum rates on ex-river coal from points on the Ohio River to destinations in Northern Ohio, upon a finding that the minima fixed are reasonable and that lower rates would create discrimination against shippers in origin districts who can not use the water-rail route, and would tend to disrupt the rate structure and destroy proper differentials between various producing districts, —heldessentially an order under § 15, rather than § 3, of the Interstate Commerce Act. P. 480.7 F. Supp. 33, affirmed.
APPEAL from a decree of the District Court, of three judges,
dismissing a suit to annul an order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
Mr. Frederick H. Wood, with whomMessrs. J.C. Argetsinger,J.E. Bennett, andAugust C. Gutheimwere on the brief, for appellants.Mr. Daniel W. Knowlton, with whomSolicitor General Reed,Assistant Attorney General Stephens, andMessrs. Elmer B.CollinsandNelson Thomaswere on thePage 477brief, for the United States and Interstate Commerce Commission, appellees.Mr. John J. Fitzpatrick, with whomMessrs. Leo P. Day, M.Carter Hall, Guernsey Orcutt, Charles R. Webber, andFredericD. McKenneywere on the brief, for the railroad interveners.Mr. Alex. M. Bull, with whomMr. Henry C. Hallwas on the brief, for the Trustees of Consolidation Coal Co., appellees.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit for the annulment of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission fixing minimum rates on ex-river coal from Ohio River points to destinations in Northern Ohio. The District Court entered a decree of dismissal.1The appellants attack the rate order as based upon matters the Commission had no authority to consider, and as unsupported by evidence. The appellees oppose these charges and add that the appellants have no standing to maintain the suit.

Improvement of navigation on the Ohio River and its tributaries has recently made possible shipment of coal in barges from mines at or near the streams to river destinations, for use there or for transshipment by rail to inland points. Previously these mines, with others in the same producing territory, were dependent upon the railroads, and a system of rate relationships had been built up as between the producing localities.

In anticipation of shipment of coal from river points, the rail carriers filed schedules proposing a proportional rate of $1.02 on carloads from Conway and Colona, points on the Ohio River in Pennsylvania, to Youngstown, Ohio,Page 478effective May 15, 1929. The Commission suspended them, and instituted an investigation. It found the proposed rate unreasonable, and declared a reasonable maximum would be 77 cents; but contented itself with ordering the scheduled rate of $1.02 cancelled, and did not require that a maximum rate of 77 cents be adopted.2Subsequently the Commission held an investigation respecting proposed schedules of rates on ex-river coal from points farther down the Ohio River to Canton, Massillon, Cleveland, Lorain and South Lorain, Ohio. It cancelled these and found lower rates would be reasonable, but did not prescribe them.3Upon the carriers' compliance with the views of the Commission, by the establishment of the suggested rates, tonnage began to move in quantity. Meantime the Ohio Public Utilities Commission permitted and authorized reductions in intrastate coal rates, with the result that the Interstate Commerce Commission instituted a 13th section proceeding, found the interstate rail rates from the Pittsburgh and Connellsville districts to Northeastern Ohio destinations reasonable, and required the restoration of the old intrastate rates to avoid discrimination against interstate commerce.4While that proceeding was pending, certain carriers prayed a rehearing of the two ex-river cases above mentioned. This was granted, the cases consolidated, further evidence received and an order made in which the rate from Colona and Conway to Youngstown was fixed at not less than 90 cents, that from the lower river points to Canton and Massillon at not less than $1.20, and to Cleveland and Lorain at not less than $1.45.5Page 479

The Commission finds: These prescribed minima are reasonable; lower rates would create undue discrimination against shippers in origin districts who cannot use the water-rail route, and would tend to disrupt the rate structure, and to destroy the proper differentials between various producing districts on shipments to Ohio destinations. These findings have ample support in the evidence.

1. The appellants were entitled to bring and maintain this suit to set aside the order.6They were parties to the proceeding before the Commission, had a pecuniary interest in the rates and were affected by the order. The authorities cited by the appellees are to be distinguished on the ground that the plaintiffs either had no legal interest or capacity to sue or failed to allege that the rates under attack were unreasonable or discriminated against them.7

2. The appellants' principal complaint is that the Commission raised the permissible minimum rate to prevent disruption of the existing rate structure and relationship of rates for carriage from various producing regions to Ohio destinations, and that an order grounded upon any such consideration is unauthorized and violates the principle announced inUnited Statesv.Chicago,M., St. P. P.R. Co.,294 U.S. 499. The position is not well taken. This record exhibits a situation quite distinct from thatPage 480disclosed in the cited case. In the first place the Commission here found the required minimum reasonable; in the second place, it had, after full investigation in this and the Ohio case,8held the existing rate structure — built upon certain reasonable key or controlling rates by application of proper differentials — just and reasonable, and the ex-river rates here in issue, in contrast, too low. Comparisons of other rates in the same or adjacent territory, while not a conclusive test of reasonableness of a rate under investigation, have probative value.9There was much other evidence bearing upon the character of the service and cost. The order of the Commission was based primarily upon the reasonableness of the minimum prescribed. The existing rate structure furnished support for the finding of reasonableness.

3. There is no merit in the contention that the order was a § 3 order and invalid for failure to afford the carriers an alternative of raising the contested rate or lowering others to remove discrimination. It is true the Commission found prejudice to shippers all rail, but in essence the order entered was a § 15 order and not one made under § 3.10Decree affirmed.
  1. Page 4777 F. Supp. 33. ↩
  2. Page 478 163 I.C.C. 3. ↩
  3. Page 478 185 I.C.C. 211. ↩
  4. Page 478 192 I.C.C. 413. This order was sustained,6 F. Supp. 386;292 U.S. 498. ↩
  5. Page 478 197 I.C.C. 617. ↩
  6. Page 479 U.S.C. Tit. 28, §§ 46, 47;Skinner Eddy Corp. v.UnitedStates,249 U.S. 557;Chicago Junction Case,264 U.S. 258,266-269;United Statesv.New River Co.,265 U.S. 533,541;Western Paper Makers' Chemical Co. v.United States,271 U.S. 268;Assigned Car Cases,274 U.S. 564;McLean Lumber Co. v.United States, 237 F. 460, 464-468;Anchor Coal Co. v.United States,25 F.2d 462,478. ↩
  7. Page 479 SeeUnited Statesv.M. M. Traffic Assn.,242 U.S. 178;Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trusteesv.United States,263 U.S. 143;Sprunt Son, Inc. v.United States,281 U.S. 249;Moffat Tunnel Leaguev.United States,289 U.S. 113. ↩
  8. Page 480Supra, Note 4. ↩
  9. Page 480United Statesv.Northern Pacific Ry. Co.,288 U.S. 490,500. ↩
  10. Page 480 CompareSt. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v.United States,245 U.S. 136,145. ↩